

**MILITANT GROUPS IN POSO:  
DOWN BUT NOT OUT**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian government's official assessment on Poso in Central Sulawesi – site of deadly Christian-Muslim conflict from 1998 to 2001 and home to various violent Islamist extremist groups thereafter – is that it is now safe. All members of Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT) who were on the police wanted list had been arrested or killed by September 2022, according to National Police Chief (Kapolri) Listyo Sigit Prabowo, and no other militant organisation posed a serious threat. Not a single terrorist attack had taken place in 2022.

Interviews with dozens of residents, however – former prisoners, local officials, religious leaders and police – paint a less rosy picture. With more than 100 members of militant groups released after serving prison terms, Poso has more ex-prisoners than any other district of Indonesia and dozens more are expected to be released by the end of 2024 (see Appendices). Managing their expectations will not be easy, and government rehabilitation and reintegration programs are deeply flawed. Communal tensions left over from the conflict have left a religiously segregated community, and small incidents can still spark mass mobilisation. Schools and mosques with links, past or present, to militant groups like MIT and Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) have mostly been penetrated by the government but can still serve as recruiting centres and vectors for militant regeneration. If Poso has the largest concentration of ex-prisoners, it also has many children and family members of militants who are vulnerable to radicalisation.

It is therefore critical that Poso receive the highest attention from the government, especially as elections approach in 2024, since local power struggles can also be triggers for conflict. Police need to ensure that their best, most experienced officers are assigned to Poso; that they provide local officials and legislators with regular briefings on the security situation, addressing possible scenarios that could arise as more releases take place; and that the flaws in the programs of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) for ex-prisoners are fixed. Particular attention should be paid to creating youth activities to encourage interaction between Muslim and Christian students at the elementary, junior high, and high school levels. Skill-training that is congruent with labor market needs would also be useful, particularly for women, and if open to all members of the community, not just those from militant families, it could help expand the social networks of these women beyond extremist circles.

Despite the public optimism from Kapolri Listyo, it is clear that local police still see Poso as a high-risk area, since over the last two years, they have prevented any MIT fighter killed in operations from being buried in Poso, so that the burial does not become a flashpoint for more violence. Instead, they are buried in Palu, the provincial capital, and this itself has become a new grievance for the militants.

There have been lulls in violence in Poso before. Between January 2007, when a clash on the streets between police and armed militants led to the (temporary) break-up of the JI base in

Poso, and 2012, when MIT was founded, Poso was also quiet. Local officials and security forces in 2023 need to understand how, why and through whom violence reemerged, so they are better prepared for the next turn of the wheel.

This report is based on extensive interviews carried out in March and April 2023. It analyses some of the challenges the government faces in maintaining the peace in Poso and preventing the regeneration of militant groups.

## II. BACKGROUND: REGENERATION AMONG POSO MILITANTS

Many useful studies have been written about the Poso conflict and the violent Islamist extremism that emerged in its wake.<sup>1</sup> JI, which first began sending preachers and fighters to Poso in 2000, made the neighborhood of Tanah Runtuh in Poso city its base and the boarding school (*pesantren*) al-Amanah, led by cleric Haji Adnan Arsal, the centre of its activities. It believed that residual grievances from the conflict had the potential to make Poso a safe base (*qiadah aminah*) for an effort to establish an Islamic state. JI's efforts were therefore as much on education and religious outreach (*dakwah*) as on waging an ongoing jihad against the Christian community. Many in the Muslim community saw the militants as providing better security than the police and better religious training for their children than many local clerics, so at least initially, JI had strong local support.

Another violent extremist group, Mujahidin KOMPAK, also known as KOMPAK Kayamanya, operated out of the neighborhood of Kayamanya in Poso city, both during the conflict and afterwards. It focused less on religious education and more on sending militants into combat as quickly as possible. As a result, tensions developed between it and JI-Tanah Runtuh.<sup>2</sup> Fighters from across Indonesia – West Java, Banten, South Sulawesi, Riau and more – flocked to Poso to train and fight at the height of the conflict, forging bonds that MIT could draw on more than a decade later. The bonds between KOMPAK and fighters from a Darul Islam branch in South Sulawesi were particularly close. A key figure in KOMPAK Kayamanya was a former soldier from Central Java named Sabar Subagyo who settled in Makassar, South Sulawesi and under the name Daeng Koro became a storied fighter, training instructor, and recruiter for both KOMPAK and later, MIT.<sup>3</sup>

In 2003, JI appointed a Mindanao-trained fighter from Central Java, Slamet Raharjo alias Hasanudin, as head of its operations in Poso. Attacks on local Christians increased, culminating in the 2005 beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls. That attack triggered an

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Dave McRae, *A Few Poorly Organised Men*, Leiden, 2013; Tito Karnavian, *Indonesian Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso*, Jakarta, 2008; International Crisis Group, "Jihad in Central Sulawesi", Asia Report No.74, 3 February 2004; "Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso", Asia Report No.103, 13 October 2005; and "Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge", Asia Report No.127, 24 January 2007; Lorraine V. Aragon, "Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People," *Indonesia* (Cornell), Vol.72, 2001, pp.45-80.

<sup>2</sup> International Crisis Group, "Jihad in Central Sulawesi", Asia Report No.74, 3 February 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Daeng Koro was killed by police on 3 April 2015 in Pangli, Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi.

intensive investigation by Indonesia's counter-terrorism police unit, Detachment 88, resulting in the arrest of Hasanudin and other perpetrators. It also resulted in a major armed showdown on the streets of Poso in January 2007 between police and JI supporters. A wave of arrests followed, and Poso seemingly went quiet.

## A. Military Training

Military training of Poso militants, however, continued to take place. Between 2008 and 2011, at least five military training sessions were conducted in South, West and Southeast Sulawesi, mostly by instructors with links to Darul Islam and KOMPAK in Java and Sulawesi, including Daeng Koro. Participants came from many areas, but always included a handful of men from Poso.<sup>4</sup>

In late 2009, Tanah Runtuh and KOMPAK Kayamanya agreed to look for a new training site in the area around Tamanjeka, Poso Pesisir, but cooperation quickly collapsed when JI refused to let its men train under Daeng Koro.<sup>5</sup>

In 2010, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), an organisation founded two years earlier by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, JI's former amir, began recruiting in Poso. It brought together members of different militant groups who were still committed to military preparation (*i'dad*) and jihad operations (*amaliyat*). The head of its military wing in Poso was a man named Santoso.

Santoso was a non-ideological militant who had joined Tanah Runtuh at the height of the conflict and according to one of his men, had no particular loyalty to any organisation – he only wanted to wage war.<sup>6</sup> He was as open to KOMPAK Kayamanya as he was to Tanah Runtuh, but he did not like being under someone else's authority. One of his first violent acts in his JAT capacity was to send two youths to mount the deadly attack in May 2011 on police who were on guard duty at a bank in Palu, the Central Sulawesi provincial capital. The attack was on his own initiative, without the knowledge, let alone instructions from the local JAT leadership.<sup>7</sup> In 2012, he broke with JAT and founded his own organisation called Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT).<sup>8</sup>

Under Santoso, MIT became Indonesia's only active territorially-based insurgency, with perhaps 50-60 combatants at its peak. In 2014, Santoso declared his support for Islamic

<sup>4</sup> As recounted by Mohammed Ikhwan alias Zulfikar alias Abu Umar during his 2012 trial, these trainings included a ten-day course August 2007 on Gunung Sanca, near Palopo, South Sulawesi with about 25 participants, who each paid Rp200,000; July 2008 on Pulau Kura-kura (Turtle Island) in Southeastern Sulawesi, against with about 25 participants, mostly from Sulawesi with Daeng Koro as one of the instructors; October 2009, also on Pulau Kura-Kura; February 2010 in Lembah Bangka, near Mamuju, West Sulawesi; and February 2011 on Gunung Walenrang in Palopo, South Sulawesi. The latter included two men from Tawau, Malaysia as well as from Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, including six from Poso. There are slightly different versions of the dates among the testimonies of those who were later arrested, but the locations and broad outlines of participants are the same.

<sup>5</sup> The hamlet of Tamanjeka, in Masani village, Poso Pesisir lies at the foothills of Gunung Biru where many MIT training sessions took place. Tamanjeka was 20 km from the district police station (polres) and the poor infrastructure and high altitude made it difficult to reach, especially during the rainy season. Gunung Biru was a source of fresh water and was therefore an ideal location for an MIT camp. In addition, several militants had small plantations in the foothills where Santoso and his followers could train and hide. IPAC interview with former KOMPAK member, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>6</sup> IPAC interview with former JAT member, Pamulang, 16 March 2023.

<sup>7</sup> IPAC interview with former JAT member, Pamulang, 16 March 2023.

<sup>8</sup> See International Crisis Group, "How Indonesian Extremists Regroup," Asia Report No. 228, 16 July 2012, p. 6 and Sidney Jones, "Poso's Jihadist Network", *Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor*, February 2013, pp.16-19.

State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS). It was less an expression of ideological solidarity than an opportunistic measure taken in the hope that it would lead to new funding and more fighters, both from Indonesia and abroad.<sup>9</sup> The only foreign fighters who joined, however, were ethnic Uyghurs from China's Xinjiang province.<sup>10</sup> Many of the Indonesian fighters from outside Poso came from Makassar, South Sulawesi and Bima, on the island of Sumbawa, Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB), the province east of Bali.

The Bima contingent was particularly important. There had always been a few Bima fighters in Poso at different stages of the conflict, but after police laid siege to one of the most extremist schools in NTB, Pesantren Umar bin Khatab (UBK) in July 2011, many militants associated with the school fled to Poso via Makassar and became a critical part of MIT. Most were followers of radical cleric Aman Abdurrahman.<sup>11</sup>

## B. MIT Attacks

MIT attacks began taking place regularly using knives, machetes, guns and more rarely bombs. Its activities have been documented in several IPAC reports.<sup>12</sup> Several police operations were launched in response, but for years, there was little to show for their efforts. At the time, there was no police unit trained for jungle warfare, and Santoso had a well-organised supply chain.

According to one source:

The rice supplies we delivered to the hills could reach five tons. We brought it part way in a truck, then we moved it in via motorcycle. I'm amazed we weren't caught. There were motorcycles going up and down. We used the truck till the foothills, then we used a motorcycle, up and down, up and down, bringing rice. Why didn't Densus arrest us? Maybe they didn't know.

We bought rice in the city, salted fish, too. They had lots of requests. They wanted cigarettes, all that stuff. It was comfortable up in the training site. Money was always coming in. From Java, from all over the place. It was good. And then there were the hackers who stole money. Mas Hendro was there. Hendro eventually got killed in Pantango. But he'd already trained Yono Adem's younger brother how to do it. [...] Hendro did his hacking with a laptop. When he was caught, police took the laptop. Fortunately, it had a virus and just hung. There were lots of power banks up in the hills.

<sup>9</sup> See IPAC, "Indonesia's Lamongan Network: How East Java, Poso and Syria are Linked," Report No. 18, 15 April 2015 and IPAC, "The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells," Report No. 69, 21 January 2021.

<sup>10</sup> Five were captured and tried, then deported after serving their sentences, six were killed, and one was caught and deported without trial. See IPAC, "Explaining Indonesia's Silence on the Uyghur Issue," Report no.57, 20 June 2019.

<sup>11</sup> IPAC interview with former JAT member, Pamulang, 16 March 2023. Aman Abdurrahman, whose real name is Oman Rochman, was an early supporter of ISIS. He was sentenced to death in 2018 for his role in planning the January 2016 attack in central Jakarta, even though he was already in prison at the time for his part in funding a training camp in Aceh in 2010.

<sup>12</sup> See IPAC, "Covid-19 and The Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT)", Short Briefing No.3, 28 April 2021 and IPAC, "The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells," Report No. 69, 21 January 2021.

The Satgas (Tinombala or Madago Raya) only ever reached the bottom, where the people had plantations. Because of this, it took them a long time to arrest us. We just waited for them. They didn't dare climb to the top. We laid mines, too, so we'd know when they were coming. We once had a clash when we were going down. Exchange of fire. I was carrying an M16. The Poso kids who were carrying guns ran. So did the police. Only the Bima people were brave enough to stand and fight.<sup>13</sup>

It took an order from President Jokowi in 2015 to force police-military cooperation in the hunt for Santoso. A military patrol operating as part of the joint task force found and killed him in 2016. Santoso was succeeded, at least in name, by local Poso resident Ali Kalora, though the real strategist was a man from Bima named Qatar.<sup>14</sup> One former fighter said:

Ali Kalora's name had no prestige. Qatar was more popular. Ali was considered to represent Poso, so he became a leader. Qatar was quiet but harsh. He beheaded people. Bima people are really strong physically. We frequently asked them to cut down trees. Poso people are weak. They didn't like it up in the hills, and when they went down, they got caught.<sup>15</sup>

Even in a situation of extreme weakness, MIT insurgents held out in the jungles of Poso Pesisir for another seven years, managing to recruit and rebuild even as security forces tightened the dragnet around them. On 27 November 2020, some fighters killed a Christian family of four and set fire to homes and a church in Lembantongoa, Palolo, Sigi.<sup>16</sup> Many residents questioned where all the funds the government was spending on security operations in Poso could be going if incidents like Sigi could still occur.<sup>17</sup>

### III. CHANGES IN SECURITY OPERATIONS

After the Sigi attack, the government decided to extend security operations in Poso and increase the number of TNI and police forces to hunt down the remaining fugitives of MIT. At the beginning of 2021, in what was now called Operation Madago Raya, some 1,500 personnel from both police and military were sent to support the operation.<sup>18</sup> This was twice the number that had been involved in the fourth and last phase of Operation Tinombala from October-December 2020, when the joint force totalled 750. The police also increased their

<sup>13</sup> IPAC interview with former prisoner, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>14</sup> Qatar alias Farel was shot and killed at close range in a police operation in July 2021 in Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi. He was 27 at the time. He had attended a teacher training school in Bima before joining JAT in 2011. He joined MIT in October 2013. By the time he was killed, MIT had split into several small groups, and Qatar led the most deadly. See "Qatar Sang Pengancam Ditembak Aparat," <https://wartakota.tribunnews.com/2021/08/07/qatar-sang-pengancam-tewas-ditembak-aparat-akankah-ali-kalora-cs-menyeraikan-diri>, 7 August 2021.

<sup>15</sup> IPAC interview with former prisoner, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>16</sup> "The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia," *op.cit.*, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> "Biaya Operasi Tinombala Tinggi, Satgas Diminta Tuntaskan Misi," *cnnindonesia*, 17 February 2021.

<sup>18</sup> "Polri Ganti Nama Operasi Tinombala Jadi Madago Raya, Ini Artinya," *kompas.com*, 17 February 2021. On troop numbers, see "Koopsgabsus Tricakti TNI: 7 Teroris Poso Tewas Sepanjang 2021, DPO 4 Orang," *detik.com*, 21 September 2021.

posts outside Poso, particularly around the district of Parigi Moutong and Sigi to interdict the movement of MIT fugitives and sympathisers.

On 20 February 2021, in an effort to boost the prestige of the Madago Raya forces, Kapolri Listyo, who had been installed less than a month earlier, and Marsekal Hadi Tjahjanto, commander of the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), made a joint working visit to Poso.<sup>19</sup> The visit was also designed to show solidarity of the police and military and demonstrate to the public that there was no competition between them, even though their rivalry was an open secret.<sup>20</sup>

Said one ex-fighter:

We never clashed with the soldiers sent by the TNI. But we ran into police all the time. We never sought problems with the TNI. Our problem was only with the police. The TNI was always complaining: “Those Brimob, they’re afraid to go up, they always are the first to retreat. In joint forces, it’s always the TNI in front, Brimob in the back.”<sup>21</sup>

Community relations with the police did not improve after the joint visit, in part because shooting to kill had become the standard operating procedure (SOP) of Satgas Madago Raya, despite its claims to the public that it stressed persuasive means. In chasing down MIT members on its most wanted list, it rarely tried to capture them alive and there is no record of anyone voluntarily turning themselves in after Santoso was killed.<sup>22</sup> Shooting them on the spot may have been the chosen method of eradicating MIT, but it had the potential to create new problems in the form of the desire for revenge on the part of the families left behind.

At the same time, as a security measure to avoid unrest, police buried all those killed in Palu, rather than letting families take the bodies home. This caused further alienation in the Muslim community.

## A. The Last of the MIT Fugitives

Operation Madago Raya seemed to have a successful start when its Satgas prevented an MIT attack on the village of Tambarana, North Poso Pesisir, on 1 March 2021. Based on information from villagers, it was able to detect the presence of MIT fighters and managed to chase and engage four of them in an armed clash in the Andole hills in Tambarana. One TNI

<sup>19</sup> “Kunker ke Poso, Ini Arahan Panglima TNI dan Kapolri”, nusantara-news, 2 February 2021. Listyo Sigit was installed as police chief on 27 January 2021.

<sup>20</sup> In early 2021, when rumours were rife that the Ali Kalora faction of MIT wanted to turn themselves in, the regional military commander (Danrem Tadulako) and the provincial police chief (Kapolda) competed to see who could capture Ali Kalora first. Each formed his own team and gave it two weeks to make the capture. Both failed. In the end they agreed to just shoot him. IPAC interview, Poso, March 2023. For more on the rivalry, see “The Expanding Role of The Indonesian Military”, 25 May 2015, IPAC Report No.19. The local police were also annoyed that the TNI made a point of speaking to the media and claiming success for operations that led to the deaths of wanted MIT members. The provincial police felt that it was their role to speak to the media, since the TNI forces in Poso were only back-up forces (Bawah Kendali Operasi, BKO).

<sup>21</sup> IPAC interview, Poso. 1 March 2023.

<sup>22</sup> One MIT fugitive who was captured alive was Syarifudin Thalib alias Udin. The media said he had surrendered, but in fact he was captured while sleeping in his house. Udin was a minor and was sentenced to one year and two months in prison. IPAC phone interview with Syarifudin Thalib alias Udin, 6 April 2023.



soldier, Praka Dedi Irawan, was shot and killed and two MIT fighters also died, Alvin alias Adam alias Mus'ab dan Khairul alias Irul.<sup>23</sup>

The death of Irul was a major loss for MIT because he was a local man who had the potential to carry on the struggle of MIT founder Santoso, his father-in-law.<sup>24</sup> Before he joined Ali Kalora's forces at the end of 2018, he married Wardah, Santoso's eldest daughter. Irul himself was the son of Sugianto alias Kang Su, a close associate of Santoso and one of the early supporters of MIT.<sup>25</sup> Two days after the death of Alvin and Irul, MIT undertook a retaliatory attack against Satgas Madago Raya, which was then conducting a sweeping operation at Kilometer 7 in the village of Gayatri, in North Poso Pesisir, Poso. They shot and killed an officer from the paramilitary police unit stationed in Central Sulawesi.<sup>26</sup>

The security forces decided in the end to bury Alvin and Irul in Palu on 3 March 2021 to avoid the kind of mass demonstration that happened at the burial of Abdullah and Darwin Gobel earlier.<sup>27</sup> Then, hundreds of Poso residents had stood on both sides of the main Trans-Sulawesi road shouting "Allahu Akbar" and waving ISIS flags as the bodies arrived from Palu. They crowded into the gravesite even though the dead men had not been important members of MIT. After Irul was buried, his family requested permission from the Central Sulawesi police to exhume his body and move it back to Poso, but the request was denied and resentment in the community continued to fester.<sup>28</sup>

While anger over that case continued, a case of a mistaken shooting reinforced it. Qidam Alfarizki Mowance had been shot and killed by police when he left his house on the morning of 9 April 2020. The police explanation at the time was that he was a suspected MIT terrorist who had resisted arrest, so they were forced to shoot him. No one in his family or the larger community in Tambarana village, North Poso Pesisir, believed this, and a year after the killing, on 9 April 2021, they held a demonstration to demand justice.<sup>29</sup> Protestors blockaded the Trans-Sulawesi road and set fire to a Madago Raya police post. The demonstration dispersed when the head of the Central Sulawesi police command and the head of the Poso police agreed to meet with Qidam's family.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Alvin, from Banten, West Java, joined MIT in 2018 with Jaka Ramadhan alias Ikrima.

<sup>24</sup> See "Covid-19 and The Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT)," op.cit, p. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Kang Su alias Sugiatno, a resident of Kalora, Kecamatan Poso Pesisir Utara was arrested on 31 January 2013 because he had helped Santoso with military training on Gunung Biru, Poso. He was also involved in several terrorist attacks that had taken place before 2007, but he had never been arrested. This time he was tried, sentenced to ten years in prison, refused to swear loyalty to the Indonesian republic and was released on 5 July 2021 after serving his terms in full.

<sup>26</sup> "Baku Tembak Aparat Dengan MIT Kembali Terjadi: 1 Anggota Brimob Gugur," liputan6.com, 3 March 2021. The police victim was Briptu (Sub-inspector) Herli.

<sup>27</sup> "Pemakaman 2 DPO MIT di Poso Diantar Massa, Bendera Tauhid Hitam Berkibar," detik.com, 17 April 2020.

<sup>28</sup> Earlier, the provincial police had also denied a request from the family of Aan alias Wahid alias Bojes to move his body from a grave in Palu to Parigi Moutong district. In the end, the family exhumed his body themselves and reburied it in Bolano Barat, Parigi Moutong. See "Kuburan Jenasah Anggota MIT Poso Digali Keluarga," mercusuar.web.id, 20 November 2020.

<sup>29</sup> "Demo di Depan Polsek Poso Pesisir Utara, Warga Blokade Jalan dan Bakar Satu Pos Satgas Madago Raya," palu.tribunnews.com, 9 April 2021. See "Covid 19 and The Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT)," op.cit, p. 6.

<sup>30</sup> On 3 June 2021, the Palu district court ruled against a civil suit from Qidam's father requesting Rp.5 billion in damages and a formal apology from the national police because they said his accusation was unclear. Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Civil Action of Irwan Monance," Decision No.78/Pdt.G/2020/PN.Pal. The police officer who shot Qidam was never identified, and in January 2022, the national police headquarters and its internal disciplinary unit were reportedly still working on the case. "Sudah 18 bulan, kasus kematian Qidam belum terkuak, sampai kapan?" *Media al-Khairaat*, 1 January 2022. In September 2022, the provincial legislature of South Sulawesi requested the police to identify the shooter but as of mid-2023, the police had made no response.

In the midst of these incidents, Central Sulawesi Police Commander Abdul Rakhman Baso had some bad news. Satgas Madago Raya had lost the trail of the MIT fugitives, and they succeeded in committing a new act of terrorism.<sup>31</sup> On 11 May 2021, MIT men beheaded four villagers from Kalimago village, Lore Timur, Poso. Their bodies were found about two kilometers away in a coffee and cacao plantation around Puho, close to Blue Mountain (Gunung Biru).<sup>32</sup>

The Kalimago killings were a heavy blow to Satgas Madago Raya, which was trying to earn public trust. The credibility and effectiveness of the task force were questioned because it was less than a year since the Sigi incident had added more civilians to the list of MIT's victims. The ongoing violence prompted Ustad Haji Adnan Aرسال, Poso's best-known cleric, to speak out.<sup>33</sup> He requested President Jokowi to evaluate the work of the Satgas and issue new instructions for handling MIT in Poso.<sup>34</sup>

Satgas Madago Raya eventually was able to trace the remaining MIT members, thanks to information from villagers in Parigi Moutong about the theft of food. A team from the joint military-police force picked up their trail and exchanged fire with them in the Tokasa Mountains, Tanah Lanto, Torue subdistrict, Parigi Moutong, on 11 July 2021, killing two of the fighters. The police initially could not identify them but decided to bury them in Palu on 14 July 2021. One of them turned out to be Qatar, and his death marked the end to the use of beheadings as a terrorism method.<sup>35</sup>

Three days later, there was another armed clash. An MIT member from Bima named Ambo alias Abu Alim was shot and killed in the mountains of Torue, Parigi Moutong. The MIT fugitives who were Poso locals were reduced to three: Ali Kalora; Ahmad Ghazali alias Ahmad Panjang from Kayamanya; and Suhardin alias Hasan Pranata.<sup>36</sup> The security forces tried to encourage the remaining MIT fugitives to turn themselves in. In August 2021, they circulated a video of Basri alias Bagong, a senior MIT member and former right-hand man of Santoso who was arrested in 2016.<sup>37</sup> In it, he urged other members to turn themselves in. The appeal was ignored, however, even by Suhardin, his own brother-in-law.

## B. MIT after the Death of Ali Kalora

Satgas Madago Raya got fresh energy in August 2021 with the reappointment of Rudy Sufahriady as the Central Sulawesi police chief, replacing Abdul Rakhman Baso, who

<sup>31</sup> "Jejak DPO Kelompok MIT Hilang, Sejumlah Personel Satgas Diganti," kalteng.antaranews.com, 1 May 2021.

<sup>32</sup> "Sederet Teror MIT Poso Sebelum Ali Kalora Tewas Tertembak: Bunuh Petani," kompas.com, 19 September 2021. The victims were Marten Solot, Simson Susa, Lukas Lese, and Paulus.

<sup>33</sup> For a profile of Adnan Aرسال, see Khoirul Anam, "Muhammad Adnan Aرسال: Panglima Damai dari Poso," Jakarta, Juni 2021.

<sup>34</sup> "Ustad Adnan Aرسال Desak Presiden Jokowi Terbitkan Kepres Penanganan MIT Poso," kumparan.com, 17 May 2021.

<sup>35</sup> "Berhasil Dievakuasi, Polisi Kesulitan Identifikasi 2 Jenazah Anggota MIT," liputan6.com, 15 July 2021. The other proved to be a fugitive named Rukli.

<sup>36</sup> Suhardin had joined MIT in January 2020 through his son-in-law, Yudit Padjja alias Yudit alias Abu Zaim who was arrested a few weeks later in February. Suhardin managed to pass by a police post manned by Operasi Tinombala because he was dressed as a woman, using an abaya-like garment and a face veil. Before he joined MIT, he took part in the *taklim* at Pondok Pesantren Darul Anshar Kayamanya. He also took part in military training (*i'dad*) in the form of physical fitness, archery, and war tactics led Muis Fahron alias Abdullah behind State Senior High School (SMAN) 4 Poso in Kayamanya. See Verdict in the case of Yudit Padjja alias Yudit alias Udit alias Abu Zaim," op.cit.

<sup>37</sup> "Basri, Eks Teroris Poso Ajak Ali Kalora Cs Menyerahkan Diri," tribunnews.com, 26 August 2021.

retired.<sup>38</sup> Rudy had headed Satgas Tinombala when Santoso was killed, and under his renewed leadership, Satgas Madago Raya again engaged in armed clashes with MIT. On 18 September 2021, a Satgas unit killed Ali Kalora and Jaka Ramadhan alias Ikrima, a Banten native, in the mountains around Astina village, South Parigi, Parigi Moutong. Both were buried in Palu, angering Ali's family.<sup>39</sup>

Even with Ali Kalora dead, Operation Madago Raya continued in 2022.<sup>40</sup> On 4 January, a Satgas unit killed Ahmad Panjang. He had not opened fire himself or shown any sign of resisting, suggesting he could have been captured alive.<sup>41</sup> He was buried in Palu, near Ali Kalora. Suhardin, Basri's brother-in-law who had been the target of his video appeal, was killed on 27 April in Salubanga village, Sausu, Parigi Moutong by a Satgas patrol and was also buried in Palu instead of near his home in the Gebang Rejo area of Poso.<sup>42</sup>

After Suhardin's death, the security forces announced that only two MIT fighters remained, both from Bima: Nae alias Galuh and Askar alias Jadid alias Pak Guru.<sup>43</sup> But Police Chief Rudy corrected the statement, saying that the only one left was Askar; Nae alias Galuh was dead.<sup>44</sup> Kapolri Listyo finally announced that Askar had been killed on 29 September 2022 around Kilometer 13 in Kilo village, North Poso Pesisir, and that the death of this last remaining fugitive represented the end of MIT.<sup>45</sup>

Even with no more fugitives to catch, the police extended Operation Madago Raya in 2023. They also expanded its coverage. If in 2022 it only covered the districts of Poso, Sigi and Parigi Moutong, the operation in 2023 encompassed Tojo Una-Una too, because the police believed there were still MIT sympathizers there.

<sup>38</sup> Rudy Sufahriady became police chief (Kapolda) for Central Sulawesi for the second time on 31 August 2021. He had been Kapolda there before in 2016, when he led the Satgas Tinombala whose members shot and killed Santoso in 2016. At the time he was transferred back to Central Sulawesi, the status of the province had risen from a one-star post to a two-star post. But in a way it was still a demotion because Rudy had been serving in the two-star position as police chief of West Java so normally would have expected a promotion to a three-star post. But he was held responsible for his inability to anticipate and prevent the crowds from various welcome-back ceremonies for Habib Rizieq, leader of FPI, after the latter ended his self-imposed exile to Saudi Arabia and returned to massive crowds on 10 November 2020, at the height of Covid restrictions.

<sup>39</sup> "Jenazah Ali Kalora Dimakamkan di Palu Demi Keamanan," *mediaindonesia.com*, 20 September 2021.

<sup>40</sup> The operation no longer relied on a TNI combat unit from outside Central Sulawesi, but rather drew on organic troops Kodam XIII/Merdeka, Korem 132/Tadulako, Kodim 1307/Poso, Kodim 1311/Morowali, and Yonif 714/Sintuwu Maroso. Altogether, 267 soldiers were involved, while at least 500 police personnel from the Central Sulawesi Polda and 590 from police headquarters in Jakarta. In total, the joint force comprised some 1,357 troops. See "Kaleidoskop Keamanan Poso 2021: Ali Kalora Mati, Operasi Keamanan Masih Diperpanjang," *mosintuwu.com*, 15 January 2022.

<sup>41</sup> "Ahmad Panjang, Teroris MIT Poso Tewas Tanpa Kontak Tembak," *viva.co.id*, 6 January 2022.

<sup>42</sup> The police ran into a man they suspected of being an MIT fugitive. They warned him to surrender. But he responded by throwing a camouflage vest towards them that police feared contained a bomb, so they shot him dead. See "Bukan Pak Guru DPO MIT yang Mati Ternyata Suhardin," *jawapos.com*, 28 April 2022.

<sup>43</sup> "Suhardin Tewas, DPO Teroris Poso Tersisa Dua Orang," *kompas.com*, 28 April 2022.

<sup>44</sup> "Kapolda Sulteng: Laporan Densus, DPO MIT Poso Tersisa 1 Orang," *kompas.com*, 19 May 2022.

<sup>45</sup> "Seluruh DPO MIT sudah Tertangkap, Terbaru Pak Guru Ditembak Mati," *jawapos.com*, 30 September 2022.

## IV. JAMAAH ISLAMIYAH IN POSO

Even as MIT was being systematically hunted down, police were increasingly concerned about a revived JI. The success of law enforcement efforts against JI in Poso in 2007 and the rise of MIT extremism in 2012 combined to persuade the security forces for much of the next decade that JI was no longer a serious threat in Poso. Indeed, BNPT made Hasanudin an icon of deradicalization after his 2016 release.<sup>46</sup> But JI had been steadily rebuilding since 2009, under the leadership of its new commander (*amir*), Para Wijayanto.<sup>47</sup> Its leaders were not interested in waging war the way MIT was, but they were still committed to the idea of an Islamic state in Indonesia and believed JI must always be prepared to exploit political instability if it ever arose.<sup>48</sup>

### A. The Rebuilding

That year, several JI religious teachers who were still in Poso, including Ust. Reza from Purwodadi, Central Java, convened a meeting at Pesantren Putra Amanah in Landangan, Poso Pesisir. Anticipating the recruitment of JI members into JAT, they discussed restructuring the JI organization, starting with collecting membership data and bringing together those who had not been arrested and were still in the Poso area. They also reactivated religious meetings (*taklim*) in the area.<sup>49</sup>

Participants agreed that Ust. Reza would be responsible for JI in Poso. He also was responsible for the safety of JI fugitives from the Poso area, such as Iwan Asapa and Yono Sayur, as well as for securing the weapons that Poso members had lent to members on Java for training purposes at the beginning of 2011.<sup>50</sup> When JI began sending its cadres to Syria for military training in 2013, Ustad Reza was one of the first to take part.<sup>51</sup>

The pace of JI activities in Poso picked up after Hasanudin was released from prison in 2016 and was appointed as the coordinator (*Kosin*) for Palu-Poso, reporting directly to Para Wijayanto. Ust. Reza in turn reported to Hasanudin. Senior JI members began visiting Poso to give lectures about the nature of the Islamic struggle and the change in JI strategy.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>46</sup> For a profile of Hasanudin before 2007, see “Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge,” op.cit. p. 5-10. NGOs also frequently invited Hasanudin to take part in discussions on deradicalization and talk about his experience being a terrorist and then renouncing violence. See, for example, “Poso Butuh Early Warning System,” conveyindonesia.com, 8 June 2018.

<sup>47</sup> For more on the revival of JI, see IPAC, “The Impact of the Taliban Victory on Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah,” Report No.73, 7 September 2021.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> See Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, “Verdict in the case of Anwar Rifai alias Ustad Reza alias Reza alias Abu Furqon alias Papa Furqon,” Decision No.455/Pid.Sus/2022/PN Jkt.Br.

<sup>50</sup> The weapons were left over from the conflict, and JI had been able to hide them while police mounted operations in 2006 and 2007 to track down the killers of the schoolgirls. One of those who received a weapon was Siyono alias Asri from Klaten, Central Java. He was a member of JI’s Tholiah or security division who was arrested on 8 March 2016, then killed by police under disputed circumstances two days later. See IPAC, “The Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Report No. 36, 27 April 2017, p. 10.

<sup>51</sup> IPAC, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Military Training Programs”, Report No.79, 2 November 2022.

<sup>52</sup> The Kosin position, reporting directly to the JI amir, reflected the new JI structure set up in 2016. It was designed to solve problems of the membership at a provincial level. See Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, “Verdict in the case of Ir. Para Wijayanto alias Abang alias Mas alias Abu Askary alias Abu Faiz alias Aji Pangestu,” Decision

Hasanudin also contacted several men who had once been active in JI or JAT but were against ISIS to rejoin and help manage JI in Poso.<sup>53</sup>

In a 2018 meeting of JI coordinators in Ungaran, Central Java, Hasanudin reported on JI-Poso efforts to meet recruitment targets. He said ten new members had been recruited in 2018 and the target was 60 for 2019, 40 from Poso and 20 from Palu.<sup>54</sup> In 2018, he also reactivated the military training program (*tadrib askari*) for new members of JI Poso. To this end, he borrowed weapons from JI members in South Sulawesi who had taken part in military training in Mindanao.<sup>55</sup> He made Panda Jaya in South Pamona, Central Sulawesi, the new centre for training.<sup>56</sup>

Only in August 2021 did the police learn how the involvement of senior JI members, including Hasanudin, in BNPT deradicalisation programs was a cover for protecting JI's strategic agenda in Poso.<sup>57</sup> Hasanudin himself was rearrested on 20 August 2021 and later sentenced to 20 years in prison. Ustad Reza and Heri Purnomo were also arrested for their role in procuring weapons for the military training, as were other members from Palu and Sigi.<sup>58</sup> All were members of Hasanudin's network. One man who was notably not arrested was Muhamad Amin Adnan, the local coordinator of the extremist charity Syam Organizer Daerah (SODA) who happened to be the son of Haji Adnan Arsal.<sup>59</sup> Police considered Haji Adnan critical to maintaining the peace in Poso, and they made sure to consult him before making any JI arrests there. As a result, though elsewhere personnel from Syam Organizer were arrested, Amin was left alone, apparently out of concern that his arrest could trigger protests as well as out of a desire to maintain good relations with his father. They may have decided just to keep Amin quiet by making it clear they had the grounds to arrest him if they chose.

## B. Can JI Rise Again?

Even though Hasanudin played a major role in the revitalisation of JI in Poso, several of his actions caused rifts within the local leadership, suggesting splinters might emerge.<sup>60</sup> One was his decision as the director of al-Amanah Pesantren's *yayasan* to accept government aid in 2020. He was questioned over the aid issue a few months later in a meeting – some said it was more like a trial convened in Pinrang, South Sulawesi. It was attended by several members of the *yayasan*, members of the JI central committee (*markaziyah*) and leaders of

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No.308/Pid.Sus/2020/PN Jkt.Tim. See also See Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Hasanudin alias Hasan alias Slamet Raharjo alias Nacho bin Rahim," Decision No.451/Pid.Sus/2022/PN Jkt.Brt

<sup>53</sup> IPAC interview with former member of JAT-Poso, Tangerang Selatan, 16 March 2023.

<sup>54</sup> Op.cit.

<sup>55</sup> Two of these members were Nur Sahid alias Sofi alias Boxer and Heri Purnomo alias Mugiroh. Heri Purnomo was a graduate of JI's training program in Mindanao from 2002 to 2005. He conducted a military training in Kolaka, Southeast Sulawesi for JI cadre from both Java and Sulawesi. See Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Muhammad Muthohar alias Thohar aliat Mamat alias Achmad Thohari alias Muadz alias Abu Abdurrahman alia Tanjung alias Mas Nur alias Bahar alias Muadz alias Alip". Decision No. 365/Pid.Sus/2022/PN Jkt.Brt.

<sup>56</sup> IPAC interview with member of JI Poso, Poso, 4 March 2023.

<sup>57</sup> See Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Heri P alias Heri Purnomo alias Heri alias Mugiroh Bin Slamet," Decision No. 345/Pid.Sus/2022/PN.Jkt.Tim. Others who took part were Yusrin Ikhtiwani from Bima, as of 2023 the head of Yayasan Pondok Pesantren Amanah/Amanatul Ummah.

<sup>58</sup> "Densus 88 Tangkap 5 Tersangka Teroris Jaringan JI di Palu dan Sigi," beritasatu.com, 17 March 2023.

<sup>59</sup> For more on Syam Organizer, see IPAC, "Extremist Charities and Terrorist Fund-Rising in Indonesia", Report No.7631 March 2022, p. 11. For Amin Adnan's involvement in SODA Poso, see Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Chairul Bachry alias Mas Irul Bin Bedjo Subronto," Decision No.1031/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Brt, p. 30.

<sup>60</sup> Among those in JI-Poso who were opposed to government aid were Ustad Afif, Tohir, Hudzaifah, and Zein.

JI from Poso and Palu. The dispute was mediated by Arif Siswanto, representing the *markaziyah*.<sup>61</sup> Arif himself did not think that the aid violated organizational principles, but he suggested to Hasanudin to stop taking it and work toward self-sufficiency instead.

The al-Amanah *yayasan* continued to receive government aid, however, in the form of a new dormitory; scholarships for members of JI families who had become willing to work with the government; animals for sacrifice on Muslim holy days; and packages of rice, cooking oil and other basic goods (*sembako*).<sup>62</sup> Several disgruntled members withdrew from the *yayasan* as a result and set up their own schools.<sup>63</sup> If these new schools take off, they could become a new source of recruitment for militant groups.

JI continued to disseminate its teachings after Hasanuddin's arrest. Its teachers could still conduct indoctrination and recruitment through other channels, such as by holding study sessions in local JI-influenced mosques. In mid-2023, Masjid Muhajirin in Kayamanya was one such mosque, and there were others in Tamanjeka, Gebang Rejo, Kalora, and other Muslim-majority villages, as well as in Palu. In addition to religious study, these *taklim* were used to identify participants to invite to smaller, closed meetings, where the vision and mission of JI were introduced.<sup>64</sup>

## V. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF VIOLENCE

Even though the strength of JI, MIT and other militant groups in Poso has declined sharply, the government still faces difficult challenges in ensuring that the area stays peaceful. It will need to guard against the rebuilding of MIT and JI, including the recruitment of women and minors; clandestine extremist teaching in pesantrens, even whose heads have sworn allegiance to the state; the emergence of new extremist groups and splinters; as well as the eruption of communal tensions, which are never very far below the surface.

That said, some of the older ex-prisoners are convinced that the decline in violence in Poso in 2023 is very different to the period of relative calm following the wave of arrests in January 2007:

In 2007, there were many people with a high commitment to jihad who had not been arrested and many fugitives who were fighting as guerrillas. Many teachers came to me and said, "Come on, we have to continue the struggle!" Many who had

<sup>61</sup> Arif Siswanto, from Sukoharjo, Central Java, was head of the committee to select a new amir after Para Wijayanto was arrested in July 2019. Some said that he himself was the strongest candidate, but he was arrested in November 2020 which automatically made him ineligible. As of 2023, it was not clear whether a new amir had been chosen.

<sup>62</sup> See Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Hasanudin alias Hasan alias Slamet Raharjo alias Nacho bin Rahim," Decision No.451/Pid.Sus/2022/PN Jkt.Br, p. 9-10.

<sup>63</sup> Ustaf Afif set up Madina-Poso in Kayamanya, which is a branch of JI's proselytisation network, Majelis Dakwah Islam Indonesia (MADINA), with 26 branches around Indonesia. His colleague Ustad Tohir established a Qur'anic memorisation school and mosque, Sekolah Tahfidz Tingkat Dasar (STTD) Ashabul Qur'an and Masjid Islamic Centre Yayasan Cahaya Islam in the village of Meongko Lama.

<sup>64</sup> Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Bahar Lasiri alias Bahar alias Papa Risky alias Papa Ipang," Decision No.452/Pid.Sus/2022/PN Jkt.Br. Other JI-influenced mosques were the Masjid Husnayain, in Silae, Kota Palu and Masjid Al-Muhajirin in Bau, Kec. Sayo Jaya, North Morowali.



come from Java or elsewhere outside Poso were still active. If there was a cooling down after 2007, it was because people were afraid, not because they had changed their views or saw things differently. The cooling down now is because there is an awareness that ISIS was wrong. They aren't making plans like they were before.<sup>65</sup>

It is nevertheless worth keeping an eye on high-risk individuals; high-risk institutions; and the state of communal relations.

## A. High-Risk Individuals

One group that the government needs monitor closely are the ex-prisoners who served their time in full without remissions and refused to take part in deradicalisation programs, either while in prison or after release. They can act as extremist proselytisers or recruiters of new members; obstruct government efforts to weaken militant networks; or perpetrate acts of terrorism. If new extremist groups emerge outside Poso, these ex-prisoners could become the key to building alliances.

From 2017 to 2022, some 26 ex-MIT prisoners from Poso who had served their sentences in full were released, and several others will be out in late 2023 and 2024. Three individuals stand out.

- Ustad Awaludin will be released in October 2023 from Pasir Putih prison in Nusakambangan and is the leading candidate to replace Ustad Yasin, his father-in-law, as the leading radical cleric in Poso. Before his arrest, he served as Yasin's right-hand man in running the pesantren in Kayamanya. He is the son of Nasir Selleng, a former MIT prisoner.<sup>66</sup> Awaludin was arrested in October 2019 and sentenced to four years for planning a bomb attack in Toini village, Poso Pesisir. As of this writing was still refusing to pledge his loyalty to the NKRI.
- Kang Su, father of Khairul alias Irul, Santoso's son-in-law, was released on 7 July 2021 after serving his full sentence of eight years in prison. He was arrested for taking part in military training led by Santoso soon after MIT was first formed. Kang Su remains angry at security forces in general and Satgas Madago Raya in particular because they killed Irul in 2021 and then refused to let him be buried at home. As of this writing, Kang Su was still refusing to swear loyalty to the NKRI or accept aid from the government.
- Linda Ipa, the younger sister of Ali Kalora, served as financial manager for MIT. She was arrested in 2019 for having sent food and smartphones to Ali Kalora and was sentenced to three years in prison. She was released on 11 January 2022. She is married to Hamdan, a senior figure in Mujahidin Kompak Kayamanya who was

<sup>65</sup> IPAC interview with former member of JAT-Poso, Tangerang Selatan, 16 March 2023.

<sup>66</sup> Nasir Selleng lives in Desa Weralulu, Kecamatan Poso Pesisir and assists with religious activities at Yasin's pesantren. He was released in 2018 after serving his term in full. Nasir remains hostile toward Detachment 88 and has influenced his son to reject any involvement with the government. IPAC interview, Poso, 03 March 2023.

arrested in 2003 after he took part in an attack on Beteleme, a Christian village. Linda and Hamdan were very upset with the police refusal to let Ali Kalora be buried in Poso.

In addition to these three, several others have been released without remissions and were categorised as “red”, i.e. needing post-release monitoring.<sup>67</sup> Many JI-Poso also remain active and have the potential to attract the former followers of Ustad Yasin, in addition to recruiting new members.<sup>68</sup>

## **B. Pesantren Darul Anshor Putri, Kayamanya**

Pondok Pesantren Darul Anshor Putri in Kayamanya, Poso, an MIT stronghold, remains a high-risk institution, even though it has been renamed the Iman Nafian Qur’anic Memorization School and the government is involved in its management.

The pesantren for girls was first set up by Ustad Yasin around 2011 in Tamanjeka, Poso Pesisir shortly after JAT-Poso was formed. But when police detected a military training camp in the area in early 2012, Yasin moved the pesantren to Kayamanya. After his release from prison in 2016, Yasin ran study sessions for male MIT followers in the mosque, while assisting his wife, Mei Ekowati or Ustadzah Eki, in teaching the radicalised girls and women of Poso. These included MIT widows as well as women left on their own because their husbands were in prison or still fighting in the hills.

The school helped reinforce the commitment of these women to MIT’s jihad agenda through the religious meetings (*taklim*) and the provision of aid. Lasmi alias Umi Syifa, the second wife of Ali Kalora, was one beneficiary. Umi Syifa had first married an MIT fighter who was killed in 2015. Even though she had taken part in a police deradicalization program, received government assistance for a small-scale enterprise, and was encouraged to marry a man from outside the militant network, she still took part in the gatherings at Darul Anshor Putri, not because she sought vengeance for the death of her husband but because there was an economic incentive for attending.<sup>69</sup> She said:

Since 2015, when my husband died, I attended the meetings with Ustad Yasin’s wife. My goal wasn’t just the *taklim*, but they gave out assistance. You didn’t get it unless you attended. Rp.100,000 per person. Also Rp.100,000 per child. I had four children, so I got Rp.400,000, then another Rp.100,000 for me.<sup>70</sup>

In 2018, Umi Syifa married a local man with no connections to MIT who died a year later of illness. She then married MIT commander Ali Kalora online by proxy at the beginning of 2020 and decided to join him in the hills. She was captured by Satgas Madago Raya on 29 July

<sup>67</sup> These include Arif Susanto, an MIT fighter who made the bombs used in Tonipa and Kawua villages, who was arrested in 2014 and released in 2018; Hasan Zahabi alias Hasan Ayam, arrested in 2015 for sending supplies to MIT, released on 30 May 2019 (his wife, Rosmawati, was arrested in 2015 for funding MIT and was released in 2017); and Sutriyono alias Mas Tri from Panca Makmur, Kec. Soyo Jaya, Morowali Utara, who was arrested in 2015 for making bombs for MIT, sentenced to four years in prison, and released without remissions on 7 January 2020. Hasanudin once approached him about continuing Santoso’s struggle, but he refused, saying he had been “traumatised” by his experience in Pasir Putih prison on Nusakambangan. IPAC interview, Poso, 4 March 2023.

<sup>68</sup> They include Ustad Afif, Harits Imaduddin, Amin, Yusrin Ichtawan, and Jamil Adnan, Ust. Adnan Arsal’s son.

<sup>69</sup> Umi Syifa also received assistance from Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), a Ministry of Social Affairs program.

<sup>70</sup> Interview IPAC, Poso, 6 March 2023.



2020 and served two and a half years in prison. Before her release, she swore an oath of loyalty to the Indonesian republic as symbolic proof that she was disassociating herself from the militants. As a result, she was ostracised by other women who were still active at Darul Anshor Putri.

Even after Ustad Yasin was arrested for the second time on 2 September 2020, the school continued to stay strong, recruiting new cadres to support the MIT struggle. In Yasin's absence, it was run by Ust. Abdul Malik, assisted by Yasin's son, Ustad Azzam. As a result, it was watched closely by the security forces. In May 2022, they arrested Abdul Malik and Azzam, together with dozens of their followers, especially those from the Darul Anshor Putri and the region of Ampana, Tojo Una-una. They were arrested on suspicion of joining MIT in the hills. (See Appendix for names.)

The arrests paralyzed the pesantren, especially after Ustad Yasin was sentenced to life in prison on 19 May 2021. Only Yasin's wife and a few women remained committed to the pesantren's extremist agenda. The local government threatened to dissolve the school because it did not have an official permit to operate. Several former inmates who had helped set up the pesantren such as Ahmad Wahyono alias Yono Adem and Wikra Wardhana, suggested to Yasin's wife that she establish a foundation (*yayasan*) as a way of legalising and thus saving the school.<sup>71</sup> This project, however, was taken over by several former prisoners who were close to Detachment 88 and its Social Identification Team (Idensos) that handles deradicalization programs.<sup>72</sup> They convinced Yasin's wife to form Yayasan Iman Nafian, headed by Yono Adem, and the name of the school itself was changed from Darul Anshor Putri to Iman Nafian Qur'anic Memorization School.<sup>73</sup> Although Ust. Yasin and his wife are reported to have sworn a pledge of allegiance to the Indonesian republic (NKRI), it was not clear how sincere that commitment was or how long it would last. Yono reportedly had to ensure that Yasin's wife did not display her hostility toward the police too openly.

The successful intervention of the police in the management of the school effectively shut down militant recruitment, at least in the short term. The pesantren's mosque was also renamed.<sup>74</sup> In addition, Yasin's followers – those who had not sworn the NKRI oath – agreed to stop recruitment after a wave of arrests of MIT supporters in May 2022. They also agreed that the school would focus on preaching in the community (*dakwah*) and on the education of its young women students.<sup>75</sup>

Nevertheless, the government must remain alert to activities at the school. Even if the reported change in attitude on the part of Yasin and his wife is genuine, it is not a guarantee that extremist ideological teachings will disappear. Yono Adem, for example, the head of the new Yayasan Iman Nafian, was a former MIT prisoner who was released in 2018 after serving

<sup>71</sup> Others in the group included Iran, Hasan, Arif Susanto, and Asrul. IPAC interview, Poso, 3 March 2023.

<sup>72</sup> All these ex-prisoners were from the group of Ikhwan Muhajirin Kayamanya (former fighters who had joined the Kayamanya group from outside the neighbourhood). Among them were Emil Samil Mardani alias Emil, Haikal Bandang, and Suhardi alias Gode alias Adi Gode.

<sup>73</sup> Another ex-prisoner, Gunawan Dhuraejo alias Gugun was secretary and several other *muhajirin* became managers.

<sup>74</sup> The name of the Darul Anshor mosque was changed to Masjid Fatimah Azzahrah. It was open to all and only used for prayers – no more *taklim*.

<sup>75</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 3 March 2023.

his five-year sentence in full. Normally, as noted above, such prisoners would be considered a high risk for recidivism. But in this case, Yono was prepared to compromise with the police to ensure that his younger brother, Ust. Abdul Malik, who had replaced Ust. Yasin as head of the pesantren, would be treated well after his arrest by Detachment 88 in May 2022. He therefore agreed to head the foundation and became the liaison with the police, allowing them to enter the pesantren, bringing government aid. He would not allow the Indonesian flag to be flown at the pesantren, however, and threatened to leave the foundation if it did. The police did not insist, and as of mid-2023, it was still not flying.

In early 2023, Yasin's wife was willing to receive aid in the form basic goods (rice, cooking oil and so on) from the provincial police, but she quietly distributed it to her husband's supporters rather than use it for her female students. She preferred to use funds from Sarang Walet for the pesantren's needs. This was an enterprise started by Yasin in Kayamanya that at its height was able to raise tens of millions of rupiah in a single week.<sup>76</sup>

If the pesantren can survive on its own without government aid, it may also be able to maintain control over its policies, especially in terms of curriculum and school activities. In addition, its independence will ensure that its authority among those who are still radical remains intact, so that they could still choose it as a place to send their children.

### **C. Communal Fights Among Youths**

Communal fights among youths can be a path to radicalisation for the Muslims involved. One major goal of MIT's violence against Christians was to spark a retaliatory attack so that Muslim-Christian fighting would once again erupt. Another conflagration along the lines of the conflict in 2000-2001 is highly unlikely, both because the political situation is different and the police and public are better prepared. But small incidents can still spark dangerous communal mobilisation.

The incident that nearly spiralled out of control began with the anger of Christian youths in Bada, a Christian-majority hamlet of Toini village, after a Muslim teen had driven through their neighborhood in a way they considered disrespectful. The Christians, who had had too much to drink, decided to track him down and beat him up, but they beat up the wrong person. The assaulted youth reported the incident to his friends in Kayamanya, including to one who was active at Pondok Pesantren Darul Anshor Putri. That evening, as prayer time approached, a crowd began to gather with the intention of mounting an attack on Bada hamlet. By this time, the local police at the subdistrict police station had heard about the incident and were monitoring it, but their inaction for several crucial hours allowed the situation to escalate.

Eventually they arrested the Christian youths and took them to the sub-district police station (Polsek) in Poso Pesisir. They asked the residents of Bada to evacuate. They also prepared to block roads so that a crowd could not push its way through. When evening prayers were over, a large crowd gathered in Bada, many carrying rocks and air guns. Police managed to disperse them. More people came in from Poso. They included many former militants from

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<sup>76</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 3 March 2023.

Kayamanya. They succeeded in getting through to Bada, but help arrived from Brimob and the military. The crowd continued to search for the Christian youths even after being told that they were all arrested. The hamlet was empty, the houses dark. Nevertheless, the Christians who stayed behind tried to resist by throwing rocks.

The Muslims carrying air guns shot at the Christians and the security forces. They also damaged a church. Eventually the police asked Ust. Adnan Arsal to come and help calm the crowd. He arrived and asked the Muslims to disperse and go home and warned that he would not be responsible for the consequences if they refused. He also said he would guarantee personally that the perpetrators would be prosecuted. Eventually, the crowd complied.<sup>77</sup>

The Toini case shows how much peace in Poso depends on Ust. Adnan. If a similar incident happens again and Ust. Adnan is not there, it will be more difficult to find a solution – a fact that police should build into their calculations as they look at possible scenarios and anticipate the outbreak of another such fight – and one happened as recently as early 2023.<sup>78</sup> Poso police fear that the frequency of these spats between youths who already know each other could escalate unless the police succeed in ensuring that no one gets killed. If a Muslim youth becomes a victim, the danger is that former prisoners – both those who have been “deradicalized” and those who have not – could once again engage in acts of violence.

#### **D. Minors**

One of the most difficult challenges will be to monitor the social media communications of a new generation of militants. Not only do they tend to be more adept at smart phones and more social media-literate than their parents, but they can quickly absorb extremist religious teachings and follow instructions online about weapons, including bomb-making, without taking part in military training. If there is a difference now, it is that most of the men like Ustad Yasin who acted as mentors to young people are under arrest, but prevention efforts still need to be targeted at young students. One JI teacher and former prisoner said:

Young people are particularly vulnerable when they're exposed to extremist teachings, because they're at the age where they're always searching. It's worse with social media because they're so easily influenced. They can act on their own without an organization. They go straight from the Internet to a suicide bombing. In my time we didn't have social media. We started with one *taklim* after another, then we underwent training, then we had to be evaluated. The process is different now.

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<sup>77</sup> No media covered the Toini incident. The chronology recounted here is based on information from interviews conducted by IPAC. The incident took place one week before Police Chief Bogiek was transferred from Poso.

<sup>78</sup> At the beginning of 2023, another clash took place after a group of inebriated Christian youths from Toini beat up a Muslim youth. Police this time moved quickly to prevent the resulting tension from turning into a mass mobilisation by mediating among the families involved.

Cases involving minors from Poso, like Ali alias Darwin Gobel, Sofyan SM Kuna alias Sofyan, and Mohamad Irham alias Aco, show how these teenagers used the app Telegram to contact militant groups outside Poso and follow ISIS teachings.<sup>79</sup> All had sworn allegiance to ISIS.

## VI. THE PROBLEM OF “DERADICALISATION”

Poso has many different deradicalization programs, but several are not working as intended. The 2018 anti-terrorism law (UU No.5/2018) made deradicalisation the joint responsibility of many ministries and agencies, with BNPT responsible for coordinating their efforts. As of 2022, 46 such institutions were involved in a so-called Synergy Program (Program Sinergitas), each of which had allocated funding for separate projects, sometimes without careful evaluation of needs, clear criteria for beneficiaries, or independent assessment of results, including auditing of expenditures. The Transportation Ministry provided “helmet aid”, the provision of motorcycle helmets to cooperative ex-prisoners in Poso. The Social Affairs Ministry gave funds for indoor football fields (*futsal*). The Agriculture Ministry provided goats in one case, tractors in another. The Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR) built dormitories for pesantrens.

The law defines deradicalization as the process designed to “erase, reduce or reverse” violent extremist ideology which has already been instilled. It is to be carried out among those “suspected, indicted, or convicted of terrorism; released after serving a sentence for terrorism”; or exposed to terrorist teachings. It can take the form of religious counselling, nationalism training (building on the declaration of loyalty to the NKRI), or entrepreneurship assistance.<sup>80</sup> In Poso, much of the aid was directed to released terrorism offenders (*napiter*) who had sworn allegiance to the Indonesian state or to once-radical schools that were willing to fly the Indonesian flag.

BNPT in Jakarta deemed a project successful if ex-prisoners or extremist-affiliated institutions accepted the aid and agreed to be photographed under a banner with the BNPT logo. The perception of informants in Poso was that all that mattered to the head office was that the money be spent. Said one source:

There’s a crisis of trust toward BNPT, but the people at BNPT-Central don’t want to hear about it. Here’s the aid, distribute it to the ex-prisoners, take photos, show the

<sup>79</sup> Darwin Gobel and Sofyan were active in one pro-ISIS Telegram group in 2014, and then began attending the taklim at Ust. Yasin’s pesantren. They began intensive communication through Facebook and WhatsApp with a Toli-Toli teacher, Ust. Mahbub alias Abu Mujadid. They had never met him face to face, only through social media, when they left Poso in March 2017 to carry out a bomb attack at his suggestion on the police station in Toli-Toli.

<sup>79</sup> Both were 18 years old at the time. The attack was foiled by police, and the two were arrested. After his release in March 2019, Darwin was killed by police as part of the operation against MIT on 15 April 2020. In 2018, another plot foiled by police involved a plan by two Facebook friends, one of them a minor, to bomb a Hindu temple in Morowali on Nyepi, one of the holiest days in Balinese Hinduism. (There are many Balinese migrants in Central Sulawesi).<sup>79</sup> IPAC interview, Tojo Una-una, 5 March 2023.

<sup>80</sup> Law No.5/2018, Article 43D, <https://jdih.kemenkopmk.go.id>.

logo, send it to the BNPT Synergy Group with a brief description, that's it, job done. That's what the head office wants.<sup>81</sup>

Building trust with the former prisoners, however, was a longer-term proposition.

### **A. Frustrations with BNPT**

Frustrations with BNPT ranged from concerns with how beneficiaries were selected, to the poor quality of some of the projects, sometimes apparently resulting from corruption, to lack of interest on the part of the head office about whether the projects had any impact in “erasing, reducing or reversing” extremist thinking.

One man close to many of the former prisoners was concerned that BNPT only wanted aid delivered to former prisoners who had sworn the NKRI loyalty pledge, whereas he was convinced that the aid should be offered even to prisoners who were still refusing to pledge.

In fact, everyone should be approached at first. It doesn't matter if they refuse. You have to keep approaching them, find out why they're refusing, invite them to chat, have coffee so you can get close to them. You can't use a standard that you give the NKRI people aid, then leave. It can turn out that behind the scenes, they're still involved [with extremism].<sup>82</sup>

There were questions about some of the institutional beneficiaries as well. The Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR) provided dormitories and other in-kind assistance to extremist pesantrens that agreed to cooperate with the government. But one of the schools that received aid, Pesantren Walisongo, had no history of radicalism, though it had been the site of a massacre of Muslims by Christians in 2000.

BNPT-Central decided that two of the schools that would receive aid would be the Amanah and Walisongo pesantrens. The aid was huge, billions. Amanah received the most. It was enough to repair the buildings at the school, build dormitories. They could also buy a car for operational needs. [...]. I didn't know why PUPR gave aid to Walisongo. If the criterion was that the pesantren had to be radical, that meant that Walisongo was radical. I was surprised: they didn't want to be branded radical, but they wanted [BNPT] aid. They asked me to give them a car for operational purposes, too. Who was I? I was instructed to do an evaluation. I told the head office, there's aid from PUPR that's not being used as intended. I said the aid to Walisongo was not the appropriate destination.<sup>83</sup>

Nevertheless, a dormitory that could accommodate 84 students – far more than the number of boarding students at the school at the time – was constructed at a cost of Rp.3.5 billion [USD\$233,934] and inaugurated in March 2022. Some suggested that Pesantren Walisongo had only received aid because its directors had lobbied BNPT in Jakarta.

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<sup>81</sup> IPAC interview, 1 March 2023.

<sup>82</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>83</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 1 March 2023.

The Amanah school, which clearly *did* have a history of radicalism, was given aid because it was following the government curriculum and was willing to accept government assistance. But one source said that these factors should not be seen as indicators of successful deradicalization, and he was concerned that some of the managers were still committed JI members. Rather, the focus should be on ensuring that the meetings taking place inside the pesantren, the materials being used as teaching materials, and the backgrounds of the school's teachers and *yayasan* managers were all free of extremist influence.<sup>84</sup>

A project from the Ministry of Social Affairs also had problems. One former prisoner had suggested that he and his friends would like to have an indoor football field (*futsal*). BNPT agreed. It was hoped that the facilities would be welcomed by the former combatants, so they could enjoy sports and not think about jihad. But things did not work out as planned:

My predecessor got aid of Rp.150 million from Social Affairs: Rp 100 million for building the field, Rp.50 million to tell people about it (*sosialisasi*). They built the field near the Tamanjeka elementary school. The land belonged to the school. But BNPT never finished the field, they just poured cement. I heard from the head of the school that funds ran out, so construction stopped. When I checked, it turned out the funds had been corrupted. But the report to Social Affairs was submitted anyway.<sup>85</sup>

The former prisoner who initially proposed the field did not hold back his irritation over the stalled construction: “BNPT is just promises,” he said.<sup>86</sup>

There were also problems with some of the entrepreneurship aid given to ex-prisoners who had been designated BNPT partners. Initially, the aid was given in the form of capital for small-scale businesses. As the program foundered, BNPT tried to reduce the amount given as cash and replace it with in-kind assistance.<sup>87</sup> But the program was chaotic, in part because it was not carefully monitored, in part because of the limited skills of some of the BNPT field staff. One partner pretended to be interested in raising goats, but as soon as he got the animals, he sold them. One partner in Palu complained that he was supposed to receive Rp.5 million in aid to buy tools for his business, but the tools that were purchased were worth far less. “Where the rest of the money went, who knows,” he said.<sup>88</sup> The provision of aid was sometimes forced on recipients, did not match needs or was only given out to meet targets for distribution. One man sold a tractor he was given because he had no land to farm.<sup>89</sup>

## B. Other Obstacles

Another problem BNPT's deradicalisation program faced was the lack of support from the local government. One project of its Synergy Program was the construction of National

<sup>84</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>85</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>86</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>87</sup> There was still some cash aid from BNPT, however, for newly released prisoners Sofyan and Darwin Gobel received Rp.15 million not long after being released in March 2019. Sofyan used the money to buy a cow, but Darwin used it to buy a homemade weapon and join MIT. He was shot dead by police on 15 April 2020. Interview IPAC, Tojo Una-una, 5 March 2023.

<sup>88</sup> IPAC interview, Palu, 27 February 2023.

<sup>89</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 6 March 2023.

Integrated Areas (Kawasan Terpadu Nusantara, KTN) in several provinces including Central Sulawesi. This was a program based on what BNPT deemed a successful model in Turen, Malang, East Java where partners developed several agricultural projects for ex-prisoners. Poso was the primary target in Central Sulawesi. The local government in Poso, however, refused to cooperate in building the KTN because it did not want Poso branded as a terrorist hotbed. In the end, the KTN program was moved to Morowali district. The Morowali government set aside seven hectares of land that could be used for agriculture, animal husbandry, plantation crops and other agricultural enterprises. The difficulty was that because it was far from Poso, most former prisoners could not benefit from it.

Sometimes, problems with the Sinergitas program originated with the ministries who funded the project. In early 2023, for example, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs told a local BNPT staffer that there was assistance available in the form of baby fish (“fish seeds”, *bibit ikan*) for stocking fishponds. The staffer said:

I told friend to make a list of the ex-prisoners who would get some. Suddenly someone from the ministry asked for a proposal with the identity cards (KTP) of the potential recipients attached. I was about to leave for Jakarta to attend a meeting at BNPT-Central. I phoned my friend and asked him to collect photocopies of the cards. I would help draft a proposal with the copies attached. The Ministry official wanted it immediately. [We sent it], but up till now, there’s no sign of the baby fish. Who’s going to take the blame? Me and my friend. We’re held responsible by the ex-prisoners because they submitted their KTP and there’s no sign of the fish.

I asked the Ministry, they said there were 70,000 baby fish, but they were in Manado. If you want to go get them, you have to use your own money. The Ministry doesn’t have transport funds to bring them from Manado. I reported this to BNPT. They said they couldn’t help. My friend and I are stuck. Up till now, the fish haven’t been collected. We don’t have the money. Are we going to use my salary?<sup>90</sup>

The transport costs from Poso to Manado were not insignificant, and the donors of the fish had never mentioned that they would have to be collected from a city 23 hours away by car. The ex-prisoners were angry at BNPT because they had collected all the data requested but the fish had never been delivered. For the BNPT fieldworkers, who had to confront the supposed recipients, “It was like being a rabbit in a tiger cage. If the tiger runs out of food, it’s we who get eaten.”<sup>91</sup>

### C. The Police Initiative

The local police also had a deradicalization program aimed at former prisoners. During the tenure of Poso police chief (Kapolres) Bogiek Sugiyarto from 2018 to 2019, the program was designed to assist recently released prisoners in business enterprises. Bogiek himself was an unusually dedicated and creative chief, who had excellent relations with the community. He made a point of mapping out who was in prison, who was released and who was about to

<sup>90</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 1 March 2023.

<sup>91</sup> IPAC interview, Poso, 1 March 2023.



released, and got to know most of the inmates and their families personally, continuing communication with them even after he was transferred out of Poso. The experience of one former prisoner named Mulyadi in a small-scale business to refill bottled water jugs was a widely-reported instance of the program's success. But the program ultimately stopped because of a limitation on funds – the police budget had to be refocused to deal with the pandemic. And then Chief Bogiek was transferred.

As of mid-2023, the police had a program called “Friday sharing”, a discussion between the Kapolres and the former prisoners on their lives and personal issues, after which each participant received a package of basic goods (*sembako*). During the time of provincial police chief Rudy Sufahriadi, in March 2022, there was also a program to renovate the home of Tini Kaduka, the wife of MIT leader Ali Kalora. Tini, however, was reluctant to stay in the house and preferred to live at Pesantren Darul Anshar Putri in Kayamanya.<sup>92</sup>

Detachment 88 also had a program to send children of ex-prisoners to pesantrens outside of Poso that were considered pro-government. One beneficiary was the child of Umi Syifa, the ex-wife of Ali Kalora, who was transferred from Ust. Yasin's Darul Anshar Putri to a pesantren in Tangerang, outside Jakarta. The wife of Ust. Reza had also requested assistance from Detachment 88 to send her child to one of these schools. The program could be useful as a way to stop regeneration of militant groups, but the program remained very limited and could not meet the demands of the parents requesting scholarships for their children.

Resistance to deradicalisation has also come from the ex-prisoners themselves. Not all want to live off the aid or business capital provided by BNPT or the police. Some have chosen a fast track to income generation through dealing in used or stolen motorcycles or hoarding subsidized diesel to sell to mining companies in Central Sulawesi.<sup>93</sup> Several former prisoners are also working as security guards for nickel mines in Morowali or gold mines in Parigi Moutong. When a clash took place between local and mainland Chinese workers at the Chinese-owned GNI nickel mine on 14 January 2023, one ex-prisoner said that it was none of their business to defend the Indonesian workers because China was their business friend.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Interview IPAC, 02 March 2023.

<sup>93</sup> One petrol station in Poso did not serve those who wanted to purchase diesel even though their stocks were full, because the subsidised diesel had already been ordered by ex-prisoners from Mujahidin KOMPAK Kayamanya to sell to mining companies. Rumours were circulating in Poso that their diesel monopoly was backed by rogue members of the security forces (*oknum*), both TNI and police. The rumours were based on the fact that their hoarding had been reported to police but no action was ever taken.

<sup>94</sup> In addition to working as security guards, the former prisoners also accompanied potential Chinese investors when they conducted surveys of the nickel mining sites in Morowali. The ex-prisoners were also used as negotiators when the companies confronted anti-mining demonstrators in Parigi Moutong. In fact, it was not so much negotiation as intimidation of the demonstrators to stop their anti-mining agitation. Among the former prisoners who worked for the mine as of mid-2023 were Adi Kalora alias Haswiadi Taher, Zubair alias Subair alias Suba, Akbar alias Rosi alias Jojo, Muhammad Asmaul alias Muket, Muhamad David Yahya, Paitang, Farid Podungge, Erwin Mardani alias Jodi, and Farid Makruf alias Farid. IPAC interview, Palu, 27 February 2023.



## **VII. CONCLUSION: A NEW DIRECTION NEEDED FOR POSO**

Militant groups in Poso remain a threat, even if they are greatly weakened.

The government, via BNPT and the various ministries involved in Program Sinergitas, must look carefully at their own programs and make sure that they are clean, transparent, and reaching the proper recipients. All of these agencies need to ensure that their field staff have the necessary training, background information, and skills to choose beneficiaries wisely so the aid does not go astray – no more tractors to individuals who have no land. They need to increase the incentives of good staff to stay and provide security guarantees to those who deal directly with former prisoners. They also need to increase the number of staff assigned to areas like Poso where the number of former prisoners is so high.

The security forces must foster good relations with former prisoners, in a way that depends on frequent communication and sustained personal interest in their welfare -- not just on aid projects. There is no guarantee that those who have declared their loyalty to the state will not return to violent extremism, because prisoners often used the oath to get lighter sentences or assistance after their release. Monitoring by well-trained and well-informed local police with good communication skills and a basic understanding of terrorist networks is important.

More funding should be made available from the Synergy Program for scholarships and educational activities. Detachment 88 has already taken steps to ensure improved schooling opportunities for children of former prisoners, but the program is still very limited. BNPT could work with high schools and universities to special attention to children from Poso, both children of former prisoners as well as others in the community.

As elections approach in 2024, it is important to keep a close watch on political developments in Poso to ensure that militants do not exploit local rivalries.

Children of different faiths should be brought together in Poso school programs. At present, neighborhoods and schools are deeply segregated along religious lines. The Poso government should make a point of creating opportunities for more interaction, including by bringing Christian children to pesantrens that have received government aid, and bringing pesantren students to visit Christian-majority schools.

Poso has a chance to leave violent extremism behind, but it will require more targeted interventions and willingness to make corrections and improvements in ongoing programs to ensure that the gains made by law enforcement are sustained.

## APPENDIX I: MIT Terrorism Offenders from Kabupaten Poso (2012-2022)

Note: The last MIT arrest took place on 5 June 2023

No	Name	Date of Birth	Village	Year of Arrest	Status, Due for Release
1	Abdul Hadip alias Aco Bambu bin Muin (Alm)*	05-May-81	Masamba	2015	Released, 2018
2	Abdul Malik Wahyudin*	21-May-97	Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
3	Abdul Wahab Iskandar*		Bega	2022	Convicted, 2025
4	Ahmad Kamal		Bega	2022	On trial
5	Ahmad Wahyono alias Yono Adem*	23-Apr-86	Gebang Rejo	2015	2018
6	Akbar Laba		Meongko Lama	2022	On trial
7	Akbar Tarore alias Baron bin Muhtar Tarore*	24-Mar-96	Meongko Lama	2019	Released, 2022
8	Ali Sanang alias Papa Irul*	18-Aug-78	Masani-Tamanjeka	2013	Released, 2017
9	Amat		Toini	2022	On trial
10	Ambo Intan alias Zubair bin Cora		Masani-Tamanjeka	2014	Released, 2018
11	Amirudin alias Aco Gula Merah	12-Oct-84	Lape	2020	Convicted, 2024
12	Amrulla Soleh bin Misi Duma Pase*	11-May-98	Masani-Ratalemba	2018	Released, 2021
13	Andriansah alias alias Andrian*	11-May-89	Masamba	2015	Released, 2018
14	Ardi alias Uje	5-Feb-91	Kayamanya	2014	Released, 2017
15	Arief Susanto alias Cengok *		Gebang Rejo	2014	Released, 2018
16	Asri Parakasi alias Abu Ipa*	18-Jun-72	Labuan	2015	Released, 2023
17	Asrul Riyadi Jack alias Nasrullah		Kasin Tuwu	2014	Released, 2018
18	Awaluddin bin Muh Nasir Seleng*	11-Dec-94	Ueralulu	2019	Convicted, 2023
19	Azzam alias Muhammad Abdullah Azzam bin Sutomo	6-May-1988	Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
20	Babe alias Riski Kurniawan bin Sugiarto*		Gebang Rejo	2022	Convicted, 2025
21	Baharudin Ahmad alias Andi bin Ahmad Ismail (alm)	31-Dec-86	Kayamanya	2017	Convicted, 2027
22	Baikanali alias Moh. Bhay Khan Ali bin Mus Khan Ali		Lawanga	2022	Convicted, 2025
23	Basri alias Bagong bin Barjo	10-Oct-76	Gebang Rejo	2016	Convicted, 2029
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24	Caco alias Arsyad L. Dg. Pasau bin Saleh Patimbah*		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
25	Dayat alias Samsul Hidayat bin Ambo		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2027
26	Dedi Mahadjura alias Dedi bin Dekman Mahadjura (Alm)*	12-Apr-90	Moengko	2022	Convicted, 2025
27	Deni Bega		Bega	2022	On trial
28	Deni Rahmad Mahadjura alias Deni bin Dekman Mahadjura (Alm)	6-Jun-85	Moengko	2022	Convicted, 2025
29	Diki Riski Kholid Fajri bin Sakarmin		Labuan	2015	Released, 2023
30	Emil Aswar Tanase alias Emil Moengko bin Abdul Malik Tanase*	21-Jan-89	Moengko	2022	Convicted, 2025
31	Eto alias Rahmad A. Nuti bin Amir		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
32	Fahrhan alias Farhan Tolana*		Toini	2022	On trial
33	Farid Makruf alias Farid Tinombo*	23-Oct-82	Kayamanya	2014	Released, 2019
34	Fathan Nur Zulkifli alias Kifli bin Hamzah*		Gebang Rejo	2017	Released, 2021
35	Fauzan alias Celo bin Agustinus Welly*	28-Nov-1994	Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
36	Fitra Kurnia Syarif Taha alias Fitra bin Syaif Taha*		Bonesompe	2022	Convicted, 2026
37	Galang Apriansyah alias Galang bin Suwanto* (Alm)		Gebang Rejo	2022	Convicted, 2025
38	Gilang Alfian alias Lang bin Yanto*		Gebang Rejo	2022	Convicted, 2025
39	Gunawan Dhuraejo alias Gugun alias*	21-Nov-79	Gebang Rejo	2014	Released, 2017
40	Hamdi B Tibe		Bega	2022	On trial
41	Hasan Zahabi alias Hasan Ayam*		Kayamanya	2015	Released, 2019
42	Haswiadi alias Adi Kalora bin Taher		Kalora	2018	Released, 2020
43	Herliansyah alias Andi Baso bin Sultanny		Lape	2022	Convicted, 2025
44	Idris		Tiwa'a	2022	On trial
45	Idul Saputra Ridwan alias Abu Djafar bin Ridwan Supu Djafar*	22-Feb-1995	Gebang Rejo	2022	Convicted, 2026
46	Ifal alias Moh. Ifal Renaldi bin Misdin Sadikin	7-Jul-1995	Gebang Rejo	2022	Convicted, 2025
47	Ikhsan Maulana alias Papa Kembar		Masani-Tamanjeka	2016	Released, 2020

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48	Iki Madong alias Muhamad Riski Wahyudi Idrus bin Rahmat	30-Jan- 1997	Bega	2022	Convicted, 2025
49	Ilham alias Papa Fikri bin H Akib	23-Nov-95	Kilo	2019	Released, 2022
50	Imran alias Genda	18-Jul-89	Tabalu	2019	Released, 2022 (Recidivist)
51	Imran Labuan alias Abu Zahra bin Sudirman	02-Jan-86	Labuan	2017	Released, 2020
52	Indra		Kasiguncu	2022	On trial
53	Isnain Salilama bin Umar Salilama (Alm)*		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
54	Isran alias Donding		Masamba	2015	Released, 2017
55	Jihan alias Khoiruddin bin M. Saiful Anwary		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2026
56	Joko Santoso alias Santo*	25-Jan-75	Labuan	2012	Released, 2015
57	Jumardi bin Arfah Juwardi	2-Mar-85	Taunca	2015	Released, 2018
58	Jumri bin Saleng alias Tamar	1982	Masani- Tamanjeka	2016	Convicted, 2026
59	Juswandi		Bonesompe	2022	On trial
60	Kamal alias Ahmad Kamal*		Kayamanya	2022	On trial
61	Lasmi alias Ummu Sifa binti Nisiduma Paise	12-Mar-92	Masani- Tamanjeka	2020	Released, 2023
62	Linda Ipa alias Ummu Qonita*	13-Mar-88	Kayamanya	2019	Released, 2021
63	M Fadli Gani alias Rodik		Kayamanya	2014	Released, 2018
64	Mohammad Rizki alias Iki Bega		Bega	2022	Convicted, 2026
65	Mario alias Rio Tato*		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
66	Moh Syaifullah Sahaba alias Mamat		Toini	2022	On trial
67	Mohammad Irham bin Latip Bonenehu*	30-Oct-02	Mapane	2018	Released, 2021
68	Muh Fadel Husa alias Fadel Toini bin Yusran Husa*	17-Aug-98	Toini	2022	Convicted, 2025
69	Muh Riski Ramadhan		Gebang Rejo	2022	On trial
70	Muh Rizal Maulana alias Ija alias Rijal bin H Yonta	21-Oct-99	Kilo	2018	Released, 2022
71	Muhadi alias Syu'aib alias Adi alias Abu Humairoh alias Sa'ad bin Usman		Lanto Jaya	2022	Convicted, 2026
72	Muhadi Basir alias alias Sueb*	13-Mar-87	Landangan	2014	Released, 2018
73	Muhammad Firmansyah alias Donjer bin Utomo Akuba	12-Oct- 1998	Kayamanya	2020	Released, 2023
74	Muhammad Nasir Seleng alias Pak Udin*	05-Jul-73	Ueralulu	2015	Released, 2018
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75	Muhammad Unul Usman Paise alias Syamil Tamanjeka	1994	Masani-Tamanjeka	2016	Convicted, 2031
76	Muhrin alias Muh alias Dani*	01-Jan-79	Gebang Rejo	2012	Released, 2015
77	Mulyadi alias Zubair	01-Nov-90	Ratulene	2015	Released, 2017
78	Ngadimin alias Abu Hisyam*	18-Oct-77	Labuan	2012	Released, 2016
79	Paimin alias Imin bin Kasidi		Gebang Rejo	2014	Released, 2017
80	Rahmad Padja alias Papa Fia bin Syahril Padja	05-May-93	Mapana	2020	Convicted, 2024
81	Ramdhan alias Andang bin Baco		Kasiguncu	2015	Released, 2017
82	Reinaldi Dai alias Abu Afkar	30-Sep-95	Kuku	2019	Convicted, 2024
83	Rian Riadi Hudzaifah bin Didi Mulyadi	14-Aug-02	Sintuwulemba	2020	Released, 2022
84	Riswan alias Abu Alif bin Lasong	28-Jan-94	Kayamanya	2019	Released, 2022
85	Riyadi Abdullah alias Mas Riad	10-Oct-69	Kasin Tuwu	2012	Released, 2015
86	Riyanto bin Margono alias Atok Margono*	27-Jun-83	Kayamanya	2013	Released, 2023
87	Rizal Manggala alias Mat Toini bin Ismail S. Manggala*		Toini	2022	On trial
88	Rosmawati alias Umi Yazid		Kayamanya	2015	Released, 2017
89	Rudianto alias Abu Hafshah		Gebang Rejo	2013	Released, 2021
90	Rustam M Djufri alias Ape	5 Nov 79	Kayamanya	2015	Released, 2017
91	Saiful Jambi alias alias Ipul	12-Feb-89	Kayamanya	2015	Released, 2017
92	Samsul alias Papa Tuti bin Mappiare (Alm)*		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
93	Sholihin alias Farhan*	15-Jan-89	Kalora	2022	On trial
94	Sofyan SM Kuna bin Syafruddin	2002	Kayamanya	2017	Released, 2019
95	Sugiatno alias Kang Su*	09-Sep-77	Kalora	2013	Released, 2021
96	Suhardi alias Adi Gode	13-May-91	Kayamanya	2014	Released, 2018
97	Sutomo bin Sudarto alias Ustad Yasin	5-Jul-65	Kayamanya	2020	Convicted, life sentenced
98	Syarifudin Thalib alias Udin bin Sardin Thalib	31-Dec-02	Gebang Rejo	2020	Released, 2022
99	Syuaib		Landangan	2022	On trial
100	Taufik Tarore alias bin Mukhtar Tarore		Moengko	2022	Convicted, 2025
101	Tini Susanti Kaduku alias Ummu Fadhel*	1985	Kalora	2016	Released, 2019

Continued next page

102	Uto alias Muhammad Fajrin Bin Umar Saulama		Kayamanya	2022	Convicted, 2025
103	Wahab		Mapane	2022	On trial
104	Wikra Wardana alias Oca	15-Sep-86	Kayamanya	2014	Released, 2017
105	Yudit Padja alias Abu Zaim	26-Jun-97	Moengko Lama	2019	Convicted, 2024

*\*Red Status (considered high risk)*

## APPENDIX II: JI Terrorism Offenders from Central Sulawesi from 2021

*Note:* This does not include the JI members arrested from 2006 to 2020

No	Name	Date of Birth	District	Year of Arrest	Status, Due for Release
1	Abdul Rahman Sirang Ludja*	3-Apr-1978	Poso	2021	Convicted, 2026
2	Ali Firdaus Als Ali*		Palu	2023	On trial
3	Anwar Rifai Als Ustad Reza*	11-Feb-1984	Poso	2021	Convicted, 2026
4	Arif Risdianto Als Rusdi Als Abdul Manan*		Palu	2023	On trial
5	Bahar Lasiri	17-May-1972	Morowali Utara	2021	Convicted, 2025
6	Firman Als Pak Jaiz*		Poso	2021	Convicted, 2026
7	Hasanuddin Alias Hasan Alias Slamet Raharjo	5-Aug-1972	Poso	2021	Convicted, 2041
8	Kosasih Budianto Als Abu Falah Als Toto*		Palu	2023	On trial
9	Muhammad Abdu Als Abdu*		Palu	2023	On trial
10	Muhammad Toha*		Poso	2021	Convicted, 2026
11	Nurlan Lahaji*	26-Jul-1973	Morowali Utara	2021	Convicted, 2025
12	Rifai Als Papa Fitri Als Daeng Mandrapi	1-Jul-1968	Poso	2021	Convicted, 2025
13	Zainal Bin Mahmud*		Palu	2023	On trial

*\*Red Status (considered high risk)*

**APPENDIX III: MIT Fighters Killed After Santoso's Death (2016)**


No	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Date Killed in Police Ops
1	Abu Alim alias Ambo		Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	17-Jul-21
2	Ahmad Ghazali alias Ahmad Panjang		Poso, Central Sulawesi	04-Jan-22
3	Aji Pandu Soetomo alias Subron		Probolinggo, East Java	19-Sep-16
4	Alhaji Daeng Simamang alias Alhaji Kaliki alias Ibrohim		Ambon, Maluku	21-Mar-19
5	Ali Kalora	30-May-81	Buru, Maluku	18-Sep-21
6	Alvin alias Adam alias Mus'ab alias Alvin Anshori		Banten	02-Mar-21
7	Andhika alias Andika alias Hilal		Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	14-Sep-16
8	Andi Muhammad Fadli alias Andi Abdulah alias Abdullah alias Fadel		Makassar, South Sulawesi	21-Mar-19
9	Askar alias Jaid alias Pak Guru		Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	30-Sept-22
10	Aziz Arifin alias Azis		Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	17-Nov-20
11	Darwin Gobel alias Ali		Poso, Central Sulawesi	15-Apr-20
12	Firdaus alias Barok		Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	15-May-17
13	Hairul alias Irul alias Abu Wardah		Poso, Central Sulawesi	01-Mar-21
14	Ibrahim alias Ibrohim		China	17-Aug-16
15	Jaka Ramadan alias Ramadhan alias Ikrima		Banten	21-Mar-19
16	Maret Pamungkas alias Sobron alias Adji Pandu Suwontomo		Purbalingga, Central Java	19-Sep-16
17	Nae alias Galuh	3-Apr-92	Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	18-May-22
18	Qatar alias Abu Farel	10-Aug-94	Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	17-Jul-21
19	Rajif Gandhi Sabban alias Rajes		Ambon, Maluku	25-Apr-20
20	Romzi alias Bashyir		Bima, West Nusa Tenggara	03-Mar-19
21	Rukli	29-Dec-99	Poso, Central Sulawesi	11-Jul-21
22	Suhardin alias Hasan Pranata	26-Dec-85	Poso, Central Sulawesi	27-Apr-22
23	Suharyono alias Yono Sayur alias Pak Hiban		Poso, Central Sulawesi	10-Nov-16
24	Wahid alias Aan alias Bojes		Parigi Moutong	17-Nov-20
25	Muis Fahron alias Abdullah		Poso, Central Sulawesi	15-Apr-20

**APPENDIX IV: Number of Terrorism Offenders Past and Present affiliated with MIT by Province**


<b>Province</b>	<b>Awaiting Trial or Convicted</b>	<b>Released</b>
Central Sulawesi	82	60
West Nusa Tenggara	9	17
South Sulawesi	7	14
West Java	13	6
Central Java	1	14
Maluku	1	8
East Java	0	8
Other Provinces	11	11
<b>Sum</b>	<b>124</b>	<b>138</b>



## APPENDIX V: Map of Central Sulawesi



## APPENDIX VI: Map of MIT Attacks



## **INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)**

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist, and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website is [www.understandingconflict.org](http://www.understandingconflict.org).

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