

# **EXTREMIST WOMEN BEHIND BARS IN INDONESIA**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

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Prison protocols in Indonesia have not kept pace with the growing number of women detained for terrorism offences. From 2004 until 2015, there were never more than two women arrested per year and several years where no women were arrested at all. In 2018 and 2019 alone, there were more than 30. While ad hoc arrangements for managing detained women extremists have worked reasonably well thus far, the burden has fallen disproportionately on prison case officers (*wali* or *pamong*) to experiment with different approaches to moderating the behaviour of their charges. Indonesian authorities need to recognise the vital role these women play by ensuring they are included in any discussions of changes to prison procedures; that they have access to assessment reports regarding the prisoner in their charge; that they are encouraged to share experiences with each other and with the broader counter-extremism community; and that there are opportunities for professional advancement and salary increases for those who succeed in helping extremist women disengage from violent networks.

Several factors account for the growing number of women extremists in prison:

- The rise of ISIS and propaganda directed specifically toward women
- The spread of encrypted messaging and chat groups on social media specifically for women
- The availability of role models of women combatants in ISIS operations
- The recognition on the part of extremist men that women were less likely to be suspected and therefore useful in jihad operations
- The changed perception of law enforcement officials from seeing women as victims to women as perpetrators
- Changes in the law that facilitated arrests for various supporting roles as well as direct involvement in violence

Understanding the backgrounds of women extremists is one aspect of developing good prison programs but equally, if not more important, is an effective system for monitoring prison dynamics: the interaction of extremist women with prison staff and fellow inmates and how this changes over time. Here the role of the *wali* is crucial, because the trust that develops between *wali* and inmate can be a more important determinant of behaviour than formal programs such as religious counselling. Other important factors are a controlled environment that keeps detained women away from extremist influence, careful selection of cellmates, and opportunities to communicate with non-extremist relatives, particularly parents.

The role of the *wali* will also be critical if and when Indonesian women begin returning from camps in Syria – indeed, the absence of any effective rehabilitation programs prepared in Indonesia for the hundreds of Indonesian women and children held there has been one (of many) factors making Indonesian officials reluctant to consider bringing them back.

In the end, the development of detailed rehabilitation programs may be less important than recruiting more women *wali*, particularly those with social work or psychology backgrounds, and creating a system of incentives that will reward initiative.

There are also many aspects of prison protocols that could benefit from closer attention to women's roles and needs, from risk assessment to healthcare provisions.

This report is based on analysis of data on all women incarcerated for terrorism activities between 2004 and 2020, as well as additional material on women who served as suicide bombers or played other roles in extremist organisations. The information was compiled from trial dossiers, NGO reports, online media and interviews with families, law enforcement officials,

lawyers and in some cases, the women themselves. The report also benefited from a confidential study conducted in September 2020 by the Indonesian Strategic Policy Institute (ISPI), based on interviews with prison staff, that was made available to IPAC.

## II. BACKGROUND: HOW WOMEN PRISONERS ARE PROCESSED

A total of 39 women have been convicted or are awaiting trial on terrorism charges since 2004 (see Appendix 1). Most were arrested since 2018, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Indonesia's Terrorist Arrests 2000-2020





Figure 2: Female Terrorist Arrests 2000-2020



As of September 2020, eleven were in women's prisons under the authority of the Corrections Directorate of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. Eleven others, including four convicted women and seven on trial, were being held in the women's block of the Jakarta Metropolitan Police detention centre. The others were mostly in other police facilities, such as detention cells at the South Jakarta district police command, while awaiting or on trial but will likely be moved to prisons following trial and sentencing. Eleven women extremists have been released, including two in 2020 and despite limited capacity for post-release monitoring, several are under the close watch of local police.<sup>1</sup>

### A. Detention Procedures and Placement

Indonesia has no guidelines specifically governing the detention of extremist women, though many provisions of its standard procedures for handling high-risk inmates apply equally to women and men.<sup>2</sup> These generic procedures, however, covering orientation, evaluation at different stages of detention, disciplinary measures, access to visitors, cell phone communications, medical care, and searches, among other things, do not necessarily help prison staff understand the women they are charged with rehabilitating or the need to see them as individuals.

Indonesian authorities are increasingly aware of the importance of careful placement of extremist prisoners because this can determine the success or failure of rehabilitation. Whether a prisoner, man or woman, constitutes a serious risk after release can depend in part on what happens in prison and what relationships are formed there. Many different factors are taken into consideration: level of radicalisation, proximity of family, presence of other extremist prisoners but also availability of cells and capacity of prison staff.

The usual procedure is for an initial risk assessment to be carried out while the prisoner is

<sup>1</sup> Tutin Sugiarti was released in June 2020 and Anggi Indah was released in August 2020.

<sup>2</sup> Regulation of Ministry of Law and Human Rights No. 35/2018 on Revitalisation of the Correctional System.

still in pre-trial detention. Risk assessments have a complicated and mostly unhappy history in Indonesia, as different agencies have tried different models and discarded them, often because they were too complicated for prison staff to use.<sup>3</sup> Current practice is for a dossier called *penelitian masyarakat* or *litmas* to be prepared by probation officers (*pembimbing kemasyarakatan*, PK) from the Correctional Centre (Balai Pemasyarakatan, BAPAS), a unit of the provincial office of Law and Human Rights. It is based on several different sources including police reports and detention centre observations. When the *litmas* is complete, the probation officers sit down with officials at the detention centre and intelligence officers from Detachment 88, Indonesia's counter-terrorism police, to produce an evaluation. There are no specific guidelines given to the PK officers compiling the *litmas* on particular elements to look for in women detainees.

If the suspect is then convicted, the Operations Department of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) under Deputy II will convene a placement meeting by a team consisting of the same parties involved in the risk assessment, together with the Corrections Directorate and prosecutors. This is known as the Prison Observation Team (*Tim Pengamat Pemasyarakatan*, TPP). The *litmas* dossier is one element of the discussion but participants will report their own observations, so the prosecutor, for example, will report on the individual's behaviour in the courtroom. Also included will be the results of a simple score card called Screening Instrument for Prisoner Placement (*Instrumen Screening Penempatan Narapidana*, ISPN) that aims to provide a baseline assessment of the prisoner's risk to society, stability and security but in fact may be too general to be useful.<sup>4</sup>

Taking all this information into consideration, the team will determine whether an inmate is low, medium or high risk and what the appropriate prison security level should be – minimum, medium, maximum or supermax. The team then makes recommendations for placement and programs for each inmate.<sup>5</sup> In December 2019, based on such a TPP, BNPT's Deputy II facilitated the transfer of nine women from Metropolitan Jakarta police headquarters to women's prisons in Semarang, Malang, Sungguminasa (South Sulawesi), Bandar Lampung, Palembang, Tangerang, Bandung and Jakarta.<sup>6</sup> All of the women's prisons are considered medium security; a 2018 regulation allows them to create special blocks for high-risk inmates but none have done so thus far, probably because none had more than two extremist inmates and most had just one. No women have been sent to supermax prisons to serve their sentences and indeed there are no supermax facilities at the moment designed to accommodate women.<sup>7</sup> The Corrections Directorate was said to be developing new guidelines for managing each level of prison (*Pedoman Kerja: Pengelolaan Lapas Maksimum, Medium and Minimum*), but thus far, there is no indication that there is any attention to the special needs of female inmates.

3 For a good history of how risk assessments have fared in Indonesia, see Cameron Sumpster, "Realising Violent Extremist Risk Assessments in Indonesia: Simplify and Collaborate", *Journal for Deradicalization*, Spring 2020, pp.97-120

4 This questionnaire was developed by the Centre for Detention Studies, a Jakarta-based NGO, and was adopted by the Corrections Directorate in 2019. Scores intended to be a measure of risk are calculated based on an interview with the prisoner concerned and a series of yes-no questions. Whether it proves to be useful, either for a preliminary assessment or for subsequent interviews throughout the prisoner's incarceration will depend wholly on the training and background information provided to prison staff. Prison staff were introduced to the ISPN throughout 2019 and 2020 and it is now widely in use, though its effectiveness will need careful evaluation. See "Keputusan Direktur Jenderal Pemasyarakatan Nomor PAS-58.OT.02.02 Tahun 2019 tentang Instrumen Screening Penempatan Narapidana (ISPN)", 23 December 2019.

5 Ministry of Law and Human Rights Regulation No. 35/2018 on the Revitalisation of the Corrections Service classifies prisons into the four categories and requires inmates to be classified, accordingly.

6 "BNPT Koordinasikan Pindahkan Napiter Wanita Dari Rutan PMI Ke Lapas Untuk Jalankan Program Deradikalisasi Lebih Mendalam", *damalahindonesiaku.com*, December 2019.

7 After the 2018 Mako Brimob riot, two women terrorist inmates, Anggi Indah Kusuma and Meilani Indira Dewi, were sent to Batu prison, one of super maximum-security prison in the penal complex of Nusakambangan. They stayed for less than a month then were moved back to Jakarta Metropolitan Police Command detention centre for trials that started in June 2019.

## B. Procedures in Prison

The risk assessment reports are supposed to be shared with the prison, but this appears to happen only sporadically. Medan Women's Prison was among the few prisons to receive risk assessment results and recommendations from Detachment 88. They showed one woman, convicted terrorist Ika Puspitasari alias Tasnima Salsabila, to be highly radicalised and therefore high risk and recommended that she be put in an isolated cell and monitored closely to prevent any negative outside influences.<sup>8</sup>

Prison authorities thus put her in a single cell but did not have the resources to follow up on other recommended procedures for handling high risk prisoners. Regulation No. 35/2018, for example, states that prisoners will receive two streams of services, personal and legal. The personal will focus on awareness of religion, state and nation, and law as well as intellectual development, psychological counselling, and rehabilitation.<sup>9</sup> No psychological counselling was taking place in Medan. A prison administrator acknowledged that the value of psychologists was not well understood anyway, hence it was not a priority even had one been available.<sup>10</sup>

Where women are placed in shared cells, other inmates are briefed before the extremist prisoner joins, and the cell is constantly monitored. Shared cells are common in overcrowded facilities, such as Lampung Women's Prison that as of September 2020 was more than 30 per cent over capacity. In the Metropolitan Jakarta Police Command's remand centre, the women occupy a separate block with one to two persons per cell, monitored by experienced policewomen.

A common complaint from prison administrators, for both men's and women's prisons, is that they are often inadequately briefed about new arrivals. They get a one-page sheet from the prosecutor with the bare outlines of the case, but nothing that would give them enough background to understand more about the individual they will be supervising and rehabilitating for the next several years.

Once in prison, the inmate will be given periodic ISPN assessments, but experienced prison staff found these checklists of limited value, many relying instead on a detailed profiling template that has been in use for the last several years, designed to record in detail the activities and attitudes of extremist prisoners. A *wali* at the women's prison in Lampung was one of those who said she was not using the ISPN.<sup>11</sup> Not only is the questionnaire itself very general, but the results are also not always shared as they should be with prison authorities and case officers. Other staff use simple indicators to determine level of radicalism, such as prisoners' responses of greetings from the officer, willingness to meet male guests or readiness to take part in prison activities.

Those who want early release may apply for remission after serving two-thirds of their sentence, but they are required to sign loyalty oaths to the Indonesian state and participate in the government's "deradicalization" programs, consisting of instruction in religion, nationalism and entrepreneurship.<sup>12</sup> Extremists see applying for remission as a betrayal, because it acknowledges the legitimacy of a non-Islamic legal system and because prisoners are expected to work

8 Ika Puspitasari alias Tasnima Salsabila was arrested as an extension of the 2016 case involving Dian Yuliana Novi. She was sentenced to four and a half years in prison. On 17 April 2018, she was transferred to the women's prison in Medan Prison from the detention centre at Brimob headquarters (Mako Brimob).

9 Regulation No. 35/2018 of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, *op cit*.

10 IPAC videocall interview with Medan Prison staff, 18 May 2020.

11 The template was developed in 2013 by the NGO Search for Common Ground working with the Corrections Directorate.

12 Government Regulation No. 77/2019 on Terrorism Prevention and Protection of Investigators, Prosecutors, Judges, and Correctional Officers.

together with law enforcement officials as “justice collaborators” – or in extremist eyes, cooperate with the enemy.<sup>13</sup> As of September 2020, only one of the extremist women, Nurhasanah in Lampung, had applied for remission.

### III. CLUSTERS OF WOMEN PRISONERS

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Understanding the backgrounds of these women, how and why they became involved in radical movements and the nature of their social circles is crucial to developing effective programs for rehabilitation and ultimately, prevention – including preventing the radicalization of their own children. IPAC began to address these questions with a 2017 study, “Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists.” It showed how far from being passive victims, many extremist women were actively seeking a more operational role in extremist organisations.<sup>14</sup> The 2018 Surabaya bombings involving women and children drove this point home forcefully and subsequent cases have reinforced it, though in many cases, officers still see women in supporting roles. As of mid-2020, BNPT officials were still denying that women could have or want any agency in violent extremism, suggesting that women were duped into joining terrorist networks by men because they are “loyal, faithful, and obedient.”<sup>15</sup> Such attitudes do not help in formulating effective programs to counter female radicalization.<sup>16</sup> Of the cases covered in this report, only one woman, Nurhasanah from Indramayu, acknowledged that she became involved in extremist activities.

All of the women now in prison were arrested for pro-ISIS activities, and there is a clear break from the women arrested before them.

#### A. *The Pre-ISIS Women*

Only four women were arrested on terrorism charges before the declaration of Islamic State in June 2014: Munfiatun, Putri Munawaroh, Deni Carmelita and Nurul Azmy Tibyani (see Appendix I). All were highly educated with undergraduate degrees from secular universities who had dreams of marrying mujahidin. They were all arrested primarily for failing to report their knowledge of terrorist activities to authorities or for hiding a fugitive.

Of the four, only Munfiatun was linked to Jemaah Islamiyyah (JI), the most prominent of the pre-ISIS organisations and one still active today.<sup>17</sup> (Munfiatun’s brother was arrested for JI activities in August 2020.) This was in part because JI deliberately kept women out of combatant roles, seeing them largely as mothers, teachers, fund-raisers and occasionally couriers.

It may well be that the small numbers of women detained prior to the emergence of ISIS was a disincentive to develop any special programs, especially as there was a strong feeling in the corrections directorate that all prisoners should be treated alike.<sup>18</sup> Also, prior to 2017, the general

13 See IPAC, “Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia”, Report No. 2, 2 September 2013.

14 IPAC, “Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists”, Report No.35, 31 January 2017.

15 “BNPT: Perempuan Banyak Dilibatkan Dalam Terorisme Karena Setia”, antaranews.com, 18 June 2020.

16 See Rachel Schmidt, “Duped: Why Gender Stereotypes are Leading to Inadequate Deradicalization and Disengagement Strategies”, TSAS: Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society, Working Paper No. 18-07, August 2018.

17 In Malaysia, Noralwizah Lee, the Malaysian wife of Hambali, was arrested under the Internal Security Act in 2003 for her role in managing JI’s finances. Hambali, from Cianjur, Indonesia, is the only Indonesian held by the U.S. in Guantanamo prison.

18 International Crisis Group, “Deradicalisation and Indonesian Prisons”, Asia Report No. 142, 19 November 2007.



approach to managing high risk prisoners was simply integrating them into the general prison population.<sup>19</sup> Of the four, however, Putri Munawaroh should have been recognised as high risk. She was seen as the widow of a martyr and someone who risked death to defend her husband from the police. Her trial was packed with supporters who shouted the *takbir* (Allahu Akbar) when she was sentenced. It became obligatory for the wives of extremists to visit her regularly in prison. She was married by proxy in prison to a hardline ideologue from Ambon, Ridwan Lestahulu. After they were both released, they moved to Ambon where in 2020, he was re-arrested for trying to send ammunition to Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT).

### B. *The ISIS Clusters*

The women arrested since 2014 have all been linked in one way or another to ISIS. They include clusters of MIT supporters, migrants and deportees. Many became radicalised through online connections; some made their first contact with an ISIS supporter through a religious study group (*pengajian*).

The Poso cluster consists of the women who have helped keep alive MIT, Indonesia's only pro-ISIS jungle-based insurgency, as combatants, suppliers and financial managers. It includes the country's first three female fighters, all wives of top leaders, who were trained to use guns as security forces closed in 2015-6. Jumiatusun, wife of the group's late founder Santoso, was arrested in July 2016, days after he was killed. Tini Susanti, wife of Santoso's successor, Ali Kalora, and Nurmi Usman alias Oma, wife of senior fighter Basri, were both arrested in September 2016.<sup>20</sup> Jumiatusun was released in 2018 and returned home to Bima, Sumbawa where she almost immediately remarried a fighter named Asrak. Asrak himself was arrested in May 2019 for JAD activities. On 29 July 2020, Ali Kalora's new wife, Ummu Syifa, was arrested in Poso; she had only been with MIT for 23 days.<sup>21</sup> The cluster also includes Ali Kalora's sister, Linda Ipa, arrested in 2019 for being the group's provisional and financial manager together with another woman, Wahyuningsih. In 2015, another woman, Rosmawati, was arrested with her husband for supplying the MIT camp.

The migrant worker cluster has been described at length in earlier reports and includes three women arrested between 2014 and 2017. It is important to note that no women migrant workers or ex-migrant workers have been arrested in Indonesia since 2017, though three Indonesian women in Singapore were arrested for pro-ISIS sympathies in August 2019. The absence of new arrests could reflect a drying up of travel to Syria, which is what attracted some migrant women to ISIS, and a decline in the number of Telegram chat groups, which is how some migrants encouraged each other to join.<sup>22</sup>

Another cluster of women detainees might best be described as women inspired by the Surabaya bombers. Many Indonesian women were inspired by accounts they read online about the women of Palestine, Iraq and Chechnya who became combatants, but the May 2018 Surabaya bombings involving whole families of suicide bombers also had a major impact. Some saw the mothers who had strapped explosive belts to their young children as exemplars of personal sacrifice, even if the women's own motives were different.<sup>23</sup>

19 Ministry of Law and Human Rights Decree No. MHH-07.OT.01.01/ 2017

20 "Mothers to Bombers", *op.cit.* p.13.

21 "Baru bergabung 23 hari, isteri Ali Kalora ditangkap polisi di Poso", *jawapos.com*, 19 August 2020.

22 See IPAC, "The Radicalisation of Indonesian Women Workers in Hong Kong", Report No. 39, 26 July 2017.

23 The Surabaya families believed the world was coming to an end and wanted to ensure access to heaven for themselves and their families after Judgment Day.



Those who may have seen the family bombers as role models came from different parts of Indonesia.<sup>24</sup> In July 2018, two women from Indramayu were arrested for planning or taking part in attacks on police stations with their husbands.<sup>25</sup> In March 2019 in Sibolga, North Sumatra, an extremist named Abu Hamzah drew three women, all of whom he married, into a deadly bombing plot. After he was arrested, the first wife, Marnita Sari, barricaded herself and her two-year-old child in her house and then detonated a bomb that killed them both and flattened the neighbourhood.<sup>26</sup> She had reportedly been radicalised since 2017. The two other women were arrested shortly afterwards. One, Rosliana from Tanjung Balai whom Abu Hamzah had married only so that she could take part in the operation, was eventually sentenced to six years in prison. She wanted to take part in a jihad operation to avenge the death of her first husband, Andri, who had been killed by Detachment 88. The third woman, Yuliati Sri Rahayuningrum from Klaten died in custody after drinking toilet cleaner during her interrogation process.<sup>27</sup>

Deportees remain an important cluster although only two deportee women have been convicted of terrorism. (See Appendix II for the case of Arti, a woman deportee linked to the Surabaya bombings.) The number who have become involved in violent extremism following their deportation is actually higher, because it includes women detained elsewhere, including Afghanistan; women who joined the Abu Sayyaf in Mindanao; and women who are providing other behind-the-scenes support services to extremist organisations.<sup>28</sup> Meilani Indira Dewi, a woman with a degree in banking who sold Muslim clothes online, was the first to be arrested after being deported from Turkey in November 2017. She had used the profits from her online business to purchase tickets to Turkey for herself and another couple, so she was charged on her return with terrorist financing.<sup>29</sup> Unlike people who got to Syria and saw first-hand what ISIS was like, the deportees were sent back with their illusions and ideological commitment still high. Some women looked for other ISIS theatres to join, once it became clear that Syria was not an option.

Many women now in prison on terrorism charges became attracted to extremist groups through social media. They include two young women who tried to go to the aid of rioting pro-ISIS inmates in May 2018 at what was then the main remand centre holding extremist suspects at the headquarters of the paramilitary police (Mako Brimob) just south of Jakarta. Dita Siska Millenia, then 18 and a teacher at an Islamic boarding school in Cilacap, Central Java, and Siska Nur Azizah, then 21, had become participants in pro-ISIS chat groups on WhatsApp and Telegram. The two women were arrested outside the prison with a pair of scissors, which they apparently were going to use as a weapon against police.<sup>30</sup> They were both sentenced to two years and eight months for supporting terrorist activities. Social media also played a major role in the

24 Betty Rinawati Brojo, Damayanti and Emil Lestari, were arrested for helping JAD members dismantle bombs in the aftermath of the Surabaya bombing. Trial dossier of Damayanti, West Jakarta District Court, 14 March 2019; verdict of West Jakarta District Court case of Betty Rinawati Brojo, Decision Number 2031/Pid.Sus/2018/PN.Jkt.Br, 21 March 2019.

25 Darcy alias Maryam was arrested on 14 July 2018 with her husband Ahmad Syafii of JAD Haergeulis for planning an attack in Cipancuh, Indramayu. The next day Ahmad's nephew, Galuh Rosita Charisma and his wife Nurhasanah tried to throw a pressure cooker bomb at the police. Police shot Galuh dead; Nurhasanah survived.

26 See IPAC, "The Ongoing Problem of Pro-ISIS Cells in Indonesia", Report No. 56, 29 April 2019.

27 "Terduga Teroris Klaten Bunuh Diri di Polda Metro Jaya", *tirto.id*, 20 March 2019.

28 Wartini, whose husband was killed in Syria, tried to join ISIS Khorasan and as of September 2020 was detained in Kabul. Ulfah Handayani Saleh was one of the suicide bombers of Jolo cathedral in January 2019. Her daughter, Rezki Fantasia alias Cici, was believed to be in Sulu as of September 2020 with her husband Andi Baso. All three women were deported from Turkey in early 2017.

29 Annisa Budyono, "Kebijakan Luar Negeri Indonesia dalam Menangani Pemulangan WNI yang Hendak atau Telah Bergabung dengan Islamic State Di Suriah Periode 2017-2018", Undergraduate Thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2019.

30 IPAC, "Indonesia and Tech Giants vs ISIS Supporters: Combating Violent Extremism Online", Report No. 48, 27 July 2018.

radicalisation of other women including Dian Yuliana Novi, Meilani Indira Dewi, Ika Puspita, and Fitri Diana, wife of Abu Rara, the man responsible for stabbing Coordinating Minister, Gen. (Ret.) Wiranto in October 2019.

#### IV. PRISON DYNAMICS

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The nature of prison dynamics can have a major impact on prospects for rehabilitation and reintegration of extremist women. Lessons learned across prisons suggest that trust-building between prison staff and inmates is particularly important, and it works two ways. Prison authorities need to understand as much about the background of the prisoner as possible but they also need to understand the concerns of their own staff, from issues of personal safety, especially if a prisoner is prone to utter threats or curses, to fear of being radicalised by too much interaction with someone deemed to be “terrorist” or “extremist”. One officer at the women’s prison in Medan, North Sumatera noted after attending a training program organised by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that what she needed was not information on best practices around the world but rather specific skills on how to communicate with extremist women.<sup>31</sup>

The *wali* (also called *pamong*) plays a particularly important role. She needs to develop a personal relationship with the prisoner and show empathy while maintaining her role as objective observer and government interlocutor. Communication skills are essential. At the same time, the *wali* needs to closely monitor and understand the development of her charge’s interaction with other inmates, particularly if the detainee is in a shared cell. Some of the extremist women are very aware of having hurt their parents, particularly their mothers, and this sometimes provides an opening for the *wali* to have a conversation or to encourage telephone calls back home, with all communications closely monitored. Depending on the orientation of the family, these calls can become an important part of rehabilitation.

Religious education does not seem to be as important as is sometimes assumed. The kindness shown by prison staff and interaction with parents (as long as they themselves are not extremist) are far more important in changing attitudes. Women extremist prisoners did not find the material provided by the Ministry of Religion of much value, nor did they have much interest in the occasional visits by religious teachers sent by the government.

In all cases, visits by BNPT were rare and not particularly productive. The day-to-day interactions with the *wali*, guards and fellow inmates were far more meaningful. Regular visits by individual Detachment 88 officers with knowledge of the prisoner in question as well as strong religious credentials could sometimes shift thinking as well, by forcing a prisoner to consider whether her desire for full application of Islamic law was unconditional or selective. In one case, a police officer used his knowledge of a prisoner’s failure to repay credit for a land purchase as an opening for a discussion about selective application of Islamic principles.

There are lessons to be learned from experienced prison staff working with male extremists in the Nusakambangan prison complex, and such sharing with the staff of women’s prisons is increasingly taking place, facilitated by donors. A *wali* from the women’s prison in Bandung, however, noted that after one of these sessions, the most useful part was the women prison staff talking afterwards and exchanging information among themselves.<sup>32</sup>

31 IPAC videocall interview with Medan Women’s Prison officer, 18 May 2020.

32 IPAC phonecall interview with Bandung Women’s Prison officer, 15 June 2020.

### A. Tangerang Women's Prison

Several well-known women extremists have served or are serving their sentences at Tangerang Women's Prison, outside Jakarta, a facility sometimes showcased as a model prison.<sup>33</sup> Its struggles to meet international standards, however, give some idea of what women in lesser resourced and more remote prisons face.

In mid-2020, Tangerang was 40 per cent over capacity, with 350 inmates in a facility built for 250.<sup>34</sup> About 95 per cent were drug offenders. The remainder included two money launderers, one human trafficker and one convicted terrorist. On paper, it had 98 correctional officers on staff, predominantly women, with 52 guards, but only eight were on duty at any one time.<sup>35</sup> The prison accommodates women's needs during child-rearing, providing health consultations, nutritious food, and a separate room for pregnant women and nursing mothers.<sup>36</sup>

Three of the first four convicted women terrorists – Putri Munawaroh, Deni Carmelita and Nurul Azmy Tibyani – were held there as was Jumiatus alias Umi Delima, wife of the late Poso leader, Santoso, who was released in November 2018 and Tutin Sugiarti, released in June 2020. The prison holds only one extremist woman as of August 2020, Meilani Indira Dewi.

Tutin Sugiarti's case has been described in IPAC reports and a more recent report by NGO Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP).<sup>37</sup> She was sentenced at age 37 to three and a half years in August 2017 for introducing a would-be woman suicide bomber, Dian Yuliana Novi, to a pro-ISIS network led by a well-known Indonesian figure in Syria, the late Bahrūn Naim.<sup>38</sup> Tutin was identified as highly radical and hard to manage. She was first placed in Semarang Women's Prison in late 2017 but got into a fight with some narcotics offenders and was moved to Tangerang in December 2018.<sup>39</sup>

Her behaviour did not substantially change after the transfer. She kept getting into trouble with prison staff and other inmates. Tutin avoided the daily chores in her block, ignored greetings, and was disrespectful toward officers. At one point she tried to choke another inmate.

The *wali* assigned to Tutin, however, turned out to be an old friend from Ciamis, West Java. Tutin considered her to be an enemy because she worked for a government that did not apply Islamic law. "We were friends back then but now your blood is halal for me," she said, meaning that she believed it was permissible under Islamic law to kill the *wali* as a *thaghut* – an idolatrous oppressor.<sup>40</sup> The *wali* persisted, engaging Tutin in conversations about how they were both Muslims, but she soon realised that Tutin could walk circles around her in terms of Qur'anic references, and she was going to have to find another approach.

The key proved to be appealing to Tutin's professional skill as a therapist in *bekam*, the traditional Islamic practice of cupping. The *wali* asked Tutin for a session, and while initially reluctant, Tutin finally agreed. Soon the threats stopped – at least toward the *wali* – and the relationship moved to a more friendly footing. Other staff remained frightened of Tutin, however. One

33 "Jadi Contoh Baik Bangkok Rules, lapas Wanita Tangerang dikunjungi Putri Thailand", kemenkumham.go.id, 10 April 2018.

34 The data is drawn from "Sistem Database Perasyarakatan (SDP)", accessible in <http://smslap.ditjenpas.go.id/>

35 Tri Lestari, "Model Pembinaan Terhadap Narapidana di Lembaga Perasyarakatan Perempuan Kelas IIA Tangerang", Undergraduate Thesis, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2019.

36 Habibah Triano, "Pemenuhan Hak Pengasuhan Bayi oleh Narapidana Perempuan di Lembaga Perasyarakatan Perempuan kelas IIA Tangerang", *PEKSOS: Jurnal Ilmiah Pekerjaan Sosial*, Vol. 19, No. 1, June 2020, pp. 99-112.

37 See YPP, "Perempuan, Terorisme, dan Kehidupannya di Penjara", 2019.

38 See IPAC, "The Failed Solo Suicide Bombing and Bahrūn Naim's Network", Report No. 30, 29 July 2016.

39 IPAC phonecall interview with Semarang Women's Prison officer, 8 June 2020.

40 Confidential ISPI report made available to IPAC, September 2020.

staff member found that Tutin was using cell phone in violation of regulations, searched her cell and found and confiscated the phone. Tutin was furious and threatened the woman constantly to the point where she did not want to ever have to face Tutin again. Other prison staff tried to arrange so the two women did not cross paths.

Another opening came when Tutin was hospitalised after having serious bleeding that her family said had happened before when she was experiencing acute stress. This time, thinking she would die, she wrote a will instructing that her body shall be given to her radical circle after she died. But she recovered and returned to prison. At that moment she realised that the prison, especially the *wali*, had taken good care of her. Her relationship with the prison staff improved somewhat, but she still held extreme views.

Two other factors helped Tutin pull back somewhat from the initial anger she exhibited. First, she was placed in a shared cell with ordinary inmates, one of whom had a strong religious background and could talk to Tutin on her own terms. The second was support from a relative who lived in Ciledug, close enough for regular visits, who brought her cash and *bekam* supplies so that she did not have to rely completely on members of her old network, though she maintained contact with them.

Tutin was released in June 2020. She refused to travel home in a police car, threatened to behead the policewoman who was going to accompany her and generally seemed to leave the prison as unreconstructed as she entered it. A few others besides the *wali* had managed to break down Tutin's barriers, however, including some police officers who could both point out her own inconsistencies in claiming to apply Islamic principles in daily life and help her out as needed, including financially. She returned to Ciamis, West Java where her mother was ill and opened up a kiosk under the supervision of the local Ciamis police command and Detachment 88. She remained in close contact via WhatsApp with the *wali*.

### B. Bandung Women's Prison

The women's prison in Bandung, capital of West Java and Indonesia's third largest city, has a bigger challenge than Tangerang with fewer staff for more prisoners. There are 88 correctional officers with only twelve *wali* and 37 guards, with many fewer on duty at any one time. In January 2020, the prison was more than 37 per cent over capacity, with 445 inmates in a facility for 325. With releases due to concerns about the spread of COVID-19 in prisons, that rate declined to 11 per cent.<sup>41</sup> Around 85 per cent were drug offenders, 10 per cent were corruptors, and the rest were convicted of trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism. As of September 2020, the two terrorist convicts were Dian Yuliana Novi and Emil Lestari, who arrived in early 2018 and December 2019 respectively.

Dian Yuliana Novi was Indonesia's first would-be female suicide bomber, a woman who planned to bomb the presidential palace in Jakarta in December 2016. Her story is by now well-known.<sup>42</sup> Originally from Cirebon, West Java, she was radicalised when working as a migrant worker in Taiwan. She returned to Indonesia, looked for a radical network to join and through various introductions became the second wife of an ISIS supporter. When police arrested her on 10 December 2016, she was two months pregnant. She gave birth to a son at Mako Brimob hospital in late 2017, just after she was sentenced to seven and a half years in prison. She was moved

41 The data is drawn from "Sistem Database Permasalahannya (SDP)", accessible at <http://smslap.ditjenpas.go.id/>

42 "Mothers to Bombers", *op.cit.* p.20; "Perempuan, Terorisme, dan Kehidupannya di Penjara", *op.cit.* p. 16.

to Bandung prison in 2018 and expected to stay there until her release in November 2021. Since the prison had no special cell for mother and infant, she was put in an ordinary cell where she spent most of the time with her child.

During her first year in Bandung, Dian, considered highly radical, had difficulties blending in with other inmates. Her *wali* saw her son as the entry point for gaining trust. She helped Dian take care of the child, bought baby necessities, and encouraged other inmates to support Dian. The two women became close. Dian also became friendly with one of her cellmates, a corruptor with a strong religious background with whom she could have long debates. The *wali* believed that Dian needed a mixture of hard and soft methods and gave herself credit for a perceived moderation in Dian's outlook:

I said, if you do not follow the prison regulation, do not ask me for help! It was me who took care of her child and facilitated a video call with her family. That's the trick. She is close to me and one other prison officer. She only trusts me. She always asks me for help.<sup>43</sup>

The *wali* also persuaded Dian to turn in a forbidden cell phone:

I told her, listen to me, better get out that phone. If something happens, don't look for me, because I told you it was forbidden and that this was your responsibility. I tried to shame her. The next day, she turned in the phone.<sup>44</sup>

Dian took part in a dialogue with BNPT, but she found it unhelpful because she said it just opened past wounds and offered no solution for the future. In the meantime, she joined prison vocational programs such as gardening and sewing (more gender stereotypes).

In September 2019, the baby turned two years old and according to prison rules, could no longer stay with his mother in prison. Dian initially planned to give him to her husband's first wife, a committed extremist, because she had cut off communications with her own family. Acknowledging the risk, the prison staff encouraged her to find alternatives and successfully persuaded her to turn the child over to her mother and sister. She was so distraught by the separation from her child that she actually considered taking the loyalty pledge to the Indonesia state – a huge step for extremists who consider the Indonesian state as the enemy – so that she could begin the process for conditional release in order to have more access to the boy.

The urge became stronger after she attended a counselling program with a group of psychologists from Islamic State University (UIN) Bandung held by BNPT. She realised that her son will be six years old by the time she is released. That means he will spend four years without knowing or having physical contact with his mother, and it could have negative implications for his development.<sup>45</sup>

It was clear to the *wali* that Dian on her own would have readily done anything to get early release and return to her mother and child. Dian's husband, however, detained in Tangerang Prison, maintains regular contact with his wife and every time she wavers, he tries to persuade her to stay firm and reject any cooperation with prison authorities.

43 Confidential ISPI report made available to IPAC, September 2020.

44 Ibid.

45 IPAC phonecall interview with Bandung Women's Prison Officer, 15 June 2020.



### C. Lampung Women's Prison

The only convicted woman terrorist convict thus far who agreed to declare loyalty to the Indonesian state is Nurhasanah alias Nana, from Indramayu, West Java.<sup>46</sup> She was sentenced to six years in prison for attacking the Indramayu police station in July 2018 with her husband, Galuh Rosita Charisma. Police shot and killed Galuh in the operation to arrest him.

A *wali* with a background in psychology, was assigned to Nurhasanah. When the prison staff conducted an assessment after she arrived, the *wali* evaluated her as low risk, because she was relatively open and cooperative and never showed any hostility to the prison staff. She said she had only followed her husband and did what he told her. She also had little education or religious training.

Because of limited facilities in Lampung Women's Prison and because she was considered low risk, Nurhasanah was put in a cell with about eight selected prisoners, all of them drug offenders. One had a strong religious background and was often referred to as prison ustadza (female preacher), who discussed and challenged Nurhasanah's religious views. Initially, Nurhasanah showed little inclination to interact with her fellow inmates, and they with her, but little by little, she relaxed. After the *wali* assured her that there were no male staff, she removed her veil, then her other conservative Muslim garments until she began dressing like the other prisoners.

The assessment that the prison staff conducted had produced the information that Nurhasanah had good sewing skills so they put her into the prison workplace, sewing COVID-19 masks – and for 17 August, she made red and white masks, the colour of the Indonesian flag, to sell to visitors. None of her own family comes to visit but she receives occasional visits from the local secretary of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) women's organisation, Muslimat who also happens to be on the local anti-terrorism board.<sup>47</sup> She has never been visited by anyone from BNPT, although she gets regular visits from officers of Detachment 88 stationed in Lampung.

The *wali* has facilitated videocalls to Nurhasanah's parents. They are taking care of her only child, now fatherless, and are eager for her to return to them when she is released. The family has no known radical tendencies. The *wali* also convinced Nurhasanah that she could seek remission (sentence reductions) without feeling as though she was betraying her friends in the extremist network. Remissions were not a reward for declaring loyalty to the Indonesian state, Leni told her, but rather her right as a prisoner. That said, after persuading her charge to apply for remission so that it would be granted by 17 August, it did not come through, apparently because of a bureaucratic glitch.

Nurhasanah won second prize in a Qur'an reading contest in the prison to celebrate Muslim New Year. The *wali* gave her some money as a prize out of her own pocket. "To keep her spirits up," she said. "So that she knows we're thinking about her."<sup>48</sup>

### D. Indonesia and the "Bangkok Rules"

Indonesia's Corrections Directorate tries to follow the 2010 "Bangkok Rules", U.N. guidelines for the treatment of all women prisoners. Derived from the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, they include that women be detained in separate facilities from men; that all female inmates be assisted by female officers; and there be extra care for pregnant wom-

46 IPAC phonecall interview with Lampung Women's Prison, 4 September 2020

47 "FKPT Lampung Beri Pencerahan Beragama untuk Napiter Nurhasanah", kupastuntas.co, 27 August 2020.

48 Confidential ISPI report made available to IPAC, September 2020.



en, lactating mothers, and mothers with infants.<sup>49</sup> Most of these guidelines are applicable without question to extremist women, and prison administrators actually prefer to treat all prisoners equally rather than single some out for what they see as discriminatory treatment.

Some of the Bangkok Rules, however, may need to be thought through more carefully. For example, Rule 4 states what is by now commonly accepted good practice, that all prisoners should be detained as far as possible “close to their homes or places of social reintegration, in order to facilitate communication with their families as well as agencies and services used to enhance their social rehabilitation.” Similarly, Rule 26 emphasised the access for contact with the outside world “shall be encouraged and facilitated by all reasonable means”. Where family members are committed extremists, however, this may not be such a good idea.

The onset of COVID-19 led to tighter restrictions on visits beginning in March 2020, but the possibility of videocalls makes physical proximity to home less critical than it was in the past, and placement of extremist women has generally been undertaken with care and foresight. In several of the cases described in this report, carefully supervised communication, especially with parents, was helpful in terms of moderating women’s views but contacts with radical spouses produced setbacks, as in Dian’s case. The proximity to family can be important for getting access to cash or food from relatives so that the women are less likely to be dependent on extremist charitable organisations for assistance.

Several of the Bangkok Rules relate to the needs of children detained with mothers. For example, “Decisions to allow children to stay with their mothers in prison shall be based on the best interests of the children (Rule 49); “The environment provided for such children’s upbringing shall be as close as possible to that of a child outside prison” (Rule 51) and “Decisions as to when a child is to be separated from its mother shall be based on individual assessments and the best interests of the child within the scope of relevant national laws” (Rule 52:1).” “The removal of a child from prison shall be undertaken with sensitivity, only when alternative care arrangements for the child have been identified” (Rule 52:2). “After children are separated from their mothers and placed with family or relatives or in other alternative care, women prisoners shall be given the maximum possible opportunity and facilities to meet with their children.” (Rule 52:3).

In Indonesia, children can stay with their mothers until age two. The mother has the right to determine who will then take care of the child, and prison officers are not supposed to intervene in or question her choice. In some cases, though, handing the baby over to radical families will increase the risk of child’s radicalisation and re-engagement of the mother after release. The solution may be not to find an alternative caretaker but to find a local NGO that will take an interest in the child, develop a relationship of trust with the mother, and find ways for including the child in activities beyond the extremist network.

Mental health needs are a particular concern for all women, particularly after separation from a child. The separation often entails distress, anxiety, and loneliness. Only a few prisons have psychological support programs. Prison officers generally have a lack of understanding about mental illness and often perceive it as demonic possession. In many cases, as in Anggi’s, below, they call in religious preachers for exorcism instead of seeking professional treatment.

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49 UNODC, “The Bangkok Rules: The United Nations Rules for the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-custodial Measures for Women Offenders”, March 2011.

### E. *The Case of Anggi Indah Kusuma*

The case of Anggi Indah Kusuma illustrates the need for better psychiatric care. She happens to be an extremist, but her case shows the shortcomings in the prison system more generally.

Anggi Indah Kusuma alias Khanza Syafiyah Al-Furqon had worked in Hongkong as a domestic helper. She was radicalised online and led an ISIS-linked online group with 86 members called “Redaksi Khilafah”. When Hong Kong authorities found the site in March 2017, they deported her to Indonesia. After three weeks of a so-called deradicalisation program at a rehabilitation centre run by the Ministry of Social Affairs, where behavioural problems were already apparent, she was sent back to her hometown in Klaten, Central Java.<sup>50</sup> Once she was beyond government supervision, she married Adilatul Rahman, an ISIS supporter whom she met online, and thus reengaged with extremism, this time in a more active role.<sup>51</sup> She volunteered to carry out a chemical bomb attack on the presidential palace, but all the perpetrators were caught in August 2017 before the plan had been fully formed.

Anggi was one month pregnant when she was arrested. In March 2018, she gave birth to a baby girl in the hospital at Mako Brimob, then the main remand centre for extremists awaiting trial.<sup>52</sup> In May 2018, she was one of the instigators behind the Mako Brimob riot.

After the riot, she and another woman, Melani Indira Dewi, were brought to Batu prison, one of the maximum-security facilities within the penal complex of Nusakambangan, an island off the south coast of Java. It was the first time that women extremists had ever been incarcerated there but she was there only for a few weeks.<sup>53</sup> In June 2018, she was moved back to the Metropolitan Jakarta police detention centre for the duration of her trial, and then after being convicted and sentenced to three years, she was moved to Pondok Bambu Prison, in east Jakarta, in late January 2020.

Anggi’s cellmate there, Betty Rinawati, imprisoned for a supporting role in the Surabaya bombings, said in a February 2020 interview that Anggi had been strange since they first met as cellmates at Mako Brimob. She had poor hygiene and did not take a bath or brush her teeth for more than a month. She would scream, fly into a tantrum, even attempt violence. She tried to choke a female Special Detachment 88 officer for carrying her baby. On one occasion, she bit finger of an inmate who was trying to calm her down. The prison staff brought in an Islamic exorcist instead of a psychologist to treat her. A psychologist at Pondok Bambu, however, later diagnosed her with schizophrenic symptoms and prescribed medication.

Several factors, including a traumatic childhood, could have contributed to Anggi’s problems. A psychologist suggested that the trigger possibly occurred during the initial police interrogation when Anggi saw and heard a police officer threatening Adilatur, her husband, that they would rape Anggi in front of him if he did not confess.<sup>54</sup> The psychologist said Anggi began to deteriorate afterwards. Concerned prison authorities tried to get an accurate diagnosis of Anggi’s condition but her psychiatric problems do not appear to have been taken into consideration in her sentencing or detention. She was released on 18 August 2020 while still under medication.

50 IPAC, “Managing Indonesia’s Pro-ISIS Deportees”, Report No. 47, 17 July 2018

51 See IPAC, “Extremists in Bandung: Darul Islam to ISIS – And Back Again?”, Report No. 42, 12 February 2018; The Supreme Court Verdict of Anggi Indah Kusuma alias Khanza Syafiyah Al Furqon, No. 259/Pid.Sus/2018/PT.DKI, 4 September 2018.

52 “Bayi di Rutan Mako Brimob Adalah Anak dari Anggi Anggota ISIS”, kumparan.com, 10 May 2018.

53 “Dua Napi Terorisme Perempuan dan Bayinya Ikut Dipindah ke Nusakambangan”, regional.kompas.com, 12 May 2018.

54 IPAC videocall interview with psychologist of Pondok Bambu Women’s Prison, 19 August 2020.

Anggi's case suggests that more needs to be done to assess mental health needs in prisons and take signs of mental illness as requiring serious professional treatment.

## V. CONCLUSIONS

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Despite the sharp rise in the number of detainees and the lack of attention to women in many existing prison protocols, Indonesian prisons have done a reasonably good job in managing extremist women on an ad hoc basis. The eleven women under the authority of the Corrections Directorate rather than the police were carefully placed, with attention paid to the background and experience of the *wali* assigned to their case. The *wali* in turn tried to understand the backgrounds of new inmates – more systematic provision of information from the initial *litmas* assessment would help. Cooperation and communication between Detachment 88 and the *wali* have proved to be key factors in preparing for an inmate's release.

The number of experienced *wali* is limited, however, and the number of extremist women detained is likely to rise. It is therefore essential that the Corrections Directorate formalise a job description for the *wali* (in both men's and women's prisons) and ensure that good performances result in promotions and higher salaries. This should also help recruitment of more professional personnel.

There is a high degree of willingness on the part of the administrators of women's prisons to accept new prison protocols – the difficulty is finding people who can help develop them. There is a limit to the usefulness of looking at models from other countries, however effective they may have been. Prison staff need guidelines that directly address local dynamics in Indonesia, and it is the *wali* who have the most directly useful experience. Their observations on selection of cell-mates, current risk assessment procedures, obstacles to monitoring, and isolation versus shared cells should be systematically mined to produce the protocols that the prison system needs.

Innovative programs that enhance prisoners' skills are always useful, but these should not be based on outmoded stereotypes. It is striking how much the attitude of the most hardcore prisoner of all, Tutin, changed when the *wali* appealed to her professional skill as a traditional *bekam* therapist. That recognition of status proved key to opening communications, and it is a lesson that perhaps can be applied more broadly.

The conversation about how to manage extremist women inmates needs to take place across agencies, involving not only officials at women's prisons but also the women in charge of detainees at the Jakarta Metropolitan Police Command.

Finally, all this must be done while also keeping general women's prison problems in mind: overcrowding, systematic corruption, poor access to healthcare, including mental healthcare, and the trauma of separation from young children.

## APPENDIX 1

## LIST OF WOMEN EXTREMIST PRISONERS IN ORDER OF ARREST DATE

NO.	NAME	DATE OF ARREST	SENTENCE (MONTHS)	PLACEMENT	STATUS
1.	Munfiatun Al Fitri alias Fitri	Sep 2004	36	Malang, East Java	Released
<p>Munfiatun al Fitri, born in 1976, received a degree in agriculture from Brawijaya University in East Java. She had been a university classmate of a woman who married into the network of Malaysian terrorist Noordin Top. She told her friend that she too wanted to marry a mujahid. The word got back to Noordin and in June 2004, while Noordin was still on the run, she became his second wife. She was arrested in 2004 just after Noordin's operatives bombed the Australian embassy in Jakarta. She was released from Malang Women's Prison in 2007 and showed no inclination to return to terrorism. She also divorced Noordin shortly after her release.</p>					
2.	Putri Munawaroh	17-Sep-2009	36	Tangerang, Banten	Released
<p>Putri Munawaroh, then 21, was arrested in 2009 at the house near Solo where police killed Noordin after the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings. Putri's then husband, Hadi Susilo, who helped hide Noordin, was killed in the same operation; Putri was wounded. She was pregnant when arrested and gave birth in December 2009. In 2010 she was remarried by proxy (and by videocall) to Ridwan Lestahulu, an extremist from Ambon, then serving his sentence in Porong Prison, Surabaya. She was released in 2012, Ridwan in 2014. They moved back to Ambon and in 2020, he was re-arrested for trying to send ammunition to Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT).</p>					
3.	Deni Carmelita	27-Apr-2011	24	Tangerang, Banten	Released
<p>Deni Carmelita, born 20 September 1979, was a civil servant in the National Narcotics Agency (BNN). She was arrested in April 2011 as a minor player in a plot led by her husband, Pepi Fernando, to send book bombs around Jakarta. Pepi was linked to an obscure faction of Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII). Deni was released in 2013 after a short sentence and never returned to extremism. Pepi remains in prison and is said to have moderated his views.</p>					
4.	Nurul Azmy Tibyani	17-Mar-2012	48	Tangerang, Banten	Released
<p>Nurul Azmy Tibyani, born 26 October 1980 in Surabaya, was arrested in 2012 for helping her husband transfer money from a credit card hacking scheme used to fund training in Poso. She had been looking for a more active role in an extremist movement since college and saw marriage as the way to achieve that goal. She first made an online marriage via videocall to a man who identified himself as a Bangladeshi fighter but whom she never met in person. She then divorced him and married the hacker, an old university classmate, Cahya Fitriani. Her husband was released in 2018.</p>					
5.	Rosmawati alias Umi Yazid	11-Jan-2015	36	Sungguminasa, South Sulawesi	Released
<p>Rosmawati, from Soppeng, South Sulawesi, was arrested in 2015 with her husband for supplying MIT in Poso; she was released in 2017, her husband in 2019.</p>					

6.	Jumiatus alias Umi Delima	23-Jul-2016	27	Tangerang, Banten	Released
<p>Jumiatus alias Umi Delima, born 23 October 1964 in Bima, NTT, was the second wife of the late Santoso, leader of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). She was arrested in July 2016, shortly after her husband was killed. She was one of the first three women combatants in Poso. After her release in 2018, she returned to Bima, where she immediately married an extremist named Asrak, who was arrested in 2019.</p>					
7.	Nurmi Usman alias Oma	14-Sep-2016	36	Palu, Central Sulawesi	Released
<p>Nurmi Usman, from Bima NTT, is the wife of Basri, a legendary fighter who fought for JI in Poso, was arrested, escaped to join MIT, and was recaptured in 2016. She was one of three female combatants in Poso before she was arrested in 2016. She was released in 2019.</p>					
8.	Agustiniingsih alias Nining	29-Sep-2016	60	Malang, East Java	Convicted
<p>Agustiniingsih was arrested in 2016 for providing a safe house in Jakarta for women intending to leave for Syria via Jakarta international airport. She will be released in 2021.</p>					
9.	Tini Susanti Kaduku alias Ummu Fadhel	11-Oct-2016	36	Malang, East Java	Released
<p>Tini Susanti, wife of current MIT head Ali Kalora, a Poso native-born in 1985, was released exactly two years after being arrested. She was MIT's third female combatant together with Jumiatus and Nurmi Usman.</p>					
10.	Dian Yuliana Novi	10-Dec-2016	90	Bandung, West Java	Convicted
<p>Dian Yuliana Novi was Indonesia's first would-be female suicide bomber. She became radicalised online when working as a migrant worker in Taiwan but also came to believe that conducting a suicide operation would guarantee her ill father access to heaven. After her return to Indonesia, she sought contacts among extremists and eventually was introduced to and became the second wife of Nur Solihin, an ISIS supporter from Bahrin Naim's network. The marriage was part of her strategy to legitimate her actions because she understood from an IS fatwa that women need permission from their husbands to conduct any operation outside the home.</p>					
11.	Ika Puspita Sari alias Tasnima Salsabila	15-Dec-2016	54	Medan, North Sumatera	Convicted
<p>Ika Puspita Sari alias Tasnima Salsabila, born in Purworejo, Central Java 22 July 1981, was arrested as an extension of the 2016 case involving Dian Yuliana Novi. Ika was a prospective suicide bomber for a new Bali bombing plot that never went beyond the discussion stage. She was sentenced to four and a half years in prison.</p>					
12.	Tutin Sugiarti alias Ummu Absa	15-Dec-2016	42	Tangerang, Banten	Released
<p>Tutin Sugiarti alias Ummu Absa, born 25 September 1979 in Ciamis, West Java, was an Islamic healer and <i>bekam</i> therapist, who was arrested for facilitating the introduction of Dian Yuliana Novi to pro-ISIS cell leaders and for setting up a pro-ISIS charity called Dapur Umahat Aseer (Kitchen of the Prisoners' Wives). She was released in June 2020.</p>					

13.	Anggi Indah Kusuma alias Khanza Syafiah al Furqon	14-Aug-2017	36	Pondok Bambu, Jakarta	Released
See above Section IVe for full case study.					
14.	Meilani Indra Dewi	6-Nov-2017	42	Tangerang, Banten	Convicted
Meilani Indra Dewi, a woman with a degree in banking who sold Muslim clothes online, was the first woman to be arrested after being deported from Turkey in November 2017. She had used the profits from her online business to purchase tickets to Turkey for herself and another couple, so she was charged on her return with terrorist financing.					
15.	Dita Siska Millenia	12-May-2018	32	Palembang, South Sumatra	Convicted
Dita Siska Milenia, born 25 January 2000 in Temanggung, Central Java, worked as a teacher at Daarul Ulum pesantren in Cilacap, Central Java. She was arrested with Siska Nur Azizah, below, for trying to support the May 2018 uprising at Mako Brimob prison.					
16.	Siska Nur Azizah	12-May-2018	32	Malang, East Java	Convicted
Siska Nur Azizah, born 31 December 1996 in Ciamis, West Java, was a student at the Indonesian Education University (Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, UPI), in Bandung, West Java. She joined Darul Islam (DI/NII) in 2016 but quit and declared loyalty to ISIS and Abu Bakar Al-Baghdadi in October 2017. She met Dita Siska Millenia in a WhatsApp chat group and joined her to come to the aid of inmates during the 2018 Mako Brimob riot.					
17.	Betty Rinawati Brojo	14-May-2018	36	Pondok Bambu, Jakarta	Convicted
Betty Rinawati Brojo, born 2 May 1980 in Cirebon, West Java, moved to Sidoarjo, East Java and opened a Muslim-clothing kiosk with fellow prisoner Damayanti in 2016. She and Damayanti became involved in JAD-led pengajian led by the late Ilham Fauzan, husband of Emil Lestari (see below). The two women, together with Damayanti's husband, helped dismantle left-over bombs from the May 2018 Surabaya bombings. Betty was sentenced to three years in October 2019.					
18.	Damayanti	14-May-2018	40	Semarang, Central Java	Convicted
Damayanti, born 14 May 1984 in Nganjuk, East Java, moved to Surabaya after high school. She married Agus Satrio Widodo in February 2018. She and Agus were arrested with Betty, above, after helping dismantle leftover bombs.					
19.	Emil Lestari alias Umu Azka	15-May-2018	42	Bandung, West Java	Convicted
Emil Lestari alias Ummu Azka, born 1979 in Garut, East Java, was the wife of Ilham Fauzan, a senior JAD East Java leader killed by police in an operation following the May 2018 Surabaya bombings. She was arrested for having carried bags containing unused bombs to Damayanti's house. She received three and a half years' imprisonment.					
20.	Darci alias Maryam	15-Jul-2018	48	Sungguminasa, South Sulawesi	Convicted
Darci alias Maryam is the second wife of JAD leader Ahmad Syafii, from Haeurgeulis, West Java. They planned to detonate a car bomb during a ceremony at Indramayu police station on Indonesia's independence day, 17 August 2018. She was hospitalized for a month due to COVID-19 in June 2020, but as of August had returned to her cell in Sungguminasa Women's Prison, South Sulawesi.					



21.	Nurhasanah	15-Jul-2018	72	Lampung	Convicted
<p>Nurhasanah alias Nana, born 28 April 1992, was involved in a bomb attack at Indramayu district police command with her husband, Galuh Rosita Charisma, on 15 July 2018. Police shot them eleven times, fatally wounding Galuh. The incident took place one day after the police arrested Galuh's uncle, Mukad, of JAD Haeurgeulis, West Java. Nurhasanah was sentenced to six years on 29 May 2019.</p>					
22.	Arti Alifah Aviandari Rahardjo	20-Nov-2018	24	Polda, Jakarta	Convicted
<p>Arti Alifah Aviandari Rahardjo, born in Jakarta, 16 September 1996, holds a bachelor's degree in Arabic literature from the University of Indonesia. Arti's father was a commissioner of state-owned telecommunication enterprise, Telkom Indonesia and the family was well off. She was arrested in Turkey in 2018 with her husband, Uzair Cholid Besmelleh, and deported. See Appendix II for more details.</p>					
23.	Wahyuningsih	4-Jan-2019	24	South Jakarta Police Command	Convicted
<p>Wahyuningsih alias Ayu, born on 15 May 1994 in Bima, NTT, came from a non-radical background. In early September 2018, she flew from Bima to Makassar for a job in a restaurant owned by her relative. In mid-September 2018, high-school friend Busron alias Qatar, a member of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), asked her to marry him as his second wife. Ayu agreed and left her relative's house to Poso disguised as a refugee of the Palu earthquake.</p>					
24.	Linda Ipa alias Ummu Qonita	11-Jan-2019	36	Polda, Jakarta	Convicted
<p>Linda Ipa alias Linda alias Ummu Qonita, born 13 March 1988 in Bima, NTT, is the younger sister of Ishak Ipa alias Ali Kalora, head of MIT. She was arrested for supplying food and logistics to MIT and helping Wahyuningsih, above, the wife of an MIT member, when she arrived in Poso from Bima in 2018. She was sentenced to three years in prison on 11 December 2019.</p>					
25.	Roslina alias Summayyah	13-Mar-2019	72	Polda, Jakarta	Convicted
<p>Roslina, was involved in the 2019 Sibolga bombing and became the second wife of the mastermind, Abu Hamzah as she sought to avenge the death of her first husband, killed by police in October 2018. She also supplied some bomb materials. She was sentenced to six years in prison on 29 January 2020.</p>					
26.	Sutiyah alias Mutia	23-Sep-2019	-	Polda, Jakarta	Detained
<p>Sutiyah alias Mutia, born in Cilacap, 25 February 2000, became radicalised online in 2017. She met Abu Rara, the man who stabbed Security Coordinating Minister Wiranto in October 2019, in a Whatsapp group. Abu Rara advised her to go to the Tahfiz Al Ahlam pesantren of Abu Aswar in Kediri, East Java. She studied there for two months and swore allegiance to ISIS on the first day she arrived on 21 November 2018. She met her first husband, Muhammad Arsyad, but they soon divorced when she found he was HIV+. Sutiyah then married Asep Roni alias Ibnu Rosyid who was skilled in making bombs. The couple hoped to join Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in Poso. They were both arrested in September 2019 together with Fazri Pahlawan alias Abu Zee.</p>					

27.	Nesti Ode Samili	26-Sep-2019	-	South Jakarta Police Command	Detained
<p>Nesti Ode Samili, born 14 July 1996 in South Sulawesi, was a policewoman in the criminal unit of North Maluku Police Command, based in Ternate. She was drawn into a radical network by her junior, Rini Ilyas. She went joined online religious study groups on Telegram and WhatsApp managed by Abu Zee, where she met Galang Jiwa Pradana, later to become her husband. Police, who had been monitoring her activities, arrested her at Juanda airport, Surabaya for dereliction of duty and sent her back to Ternate. She was given 21 days in detention as a disciplinary punishment. After release, she married Galang in July 2018 then moved to Yogyakarta in the hope of getting more directly involved in pro-ISIS activities together with her former colleague, Rini. She was arrested on 25 September 2019 and was on trial as of September 2020. For more details, see appendix II.</p>					
28.	Fitri Diana alias Fitri Adriana	10-Oct-2019	108	Polda, Jakarta	Convicted
<p>Fitri Diana alias Adriana, born 5 May 1998 in Brebes, Central Java, went to work as a housemaid in Tangerang, Banten after elementary school. She began reading extremist articles and joined a chat group where in May 2019, she met her husband, Syahrial Alamsyah alias Abu Rara. They got married with the help of another extremist, Fahrial Pahlawan alias Abu Zee, in July 2019 and lived in Pandeglang, Banten. When Abu Zee was arrested in September 2019, Abu Rara knew he would likely be caught and decided to undertake an operation. He heard that an important guest would visit a nearby school and asked his wife and daughter to help him in an attack. The visitor was Coordinating Minister Wiranto. Fitri stabbed the head of the subdistrict police command but did not seriously wound him. She was sentenced to nine years in prison.</p>					
29	RAL (daughter of Abu Rara)	10-Oct-2019	-	Handayani Centre	
<p>RAL, born in 2005, is the daughter of Abu Rara from his first marriage but lived with her father and stepmother, Fitri Diana. Following the attack on Wiranto, in which she tried to stab a guard, RAL was sent to a deradicalisation program at the Handayani rehabilitation centre, a kind of halfway house for juvenile offenders, managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs, instead of juvenile prison. She is one of eighteen minors and the only female among them to be involved in terrorism as of mid-2020.</p>					
30.	Rini Ilyas alias Asiyah	10-Oct-19	-	South Jakarta Police Command	Detained
<p>Rini Ilyas, born in 1998 in North Maluku, was a colleague of Nesti Ode Samili, above, in the criminal unit of North Maluku Police Command. In May 2019, she left the police and moved to Yogyakarta. She was on trial as of September 2020. For more details, see appendix II.</p>					
31.	Marifah Hasanah alias Ummu Iffah	15-Oct-19	-	Polda, Jakarta	Detained
<p>Marifah Hasanah, born in 1975 in Pringsewu, Lampung, is the second wife of a pro-ISIS extremist named Amirudin, linked to Abu Zee and Abu Rara. She and her husband were both arrested; she was on trial as of September 2020.</p>					

32.	Novita Aditia alias Maryam alias Ummu Musa	16-Oct-2019	-	Polda, Jakarta	Detained
Novita alias Maryam, born in 1994 in Brebes, Central Java, is the wife of Abdul Aziz, another extremist linked to Abu Zee and Abu Rara. They were married when Novi was studying at a pesantren in Kediri, East Java. They moved to Aziz's hometown in Sragen, East Java. Both were arrested; Novita was on trial as of September 2020.					
33.	Har mawati alias Ummu Faruq	19-Oct-2019	-	Polda, Jakarta	Detained
Har mawati, born in Sampang, Madura in 1978, was arrested in Tasikmadu, Karanganyar, Central Java on 16 October 2019 for connections with Abu Rara and Fitri Adriana. She was on trial as of September 2020.					
34.	Sariatik alias Ummu Salsabila	12-Nov-2019	-	Polda, Jakarta	Detained
Sariatik alias Ummu Salsabila was arrested on 9 November 2019 with nine male colleagues in Kampar, Riau for pro-ISIS activities. Her role and involvement in the network are still under investigation. Her trial began on 5 August 2020.					
35.	Dewi Anggraini	14-Nov-2019	-	Polda, Jakarta	Detained
Dewi Anggraini, born in 1996, was the wife of Rabbial Muslim Nasution, the suicide bomber at the Medan police command in November 2019. She is considered highly radical. She visited Ika Puspitasari Salsabila, in Medan women's prison shortly before the bomb attack, leading to speculation that the two reinforced each other's extremist tendencies.					
36.	Nur Fazillah alias Umu Dila	15-Nov-2019	-	Polda, Jakarta	Detained
Nur Fazillah alias Umu Dila, born in Jakarta on 21 November 1981, is ethnically Acehese and grew up in Pidie Jaya, Aceh. She helped recruits from Java, Medan, and Jambi join pro-ISIS military training camps in North Aceh in 2018. She was also accused of hiding a fugitive from Medan and providing shelter for families of extremists taking part in the training camps. For more details, see appendix II.					
37.	"Ita"	23-Apr-2020	-		Detained
"Ita," born in 1985 from Lumajang, East Javawas arrested when police were trying to track down another terrorist suspect, Abdullah, at his delivery business in Surabaya. He was believed to be in illegal possession of ammunition. The police were still investigating her case as of September 2020.					
38.	Istiana alias Ammah	24-Jun-2020	-		Detained
Istiana alias Ammah, born in Semarang, 2 May 1973, is linked to the attack on the Deputy Chief of Karanganyar Police Command in June 2020. She is known to be very radical. Her case was still under investigation as of September 2020.					
39.	L alias Ummu Syifa	29-Jul-2020			Detained
L alias Ummu Syifa, born in 1992, was reportedly the new wife of Ali Kalora, leader of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). She had just been with MIT for 23 days when arrested on 29 July 2020 for withholding information about MIT. Her case was still under investigation as of September 2020.					

## APPENDIX II: THREE CASE STUDIES OF WOMEN IN POLICE CUSTODY

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The following cases provide insights into the process of how women become radicalised. As of September 2020, the women described in these cases were all in police custody, but it was likely that they would eventually be moved to women's prisons.

### A. *The Case of Arti Alifah Aviandari Rahardjo*

Arti Alifah Rahardjo, born in 1996 in Jakarta, is a particularly interesting case because her story shows how quickly small women-led religious study sessions can feed into a much larger and more lethal pro-ISIS network.

Arti's father, Rahardjo Tjakraningrat, was a commissioner of Telkom Indonesia, the national telecommunications company. The well-to-do family lived in a large house in Pejaten, Jakarta and owned a villa in Pasir Muncang Gadog, Bogor. Arti's mother, Sobah had started wearing a headscarf after attending a lecture by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir – not clear when – and had gradually become more radical, bringing her whole family along with her.<sup>1</sup> At some point, not later than 2016, Sobah began hosting pro-ISIS study sessions in her home, featuring a woman preacher named Nikmah from the Jakarta suburb of Depok.

Nikmah linked Arti's family to two other networks: the family of Cholid Abubakar, the man who led religious study sessions for the the men, women and children who carried out suicide attacks in Surabaya in May 2018 and the family of a convicted terrorist named Nibras. The links went through the women.

In December 2016, Nikmah's niece, Fitria, married Nibras who had just been released from prison. He had been convicted of terrorism for his role in a bank robbery in Medan in 2010 and After his release, he returned to his home in Bangil, Pasuruan where he became the amir of JAD for the Bangil area.<sup>2</sup> Fitria was already part of a radical network there that involved her extended family. Her brother-in-law Arif Fathoni, was active in ISIS activities. Fitria had attended a well-known Islamic boarding school for girls run and had classmates who were married to men in the pro-ISIS network.<sup>3</sup>

In January 2017, Fitria brought her new husband to Jakarta to meet her aunt, Ustadza Nikmah. The day after they arrived at her aunt's house, Nikmah arranged a meeting with Sobah, Arti's mother, who drove to Depok to pick them up and take them to the family villa in Bogor. This was the first time that Fitria met Sobah and Arti.

Shortly after Nibras and Fitria returned to Pasuruan from this visit, they had to deal with a matchmaking crisis. They were living with Nibras's parents. Through the ISIS network, Nibras's younger sister, Iliyah, had come to be considered a possible spouse for Uzair Cholid, son of a respected pro-ISIS preacher who had gone with his family to Turkey in 2016 with the intention of joining ISIS, only to be deported in January 2017. The preacher was Cholid Abubakar and his followers included several of the Surabaya bombers. In March 2017, Uzair and his parents came to meet Iliyah in a ceremony known as *ta'ruf* (getting to know one another). Iliyah did not like what she saw, however, and the family declined the marriage.

1 It is not clear when this took place. Ba'asyir was re-arrested in 2010, so he would not have been able to give any in-person lectures after that. Sobah may have had access to a taped lecture which was then played at a *pengajian*.

2 Verdict of the West Jakarta District Court case of Oko Kahana, Decision Number 545/Pid.Sus/2019/PN.Jkt.Br, 4 July 2019.

3 Ibid. One of them was the wife of Oko Kahana; another was Dina, wife of Ahmad Abdul Robbani, the so-called "bicycle bomber".

Nibras then contacted Sobah and sent her a photo of Uzair, saying that he was looking for a wife, hinting at Arti. Sobah's main concern was that her daughter married someone who was committed to ISIS but she also told Nibras she wanted someone who looked like Valentino Rossi, the Italian motorcycle champion.<sup>4</sup> Uzair got a photo of Arti from his sister, Laila. Sobah agreed to a meeting. Then Nibras and Fitria accompanied Uzair to Jakarta to meet Arti for the first time on 21 April 2017. The meeting was a success and they were married on the spot. A reception was later held on 21 May 2017 at the Kartika Candra Hotel, although the marriage was never registered with the religious affairs office. The marriage was a coming together of three networks. Arti's family had wealth. Uzair's family had religious credentials. Nibras's family had fighters. And through in-laws and classmates, especially from the girls' school that Fitria had attended, each had contacts that extended the reach.<sup>5</sup>

After the marriage of Arti and Uzair, the extended family decided to leave for Syria. This had always been their plan. Driven by Sobah, they planned to sell the house in Pejaten, use the money to buy an apartment in Istanbul, and stay there until they could all cross over safely. To hide their true destination, they would use a travel agency to buy tickets for a holiday that would involve a trip to Rome, Cappadocia and Paris. On 8 November 2018, Arti and Uzair; Arti's parents and grandmother; and Arti's brother Syahdi left for Rome on Qatar airlines. They visited the Colosseum and a few other sites, then went on to Turkey where they made down payments on two apartments. The plan then was for Arti's father and brother to stay in Syria. Arti and Uzair would return to Indonesia on 23 November to take care of loose ends, then return to Turkey; and Sobah and Arti's grandmother would return a few days later. But as they were leaving Turkey, Uzair's past deportation came to light, and he and Arti were detained. On 30 November 2018, they were deported back to Indonesia, and both were later tried and convicted of terrorism.

Several of the women in this network were never detained despite their ISIS links. Fitria, Sobah and Nikmah do not appear to have been questioned as witnesses, and the wives of several other men arrested who were part of the extended ISIS network -- Arif Fathoni, Oko Kahana, Ahmad Abdullah Robanni to name three -- were never investigated. It was clear, however, that the women were the ones who held this network together and who made the marriages that provided the glue.

As Uzair said in his trial, "The one who was most enthusiastic and supportive of the Daulah (Islamic State) was my mother-in-law, Sobah, so that she took the initiative to start a *pengajian* at her home in support of Islamic State."<sup>6</sup>

As of September 2020, Arti was detained in the Metropolitan Jakarta police command.

### B. *The Case of Nur Fazilla*

Nur Fazilla alias Umu Dila illustrates the role of women as networkers, facilitators and providers of refuge when things go wrong. Social media became an important tool in the expansion of Dila's extremist activities across several provinces, but it was her second husband, Abu Islam, who drew her into the radical network in the first place.

4 Nibras testimony in trial dossier of Arti Alifah Aviandari Rahardjo, 9 January 2019.

5 Fitria's classmates included the wives of Arif Fathoni and Ahmad Abdullah Robanni.

6 Verdict of the West Jakarta District Court, case of Uzair Cholid, Decision Number 1339/Pid.Sus/2019/PN.Jkt.Br, 9 January 2019.



Dila was born of Acehese parents in 1981 in Jakarta but grew up in Pidie, Aceh. From the time she was a teenager, she was very devout, attending a regular religious study group near her home. After graduating from a state high school, she married a policeman and went to live with him in Jambi province. She was then 21. After nine years of marriage and no children, he divorced her by text message, and she returned to Aceh. Two years later, in 2013, she met and married Zulfahmi alias Abu Islam, a lecturer at Malikussaleh University in Lhokseumawe, Aceh. He was active in Salafi circles but was also deeply interested in end-of-time prophecies. An avid visitor to extremist websites, Abu Islam introduced his wife to news about Islamic State and in 2014, both pledged loyalty to Abubakr Al-Baghdadi. Abu Islam also introduced her to other ISIS supporters, including Hendra Saputra alias Abu Hamzah. She began joining pro-ISIS Telegram and Whatsapp groups and became an active social media user. In 2015, Abu Islam left for Syria and divorced her once he arrived. Again, the divorce was via text message, but Abu Islam did not even inform Dila directly – he sent a text to his younger brother who then informed Dila that the marriage was over. Abu Islam was killed a few months later. Dila in the meantime had made ends meet by selling organic fertilizer.

In December 2017, a woman named Umi Hurairah from Purwakarta, West Java contacted Dila out of the blue on Facebook, asking if she could come and visit for a few weeks. Umi Hurairah later turned out to be part of an extremist network that was looking for land in Aceh for running a clandestine program where members from Java and Jambi could learn about ISIS and get physical training before leaving for Syria. Umi Hurairah appears to have been one of the main recruiters and was in contact with friends of Abu Islam. They referred to the program by the Arabic term *uzlah* (living in seclusion). Through Abu Hamzah, they secured land in Gunung Salak, North Aceh from Ismarwan, a former prisoner and set up what they called Camp 28.<sup>7</sup> The first batch of recruits arrived in March 2018, consisting of three men, two women, and seven children, all from Java, and more participants steadily arrived. Dila was invited to join but declined. She continued to take part in chat groups and was in particularly close communication with another friend of Abu Islam's, an Acehese living in Medan named Abu Kholid who shared Dila's interests in both farming and ISIS.

In May 2018, Abu Kholid came to Dila's house with a fugitive from a pro-ISIS network in Tanjung Balai, North Sumatra.<sup>8</sup> He asked her for help in finding the fugitive a place to hide and a job; she referred them to the camp. By September 2018, the camp, which by then was up to 46 men, women and children, was forced to move to another location, because Ismarwan was getting nervous and asked them to leave. Ismarwan had been arrested in the aftermath of the first Aceh camp in 2010 and did not want to get into trouble again (although he later ended up getting arrested again anyway). Abu Hamzah then moved with all the camp residents to another location a few kilometers away. In addition to those who transferred from Camp 28, others joined the new site, mostly from Java and Binjai, outside Medan. Dila regularly supplied them with food and other supplies but always refused to take part.

In December 2018, the police raided the camp and detained most of the male participants, including Abu Hamzah. One man who successfully slipped the police dragnet contacted Dila and asked if she could shelter some 30 people, all wives and children of those arrested. She did so for a few days but knowing her house was too small for so many people, she sent out the word

7 Trial dossier of Hendra Saputra alias Abu Hamzah, 13 December 2018.

8 The fugitive was Wahyudin Sarwani alias Abu Muslim. Police had tried to arrest a member of this network on 16 May 2018. The target of the operation attacked one of the arresting party with a knife, severing two of his fingers. The attacker was shot, but survived and was arrested. In October 2018, police shot dead two more members of the network, claiming that they resisted arrest and that they had been planning to attack Chinese Buddhist temples and police headquarters in Tanjung Balai.



that they would have to raise funds to rent a shophouse. The funds to do so came through within days to cover the costs of Rp. 12 million (just over US\$800) for a year's rent. When the women heard that the men arrested were being held in a prison near Bogor (Gunung Sindur), some decided to move there, pooling resources to rent a place close to the prison. Others returned to their home areas.

Nur Fazilla in the meantime decided to marry again. In February she was introduced to Joko Jihad, a well-known jihadi, whom she married by proxy a month later.<sup>9</sup> After two trips to Solo to join her new husband, she returned to Aceh where she was arrested in November 2019. As of mid-2020, she was being held in Polda Metro Jaya remand centre.

### C. Two Policewomen from North Maluku

Another case involved the radicalisation of two young policewomen from North Maluku and their eventual involvement in a plot to attack churches in Yogyakarta in September 2019. Both were employed at the criminal investigation unit of the North Maluku provincial police command in Ternate. In late 2018, Rini Ilyas, then 22, joined a pengajian of the Salafi mass organisation Wahdah Islamiyah and drew in her more senior colleague, Nesti Ode Samili, 23. They then started exploring pro-ISIS channels and chat groups on Telegram. Rini introduced Nesti to "Media Dakwah", a Telegram group managed by a man known as Abu Zee, the amir of JAD Bekasi and JAD's main online propagandist.<sup>10</sup> After joining, Nesti began wearing a full face veil (*niqab*) and limiting her interactions with men.<sup>11</sup>

Matchmaking was an important part of Abu Zee's recruitment procedures, and it was not long before Rini offered to arrange a meeting online for Nesti with a potential spouse from Abu Zee's group. In February 2019, the first communication online between Nesti and her future husband, Galang Jiwa Pradana. She met him in person in Surabaya in April where his main interest appeared to be buying a gun (which may have accounted for his interest in marrying a policewoman). She later told police that she wished to marry him to further her interest in Islamic State, emigrate (*berhijra*) to a more Islamic community and take part with him in a jihad operation (*amaliyah*). In May 2019, Rini left the police, moved to Yogyakarta and blocked further contact with Nesti. Nesti decided to follow her to Yogyakarta. But while in transit at Surabaya airport, she was stopped by the East Java police and sent back to Ternate. There she faced disciplinary procedures for desertion, neglecting her duties, using a false identity card and violating the police ethics code. All this earned her 21 days in detention, but perhaps surprisingly, she was not fired. As soon as she was released on 29 June, she got a new phone, reconnected with Galang, rejoined "Media Dakwah" and reunited with Rini. In August, Galang travelled to Ternate and he and Nesti were officially married. After various back and forths and a long circuitous journey, they arrived in Yogyakarta on 25 September 2019 and made plans for Nesti to stay with Rini there while Galang joined other comrades for a jihad operation in Pekanbaru, Riau. (Nesti wanted to join but her husband would not let her.) Rini and Nesti were arrested two days later at Rini's place.<sup>12</sup> Galang was picked up on 12 October 2019.

9 Joko Jihad alias Joko Tri Priyanto, originally from Solo Laweyan, was imprisoned twice for terrorist related offenses. He was sentenced for three years in 2005 for lending a laptop to a friend of Noordin Top, the mastermind of the 2005 Bali bombing, and reportedly helped him hide from the police. In 2012, he was re-arrested for being involved in bomb-making activities in Solo. His son, Fonda Amar Solihin, was the son-in-law of Santoso, late leader of Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT) in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Fonda died during a shootout with the police in February 2016.

10 "Mengenai Abu Zee, Panglima Medsos JAD, Panutan Penyerang Wiranto", kumparan.co, 16 October 2019.

11 Trial dossier of Nesti Ode Sami, 3 October 2019.

12 Ibid.

Social media played a major role in the radicalisation of Rini and Nesti. In addition to “Media Dakwah”, which Nesti estimated had about 130 followers, they also followed several other Telegram and WhatsApp groups.<sup>13</sup> Some of these were focused on end-of-time prophecies, some were more overtly pro-ISIS. The group “Wartactic”, with Nesti, Galang and four others as members, was being used to plan an operation at the time the couple was arrested, and members shared articles about how to make bombs. The social media groups were also used to reinforce bonds, assist members to raise money from each other, meet contacts, and find refuge as needed.

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13 The WhatsApp group included “Teman Dunia Akhirat” and “Tahsin Adzikirat”. Rini herself was the administrator of a Telegram group called “Tabungan Dunia Akhirat”. Galang and Nesti both followed the Telegram grup “Wartactic”, “JKL”, “Media Ummah” and “Mawar Merah”.

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