

**NUMBERS MATTER:  
THE 2020 CENSUS AND CONFLICT IN PAPUA**

**29 October 2019  
IPAC Report No. 60**

## CONTENTS

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	Background: Increasing Polarisation in Papua .....	2
	A. Coastal vs Highland.....	2
	B. Indigenous vs Migrant.....	3
	C. Pro-Government and Pro-Independence Forces.....	4
III.	Collecting Population Data in Theory and Practice.....	5
	A. The Logistical Challenges.....	7
	B. Administrative Fragmentation (Pemekaran) .....	8
IV.	Population Inflation: Case Studies From Jayawijaya .....	10
	A. Asolokobal .....	10
	B. Musatfak .....	11
V.	Inflating Data for Access to Spoils. ....	13
	A. Asolokobal, Kabupaten Jayawijaya.....	14
	B. Musatfak, Kabupaten Jayawijaya .....	15
	C. Oksibil, Kabupaten Pegunungan Bintang .....	15
VI.	Inflating Data for Access to Power.....	16
VII.	The Challenges of the 2020 Census and Beyond .....	17

Appendix I	: Data Discrepancies among Different Government Agencies on Population and Registered Voters in Papua...20
Appendix II	: Administrative Fragmentation in Papua Province.....22
Appendix III	: Map of Papua and Papua Barat Provinces.....24

## I. INTRODUCTION

---

Inflated population statistics in Papua are a source of corruption, conflict and power struggles, but unlike many of Papua's troubles, this one has a possible fix: a major effort by the Jokowi government to ensure that the 2020 census produces an accurate head count. There is no indication, however, that the president or his advisers have given any thought to the problem.

No one knows how many people live in Papua province. Statistics on population, weak to begin with because of the difficulties of reaching remote areas and poor record-keeping, have grown steadily worse in the last two decades as local Papuan elites have deliberately inflated numbers as a way to gain money and power. More people on paper can mean bigger budgetary allocations; more seats in local legislatures; and a stronger political base. The actual population of the Papuan central highlands may be less than half of what 2019 voter rolls suggest, but no one is checking.

The inflation of population statistics does not just fuel corruption, but it also has security implications. The problem is most acute in the central highlands where the pro-independence movement is strongest. Politicians from the central highlands have used the inflated numbers, combined with a supposedly "traditional" system of proxy voting in elections, to wrest power from traditional coastal elites. Highlanders, led by Gov. Lukas Enembe, now control all key provincial institutions, including the governorship, the provincial parliament, and the Papuan People's Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP). Many are sympathetic to the aspirations of activists in the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), the largest non-armed pro-independence organisation in Papua, which was founded and continues to be dominated by highlanders.

Papuan elites manipulate the data, but Jakarta has allowed the manipulation to happen by turning a blind eye to – and sometimes benefiting from – the mismanagement of huge amounts of money. Legislators have not bothered to check whether the creation of new villages, sub-districts and *kabupaten* (the sub-provincial division often translated "regency") meet legal requirements, and various agencies with programs in Papua have not made available the personnel, equipment or transport to get staff to remote areas in a way that could curb dubious practices or provide much-needed education and training to local officials. Indonesian politicians and judges on the country's highest court have endorsed a variety of fraudulent methods of proxy voting in the name of respecting traditional practices. While perhaps done with good intentions, the result has been to deny many Papuans the basic civil right to participate in elections. The failure to respect the principle of one person-one vote means that there is no check on the inflated voter rolls that highlander politicians have used to gain power. It also reflects a more widespread attitude among Indonesian officials that Papuans, because of their culture and low levels of skills and education, cannot be trusted with the same civil liberties that other Indonesians enjoy.

The Jokowi government has an opportunity to make a serious effort to get a clearer picture of the true population by allocating additional resources to the agencies responsible for conducting for the 2020 census: the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS) and the Department of Population and Civil Registration under the Ministry for Home Affairs (Direktorat-Jenderal Kependudukan dan Pencatatan Sipil, known by the acronym Dukcapil). Real data could help expose corruption and improve governance. It could help tailor programs to needs and curtail electoral fraud. It could provide a better understanding of the ratio of indigenous Papuans to non-Papuan migrants. Focusing on the 2020 census is the kind of technical intervention that President Jokowi likes, but time is running out if anything is to be done.

This report is based on fieldwork in Jayapura and Jayawijaya in July 2019 and extensive examination of Papuan statistics from the national, provincial and kabupaten offices of BPS and Dukcapil as well as interviews with their staff. It is the tenth in an IPAC series analysing political

developments in Papua.<sup>1</sup>

## II. BACKGROUND: INCREASING POLARISATION IN PAPUA

---

Papua has grown increasingly polarised over the last two decades along a number of fault-lines: highland-coastal, indigenous-migrant, inter-clan (as internal migration within Papua rises) as well as pro-independence vs pro-government. Each side is further subdivided into factions that produce new rivalries. As the fault-lines deepen, so does the incentive to produce population data to advance particular interests.

### A. Coastal vs Highland

One of the most important divisions is between the north coast and the central highlands. Under the Dutch and through Soeharto's New Order, it was the coastal elites that had access to resources, education and to the extent Indonesia allowed it, political influence. The Papuans who rose to positions of prominence in the New Order were all from the coast, like Freddy Numberi from Serui, governor during the last years of the New Order and minister in two post-Soeharto cabinets. Many of the most prominent leaders of the independence movement were also from the coast, from the late Nicolaas Jouwe, a founder of the Free Papua Movement (later a pro-government spokesman) to Theys Eluay, a prominent political leader killed by the military in 2001.

The highlands – the spine of Papua that extends from Nabire in the west through Wamena to the Papua New Guinean border in the east – were relatively unrepresented in the political elite, but it was this area where resentment against abusive military operations and government neglect arguably ran deepest. It was also where armed guerrillas were most consistently able to mount ambushes of police and military posts and occasionally larger operations. Many of the most serious instances of human rights abuse took place during military operations that followed such attacks.

The political fortunes of highlanders changed with the opening of political space after the fall of Soeharto, aided by the upheaval in 2000 that came to be known as the Papuan Spring, when for a brief period, pro-independence sentiments, symbols and organisations were allowed in public.<sup>2</sup> Highlander student activist groups emerged during this period that were later to become the core of the KNPB, with close ties both to the armed Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) and to international advocacy groups.<sup>3</sup>

From controlling pro-independence political movements, highlanders, led by wily politicians like Lukas Enembe, moved on to take control of political institutions.<sup>4</sup> When he began his rise

1 See IPAC, "Update on Local Election Result in West Kalimantan and Papua," Report No.50, 16 August 2018; "The 2018 Local Elections in Papua: Places and Issues to Watch," Report No.45, 31 May 2018; "Policy Miscalculations on Papua," Report No.40, 31 October 2017; "Rebuilding After Communal Violence: Lessons from Tolikara, Papua," Report No.29, 13 June 2016; "The Current Status of the Papuan Pro-Independence Movement," Report No.21, 24 August 2015; "Open to Manipulation: The 2014 Elections in Papua," IPAC Report No.14, 10 December 2014; "Papua Update: The Latest on Otsus Plus," Report No.7, 27 February 2014; "Otsus Plus: The Debate over Enhanced Special Autonomy for Papua," Report No.4, 25 November 2013 and "Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Problems," Report No.3, 9 October 2013. These reports, all of which are available without charge on [www.understandingconflict.org](http://www.understandingconflict.org), in turn build on a series of reports written by some of the same authors for the International Crisis Group, [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org).

2 Human Rights Watch, "Indonesia: Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Papua, 1999-2000," 1 May 2000.

3 For a history of KNPB, see International Crisis Group, "Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua," Asia Report No.188, 11 March 2010, Section 11, pp.2-4, 5-7.

4 Lukas Enembe began his political career in 2001 when, at the age of 34, he was elected deputy bupati of Puncak Jaya. He first ran for governor in 2006, narrowly losing to Barnabas Suebu, a coastal politician. He was elected bupati of Puncak Jaya in 2007 and formed the Association of Highland Bupatis in 2008 that became a major political force for highland interests. He was elected governor in 2013 and re-elected in 2018 with more than 67 per cent of the vote.

to power, as a deputy bupati of Puncak Jaya in 2001, the Papuan provincial parliament was still dominated by the coast. Enembe oversaw the dramatic proliferation of *kabupaten* and subdistricts (called *distrik* in Papua, *kecamatan* in the rest of Indonesia) in the central highlands, realising that getting supporters into key executive positions could build the political base needed to control the province. In 2012-13, he campaigned on the message “Time for a Highlander to Lead Papua.”<sup>5</sup> By 2019, safely into his second term as governor, highlanders controlled 34 of 55 elected seats in the provincial parliament.<sup>6</sup>

Coastal Papuans have taken a strong dislike to highlanders who make up an unemployed underclass in some of the major coastal towns including Jayapura but who often make up the shock troops of KNPB-organised demonstrations. In the coastal *kabupaten* of Sarmi, that antipathy is so strong that there is an unwritten agreement among *kabupaten* leaders that no highlanders will be allowed to register as residents unless they are civil servants or employed by the police or military.<sup>7</sup>

### B. Indigenous vs Migrant

The violence against migrants and their businesses in Wamena on 23 September 2019 threw indigenous-migrant tensions into the spotlight.

Indigenous Papuans activists believe they are being deliberately swamped by migrants to the point that they are becoming a minority in their own land. The lack of easily available statistics on in-migration to Papua adds to the concern, although some scholars have done their best to tease information out of existing data.<sup>8</sup>

Most of the migrants pouring into Papua over the last two decades have come voluntarily to seek a better livelihood, not through government programs, though some officials in Jakarta speak openly of the desirability of more migrants as the only solution to Papua’s economic and political ills. (One politician in a conversation referred approvingly to the “Californiaisation” of Papua, meaning he envisioned one huge melting pot of people from different backgrounds.)

Papuan academics, officials and activists have tried to propose various forms of affirmative action programs or measures that would limit the migrant influx or curb migrants’ ability to own or occupy land. Some of these were outlined in drafts of an enhanced special autonomy law in 2013 that never progressed beyond the discussion stage.<sup>9</sup> But affirmative action programs have not worked and it is not clear that restrictions would be constitutional – or would have any effect, as long as money is to be made.

Papua’s 2001 Special Autonomy law stipulates that the governor must be an indigenous Papuan and there have been periodic calls to extend this to all other elected positions, thus far without success.<sup>10</sup> In fact, the 2019 legislative election produced the opposite result: only 13

5 IPAC, “Carving Up Papua,” op.cit, p.10.

6 The Papua provincial legislature has an additional fourteen appointed seats allocated to represent the five cultural regions of indigenous Papuans, namely: La Pago (central highland), Mee Pago (western highland), Mamta and Saereri (north coast and islets) and Anim Ha (south coast). See Peraturan Daerah Khusus Provinsi Papua No. 6 Tahun 2014.

7 IPAC interview with head of BPS Sarmi, 18 July 2019.

8 Aris Ananta, Dwi Retno Wilujeng Wahyu Utama and Nur Budi Handayani, “Statistics on ethnic diversity in the land of Papua, Indonesia,” CAMA Working Paper, Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian National University, June 2016, <https://asiaandthepacificpolicystudies.crawford.anu.edu.au/publication/apps/8494/statistics-ethnic-diversity-land-papua-indonesia>.

9 “Otsus Plus: The Debate over Enhanced Special Autonomy for Papua”, Report No.4, 25 November 2013. A draft prepared by a team in Manokwari recommended strict controls and monitoring at all points of entry into Papua, so that anyone without a valid national ID card would be turned back. Non-Papuans would be given temporary residence permits as “seasonal workers”; they would not have the right to own land. No non-Papuans would be allowed into Papua through the official transmigration program until the indigenous population had reached 20 million.

10 One issue that has arisen in the course of these debates is whether “indigenous” should be defined in racial or cultural terms and if the former, then through the maternal or paternal line or both.

out of 40 seats went to indigenous Papuans in Jayapura city's legislature, eight out of 25 seats in *kabupaten* Jayapura, and three out of 30 seats in *kabupaten* Merauke.<sup>11</sup> There are six non-Papuans serving as deputy bupati.<sup>12</sup>

The pro-independence movement has had a distinctly anti-migrant tone to its rhetoric and there have been periodic attacks on migrants by the OPM (especially motorcycle taxi drivers who tend to be seen collectively as government informants). One of the worst anti-migrant attacks in recent memory took place in the highland *kabupaten* of Nduga in December 2018 when seventeen construction workers, mostly from South Sulawesi, North Sumatra and East Kalimantan, were taken hostage by the OPM and executed at close range on the grounds that they were military or working as military assets.<sup>13</sup> They were not, but most major construction projects are closely coordinated with the military, especially in remote areas, and Jokowi has relied heavily on army engineers for road construction in Papua. One aspect of the indigenous-migrant tension that has emerged is the difference in perception of the Indonesian military, with migrants often seeing them as protectors while indigenous Papuans see them as the source of abuse and extortion.

The Nduga murders led to military operations in the area that in turn produced four deaths by gunshot and widespread displacement, in which several dozen people died, including two women in childbirth and a number from unidentified sicknesses. Reports documenting those deaths came out in July 2019, just a month before the eruption of anti-racism protests in East Java. They prompted the Ministry of Social Affairs belatedly to send aid, but the military tried to turn it into a public relations exercise. Locals refused to accept the aid if the military was going to play a role in delivering it.<sup>14</sup> As local and international publicity over the issue grew, the execution of the migrants was largely forgotten, except, of course, within the migrant community.

Inflated data can affect indigenous-migrant tensions. This report will show how expanded population statistics have been used to secure aid from government programs in a way that drives the retail and service economy of the highlands, drawing more and more migrants to Wamena and other highland towns. Papuans depend on the migrant presence, but it does not lessen the resentment that feeds the anti-migrant narrative.

### C. Pro-Government and Pro-Independence Forces

Many in the international community see the debate over independence as the defining division in Papua but it is not. Of the various forms of violence in Papua – inter-clan, land disputes, electoral violence, resource disputes, vigilantism and domestic violence – pro-independence activity and clashes with the military accounted for only about 22 per cent of the violence in Papua in 2014, the last year for which good data were available.<sup>15</sup> Between 2011 and 2014, these attacks and subsequent operations led to an average of 31 fatalities per year.

The locus of separatist violence is in the highlands, where support for independence is high. It is concentrated in Mimika, around the Freeport mine, and in Puncak Jaya, Lanny Jaya, and Nduga. Different commanders compete for status within clan structures and major acts of violence can be one way of achieving prestige.<sup>16</sup> Egianus Kogoya, who led the December 2018 Nduga massacre, rose to fame as a 19-year-old for attacks on planes at the Nduga airport. Local

11 "Ironi Caleg OAP di Pileg 2019," *Majalah Lani*, Edisi 79, June 2019.

12 Amirulah Hasyhim in Nabire, Giri Wijayantoro in Jayapura, Sularso in Merauke, H. Chaerul Anwar in Boven Digoel and Jaya Ibnu Suud in Mappi.

13 "Four still missing after Nduga massacre: Minister," *The Jakarta Post*, 11 December 2018.

14 "Duduk Perkara Penolakan Bantuan Pemerintah oleh Pengungsi Nduga," [www.tirto.id](http://www.tirto.id), 1 August 2019.

15 Adrien Morel, Bryony Lau and Patrick Barron, "Indonesia" in Asia Foundation, *The State of Conflict and Violence in Asia*, 2017.

16 IPAC, "The Current Status of the Papuan Pro-Independence Movement," Report No.21, 24 August 2015.

commanders often have clan ties to political leaders, meaning provision of assistance or jobs may be as much a family obligation as an expression of support for pro-independence goals. But it does mean that the more cash that comes into the highlands, the greater the possibility that some of it can find its way to OPM fighters.

The dividing line between violent and non-violent independence groups is often blurred. The KNPB from the outset consciously tried to adopt what it saw as the lessons from East Timor: if the security forces could be goaded into a massacre, as happened on the streets of Dili in November 1991, international outrage could change the political dynamics and lead to a review of the 1969 U.N.-supervised “Act of Free Choice” – a referendum that was neither free nor a choice – that led to Papua’s incorporation into Indonesia. The KNPB’s actions are thus deliberately provocative, and while it claims to be non-violent, it has not tried to prevent its members from attacking property and sometimes people. In the violence that erupted in Jayapura on 29 August 2019, witnesses saw KNPB leaders with protestors, some of them carrying jerrycans of gasoline.<sup>17</sup>

Benny Wenda is often named by police or other security officials as a mastermind of violence, and he does work closely with the KNPB, but he is controversial even in pro-independence circles. Benny, a Wamena-born activist arrested in 2002 for organising an attack on a police station in which two officers and a guard were killed, escaped from jail, found his way to Britain where he received political asylum and settled in Oxford, where he became a major figure in growing highlander influence on the independence movement. In 2014, he joined a group of diaspora leaders when they established the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), an effort to unify the movement across the highland-coastal divide.<sup>18</sup> By 2018, however, his antics and questionable claims had alienated most of his fellow ULMWP members as well as top OPM leaders inside Papua.<sup>19</sup>

All of this is to say that the inflation of population data in the highlands has profound political consequences and underscores the importance of getting accurate figures for the 2020 census. This, however, is easier said than done.

### III. COLLECTING POPULATION DATA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

BPS and Dukcapil, the two agencies most responsible for collecting population data, operate very differently. Dukcapil at the *kabupaten* level is responsible for issuing the basic documents on which all Indonesians depend for education and jobs, including birth certificates, family cards, single identity numbers (*nomor induk kependudukan*, NIK) and national identity cards (*kartu tanda penduduk*, KTP).<sup>20</sup>

BPS conducts national population censuses every ten years but also collects population data annually as part of a national social and economic survey (SUSENAS) and other regularly updated statistical indices. It also makes population projections that are used as the basis for some government program allocations and fiscal transfers.<sup>21</sup>

17 IPAC interviews with eyewitnesses, Jayapura, 29 August 2019.

18 IPAC, “Policy Miscalculations on Papua,” Report No.40, 31 October 2017.

19 “West Papuan independence group says it is ‘ready to take over country,’” *The Guardian* (U.K.), 3 July 2-10.

20 NIK is a number that an individual receives once he or she registers for the national ID card. The NIK consists of sixteen digits that contain information on date of birth, gender, place of registration and four unique digits that distinguish one NIK holder from any other born on the same date or registered in the same location. The NIK number is used to participate in elections; acquire a passport, driving license, tax ID number and insurance; and obtain other important documents. By late 2018, only 33.16 per cent of Papuans had registered for KTP (and thus had NIK numbers, the lowest rate in the country. See “Baru 33.16 Persen Penduduk Papua yang Lakukan Perekaman,” [www.papua.go.id](http://www.papua.go.id), 29 October 2018.

21 See BPS, *Kegiatan Percepatan Penyediaan Data Statistik Dalam Rangka Kebijakan Dana Perimbangan Tahun 2012*, BPS, 2012.

While their work frequently intersects, the two agencies use different definitions of basic concepts. For Dukcapil, a person is considered a *de jure* resident of the place where he or she first acquired a national ID or family card, unless that person makes a formal request to change his or her residency – a time-consuming bureaucratic process. BPS counts anyone who has lived in a particular place for more than six months, or, for new arrivals, those who are planning to stay more than six months.

Since 2012, Dukcapil's registration of identity numbers, rather than BPS data, has been one of two primary sources of information since 2012 for drawing up voter lists, the other being its voter list from the previous election.<sup>22</sup> Local Dukcapil officials thus face intense pressure from political parties, local elites and the local election commission, to inflate figures to benefit particular interests. In one case described in detail to IPAC, members of the *kabupaten* legislature insisted on adding hundreds of fictitious NIK numbers to the voter rolls. The results are staggeringly inaccurate statistics. In Jayawijaya, at the time of the 2017 local elections, Dukcapil data showed the *kabupaten* as having 50,000 more people than BPS data indicated.<sup>23</sup>

For the most part, no one bothers to investigate if there are clear anomalies in the data. For example, in Dukcapil data for Tolikara *kabupaten*, several *distrik* showed dramatic jumps between 2016 and 2018, when statistics relevant to the potential voter lists would have been collected.

**Table 1: Unusual pre-election jumps in population<sup>24</sup>**

DISTRIK	2016	2017	2018
Bokondini	2,534	2,743	5,409
Kanggime	8,177	8,409	14,424
Aweku	1,628	1,652	3,035

Source: Data from Tolikara Dukcapil office made available to IPAC.

Dukcapil officials also face a huge problem in attracting local staff and then preventing absenteeism. The late bupati of Keerom, who died suddenly in 2018, had made a decision to strengthen the Dukcapil staff by employing only graduates of State Institute for Public Administration in Jayapura, run by the Home Affairs Ministry. But according to Keerom's frustrated Dukcapil head:

It doesn't matter if we have more Institute graduates. Nothing changes on the ground. Whatever they learned there is of no use. None of our public servants can be found at their designated posts – they are all in Jayapura or in the *kabupaten* capital.

Here in Keerom, there is only one *distrik* that functions properly. Why? Because the head of the *distrik* actually lives there. He is at the office every morning. If we call him, he will answer right away. We can know for sure his whereabouts and what he is working on. That is why the civil registration data in that *distrik* is very good.

22 Law No.8 of 2012 on legislative elections stipulates that KPU shall use the Dukcapil database, called the Potential Voters List (Daftar Pendukduk Potensial Pemilih Pemilu, D4), which includes the names of young people who are about to turn 17 and become eligible to vote for the first time, to determine the Temporary Voter Lists (DPS). Then KPU at the *kabupaten* level will produce the fixed voter lists (DPT) after it updates the number of Indonesians living abroad and consults with relevant local government agencies down to the village level.

23 IPAC interview with the head of BPS Jayawijaya, Cendana Hapsara, Wamena, 29 July 2019.

24 The 2018 data for Kanggime *distrik* also showed a startling sex ratio with 54.8 per cent men to 45.2 per cent women (8,018 to 6,606). This could be caused by faulty data, failure to count women properly or a host of other reasons – the point is that it should have raised questions.



The 2020 Census will be based for the first time on a combination of BPS and Dukcapil figures. The BPS will use the Dukcapil database of residents with registered NIK numbers, and then, in theory, send its enumerators to the field in order to verify both registered and non-registered individuals. The goal is to create a single population dataset that will be the baseline for future budgetary and policy-making processes. The problem is that none of the obstacles that have bedevilled data collection in the past have been addressed.

### A. *The Logistical Challenges*

The obstacles to getting accurate data in Papua, especially from the central highlands, are formidable, and no one should underestimate them. They include remoteness and lack of staff; the habit of highlanders to frequently change their names; the practice of moving around within a clan structure than may cross administrative boundaries; lack of interpreters for local languages where many residents do not speak Indonesian; and widespread lack of documentation for birth, death, marriage or residency.

The BPS office in Wamena exemplifies the logistical challenges. It covers five *kabupaten*: Jayawijaya, Nduga, Lanny Jaya, Mamberamo Tengah and Yalimo. These include some of the least accessible and most conflict-prone areas in the province. Ideally BPS would have a coordinator (Koordinator Statistik Kecamatan, KSK) in each *distrik*. The reality falls far short. For the 40 *distrik* in Jayawijaya, there are only three KSK – and one person handles eleven *distrik*. In Lanny Jaya, there are three KSK for 39 *distrik* and Nduga has only one KSK for 32 *distrik*. There is one *distrik* in Jayawijaya, called Trikora, that to date BPS has never entered. It is reachable only by helicopter, an unaffordable expense, or a five-day walk from the nearest road.

BPS in Wamena has asked for additional staff from the central BPS office and for a graduate of the Statistical Sciences Academy (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Statistik) to be based in Wamena. It has also requested a BPS office for each *kabupaten* instead of the Jayawijaya office having to cover five, but this is a decision the Ministry of Public Administration would have to make and so far there has been no response.

An official of the Dukcapil office in Tolikara *kabupaten* said in July 2019 that his office had only been able to issue national identity cards (KTP) for 24,878 of its alleged 248,774 residents (the real number is almost certainly lower).<sup>25</sup> As noted, a KTP is critical to getting a job, getting certain forms of assistance, or registering a child in school. The usual process for getting a KTP is that an individual goes to the Dukcapil office to register, submitting a family card, if relevant (listing spouse and children), birth certificate and profile photo, and then gets fingerprinted. But since December 2018, because few highlanders have these documents and travel is difficult, the Dukcapil in each *kabupaten* has taken the initiative to go out to the *distrik* capital with the necessary equipment to facilitate the registration process. The equipment includes a generator, an air conditioner and a router that would allow a direct online connection to the central server.

The intention of this program, called *jemput bola*, was good, but new problems emerged.

- When the electronic KTP program was introduced in Papua in 2012, a rumour spread that the registration process was a plot of the Antichrist because the number 666 was going to appear on some cards.<sup>26</sup> People in two *distrik* chased the Dukcapil staff members away when they brought in the equipment. This fear was gradually overcome as people realised the value of having a KTP but there are areas where it persists.
- There are now more people waiting for cards than the office can serve because of a chronic

25 Tolikara's population data is particularly questionable as an earlier IPAC report documented. See IPAC, "Policy Miscalculations on Papua," op.cit.

26 "Takut Isu Cip Anti Kristus, Warga Paniai Enggan Rekam e-KTP" www.kbr.id, 18 December 2012.

shortage of blank cards provided by the Ministry for Home Affairs in Jakarta. The office has had to resort to issuing an “explanatory letter” (*surat keterangan*) that people can use as an ID while waiting for the actual card.

- To address the high mobility of the population, the office instituted a requirement, stipulated in Law No. 24 Year 2013 on Administering the Population, that a Papuan who had moved from one village to another had to produce a written letter from the village he or she had left before a KTP would be issued for the new address. But because no one in the past had ever suggested these moves needed to be documented, few saw the point in trying to get a letter.
- The equipment for recording KTP data quickly broke down or parts were taken, or those trained to operate it failed to show up for work.<sup>27</sup>

Five *kabupaten* that border Papua New Guinea – Jayapura, Keerom, Boven Digoel, Pegunungan Bintang and Merauke – face additional difficulties counting traditional border crossers whose family and clan links straddle the border. Some 2,000 people in Keerom alone are considered to have dual citizenship but many more have no identity documents at all. Others are technically residents of PNG but more and more are coming into Keerom to work. The head of the Dukcapil office said he told them to just settle on the Indonesian side and set up a village – “then I can give them identity cards and they can receive government aid.”

Once they make their own village, they have to send me the number of households that are living there, then I will issue their NIK and family cards. They can use these to request aid from the Office for Social Affairs for remote and underdeveloped regions. You can see it in Towe, Yaffi and Senggi *distrik*, many of the villages there were built by the PNG people who relocated to Keerom.<sup>28</sup>

### B. Administrative Fragmentation (*Pemekaran*)

The logistical challenges are further complicated by the administrative fragmentation of Papua, with *kabupaten*, *distrik* and villages being divided and sub-divided in the name of bringing government closer to the people. In fact, it has been a deeply corrupt process overseen by local politicians to ensure access to spoils and especially in the central highlands, to facilitate the transfer of political power from the coastal to the highland elite.<sup>29</sup>

Jayawijaya *kabupaten* is a case in point. In 2002, it was carved into four, with three new *kabupaten* – Yahukimo, Tolikara and Pegunungan Bintang – and the rump Jayawijaya. In 2008, the rump was carved up again, with four new *kabupaten* created – Nduga, Lanny Jaya, Yalimo and Mamberamo Tengah – as well as the remaining Jayawijaya. The population figures soared, as can be seen below, and continued to grow in a way that is only explicable three ways: serious undercounting before that new system of counting corrected; more enumerators reaching further into remote areas than ever before; or deliberate inflation. Local officials themselves confirm the latter.

27 IPAC interview with Yohannes Tawa, head of Dukcapil office, Waris, Keerom, 1 August 2019.

28 Ibid. Senggi *distrik* is also the site of one of two relatively new transmigration towns in Papua (the other is in Merauke) called Kota Terpadu Mandiri. A 2014 regulation of the Keerom bupati authorises the establishment of the site in Senggi to encourage economic growth and foreign investment, with a focus on agribusiness and plantations. It was aimed at attracting settlers from elsewhere in Java, but with land available for locals as well. See Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Keerom No.2/2014, 22 October 2014.

29 IPAC, “Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble”, Report No.3, 9 October 2013.

**Table 1: Population growth in Jayawijaya<sup>30</sup>**

	Original Kabupaten	Census 2000	2005	2009	Census 2010	2017
1	Jayawijaya	417,326	210,654	195,719	195,719	212,811
<b>Pemekaran 2002</b>						
2	Tolikara	-	44,180	50,531	114,427	136,576
3	Pegunungan Bintang	-	88,529	98,234	65,434	73,473
4	Yahukimo	-	137,260	154,351	164,512	187,021
<b>Pemekaran 2008</b>						
5	Mamberamo Tengah	-	-	20,340	39,537	47,487
6	Yalimo	-	-	18,806	50,763	60,822
7	Lanny Jaya	-	-	59,015	148,522	176,687
8	Nduga	-	-	28,699	79,053	97,012
	Total population	417,326	480,623	625,695	857,967	991,889

Source: Data collected from BPS publications "Papua in Figures" (*Papua dalam Angka*) for the years 2002, 2005/2006, 2010, the Census Population Result 2010 and 2018.

One could try to compare population by *distrik* – except that there was a systematic creation of new *distrik* as well. When Tolikara was carved out of Jayawijaya in 2002, it had four *distrik*; by 2005 it had ten, with 137 villages. By 2015, it had 46, with 549 villages.<sup>31</sup>

The 2010 census showed Tolikara as having a total population of 114,316. According to the local election commission, however, it had 152,856 voters registered for the 2009 elections.<sup>32</sup> In the 2019 presidential elections, the number of votes supposedly cast for President Jokowi was 230,765, when BPS was showing a total population of just under 140,000 (See Appendix I to see the discrepancies between voter lists and population data for all *kabupaten* in Papua).<sup>33</sup> Almost all the central highland *kabupaten* showed a 100 per cent turnout – and in some cases, more.<sup>34</sup>

The striking difference between the highlands and coastal regions of Papua in terms of creation of new villages is shown in the graph below. It shows that both regions had relatively equal number of villages and grew at the same rate between 2002 and 2005. Between 2006 and 2008, however, the highlands underwent fragmentation at a much greater rate than the coast.


30 BPS projected that Jayawijaya's population in 2005, based on the 2000 census, would be 480,625. That was before it was divided. In the 2010 census, shortly after the division, the population of Jayawijaya together with the seven new *kabupaten*, was 857,967. That would mean a population increase over 78.5 per cent in five years, or 15.7 per cent per year. Those figures make no sense, as at the time BPS was estimating an annual population growth rate for Jayawijaya as 1.08 per cent. The biggest jump happened between BPS population projection in 2009 and the actual result of census 2010. Tolikara experienced a 126.45 per cent increase of population within one year, 94.38 per cent for Mamberamo Tengah, 169.93 per cent for Yalimo, 151.67 per cent in Lanny Jaya and 175.46 per cent in Nduga. Pegunungan Bintang is the only *kabupaten* that experienced a population decrease (-33.4 per cent).

31 IPAC, "Rebuilding After Communal Violence: Lessons from Tolikara, Papua, Report No.29, 13 June 2016.

32 Badan Pusat Statistik, Table 3.2.2. "Jumlah Penduduk Yang Terdaftar dan Menggunakan Hak Pilih dalam Pemilihan Presiden Tahun 2009, Papua Dalam Angka 2010, p.54.

33 Komisi Pemilihan Umum, "Hasil Hitung Suara Pemilu Presiden & Wakil Presiden RI 2019," 25 October 2019, <https://pemilu2019.kpu.go.id/#/ppwp/hitung-suara/>.

34 Ibid. Those showing 100 per cent turnout were Lanny Jaya, Mamerambo Tengah, Nduga, Tolikara, Yahukimo and Yalimo. Pegunungan Bintang showed a 98.9 per cent turnout, while Jayawijaya, where some actual counting was possible, showed a turnout of 65.5 per cent.

**Figure 1: Village number comparison in highland and coastal regions**

Source: Data collected from BPS publications “Papua in Figures” (*Papua dalam Angka*) for the years 2002, 2005/2006, 2010 and 2019; and BPS publications for the kabupaten of Jayawijaya, Tolikara, Pegunungan Bintang and Yahukimo.

The increase of fiscal transfers from the central government to Jayawijaya and the seven kabupaten carved out of it partly explains the motivation behind the rapid fragmentation of the central highlands. In 2009, the Region Development Planning Agency (BAPPEDA) of Papua province reported that Jayawijaya received Rp.161 billion [USD\$11.3 million] from the General Allocation Fund (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU), which constituted 38.3 per cent of the kabupaten’s total revenue. In 2014, its DAU allocation increased to Rp.1.02 trillion [\$72 million] or 57 per cent of the kabupaten’s revenue. Similar bounty poured into the other seven kabupaten.<sup>35</sup>

Although the creation of new kabupaten in Papua stopped in 2008, new distrik and villages continued to be formed – even after the government declared a moratorium on the establishment of new administrative units in 2014.<sup>36</sup> Minister for Home Affairs Tjahjo Kumolo complained that many of these units did not meet criteria set out in ministerial regulations.<sup>37</sup>

#### IV. POPULATION INFLATION: CASE STUDIES FROM JAYAWIJAYA

Interviews with a village head from Asolokobal distrik and a parish priest from Musatfak illustrate how and why population inflation takes place.

##### A. Asolokobal

The experience of one village head, whom we will call “Primus” (not his real name), from Asolokobal, Jayawijaya in the central highlands illustrates how statistics are inflated. Asolokobal is a distrik that is about 45 minutes by car from Wamena, the capital of Jayawijaya kabupaten,

<sup>35</sup> The DAU for both Pegunungan Bintang and Tolikara in 2014 constituted 64 per cent of total kabupaten revenue. See BPS, *Data Dalam Angka Tolikara 2014*, BPS Tolikara, 2014; and BPS, *Data Dalam Angka Pegunungan Bintang 2014*, BPS Pegunungan Bintang, 2014.

<sup>36</sup> The moratorium was formally announced nationwide in April 2017. See “Pemekaran Papua Tengah Terkendala Moratorium,” [www.harianpapuanews.com](http://www.harianpapuanews.com), 7 September 2019.

<sup>37</sup> “Pemerintah Moratorium Pembentukan Daerah Otonomi Baru,” [www.tirto.id](http://www.tirto.id), 17 April 2017.

meaning that it is more accessible than many highlands areas. It has nine villages, including the one that Primus has headed for more than two decades.

“Primus” said his village had a total of about 200 residents – men, women and children. According to BPS, however, his village had 1,055 people, 710 of whom were registered voters.<sup>38</sup> The BPS population projection in 2018 for the total population of Asolokobal *distrik* was 3,442, but according to data from *distrik* officials, it was 11,842.<sup>39</sup> How could this happen?

Primus said that no one from BPS had ever gone door to door collecting data. Instead, once a year, a staff member from BPS drops off forms for him to fill out and return. He said the BPS data is “purer” than the Dukcapil data because BPS does not have political interests, and he knows that the number he fills in is “closer to reality”. He acknowledged that almost no one in his village reports births or deaths or makes an effort to get actual certificates. “We don’t even report that information to our pastor or the church,” Primus said. Thus, the figures that Primus reports to the BPS, even if he intended to be accurate, already have a high likelihood of error.

More seriously, however, “Primus” deliberately increases the number on the BPS forms because he is under pressure to make the BPS data match the Dukcapil data:

We put in fictitious names – we take the names of trees, rocks, grasses, anything -- and add them to the actual 200 residents.

The pressure comes primarily from the *kabupaten* government, especially in election years or when there are government funds available. The government, according to Primus, instructs the Dukcapil to add more names, then someone goes to the *distrik* officials and orders them to produce greater numbers from villages. *Distrik* officials then come to village heads like Primus and give them forms to fill out. The message is clear:

They only said that if the numbers are not enough then we wouldn’t get as much funding. So we added extra names. Even then, more names are added by the *kabupaten*, often borrowed from neighbouring areas.

For example, surnames like “Wenda” and “Kogoya” are not clan names from the Asolokobal area but residents with those names appear on the *distrik* voter lists. Likewise, clan names that are only found in Asolokobal, such as “Aso” “Lokobal” or “Wetapo” are used to fill up lists from neighbouring *distrik*.

During the 2019 election, village officials distributed ballots to each household head in the village, with the extra ballots kept at the *kabupaten* to be put into play as local officials saw fit. Every village in the *distrik* did the same, according to Primus.

The inflated figures from the previous year become the basis for the next request, so if there is another request from the *kabupaten* government for figures, the village heads top up the total with names of people long dead – and more trees and rivers.

## B. Musatfak

Musatfak *distrik* has also undergone a process of population inflation. Before 2009, it consisted of only four villages. It was then divided in 2009 and again in 2011 to become ten villages, five of which were only reachable on foot or by helicopter.

The average population per village ranges from 200 to 300 people. Hamuhi village, established in 2009, has only six houses, although a house may have more than one family. According to Pastor Ivan Simamora, the population has not increased significantly in the eight years he has

<sup>38</sup> BPS, *Kecamatan Asolokobal Dalam Angka 2018*, BPS Kabupaten Jayawijaya, 2018, p. 32.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

served in the area. His parish includes people from eight of the ten villages in Musatfak plus the people of Muliama *distrik*. The total population in the parish is 2,700, with around 2,000 people from Musatfak and 700 from Muliama.

The likely true figure of the population of Musatfak is therefore somewhere around 2,000. But official data show far higher figures:

- According to 2017 data from BPS Jayawijaya, the population of Musatfak *alone* was 7,538.
- The number of registered voters in 2018 (17 years and over and/or married) according to the local election commission was 3,240.<sup>40</sup>
- The number of residents required to have a KTP (age 17 and over) according to 2019 Dukcapil data was 2,906.<sup>41</sup> That suggests that 111 per cent of eligible voters took part in the 2018 elections, even taking the inflated data into account.

The pressure to generate increased population data to secure project funding in turn generates pressure to enter fake data for the projects. Data on educational institutions in Musatfak produced by the *kabupaten* government said there were four elementary schools, one junior high, one senior high and one vocational high school with a total of 861 students. A BPS survey in 2018, however, said there were no secondary schools at all in the *distrik* and only two elementary schools with a total of 354 students.

School heads are supposed to enter data from a template provided by the Ministry of Education and Culture called Data Pokok Pendidikan (DAPODIK) and send it back online. It is not a difficult form, but the temptation is high to inflate figures to get access to School Operations Assistance Fund (Dana Bantuan Operasi Sekolah, commonly known as Dana BOS). The head of one of the two elementary schools noted that his predecessor three years earlier had said there were 250 students in the school. In fact, there were 57. He said the previous principal should not be blamed, because it was possible that schools were under pressure from the *kabupaten* education office to bring the statistics into line with the overall population as recorded by the Dukcapil or BPS:

It is not logical if the number of adults is growing but the number of children stays the same.<sup>42</sup>

He noted that 5,000 names of students had been removed from the *kabupaten* education office's database in early 2019. The problem was that the cut was not based on any survey but was picked out of thin air as the number which had to be removed.<sup>43</sup> He said that many schools which had closed were still reporting activities as if the number of students enrolled was increasing.

One way of testing the accuracy of school data is to take the sixth-year students who show up for the final exam and test it against the students registered over the past two or three years as fourth and fifth-year students. The elementary school head interviewed said:

Some of these school officials will pick up random kids in the streets, from orphanages, even adults, and put them in the class to participate the sixth-grade exam. You could see them! You could see those students whose hair was already white, with thick moustaches and beards. But they just sat there. They did not know how to fill the pages. The examiner

40 The figure appears in the Population Number and Gender Ratio According to the Districts in Jayawijaya Regency 2016, which was updated in August 2017.

41 The document states that only 725 people, or 25 per cent of people in *distrik* Musatfak, have registered their identity to Dukcapil. Document made available to IPAC.

42 IPAC interview with an elementary school headmaster in Musatfak, Wamena, 29 July 2019.

43 "Dana Bos masuk rekening pribadi, Bupati Jayawijaya minta penegak hukum turun tangan," [www.tabloidjubi.com](http://www.tabloidjubi.com), 24 March 2017; "Bupati Jayawijaya Tahan Gaji Guru di 12 Sekolah," [www.republika.co.id](http://www.republika.co.id), 19 January 2019.

would help them finish the exam.<sup>44</sup>

On 24 March 2017, Jayawijaya bupati John Banua asked the police to investigate 20 schools (fourteen elementary and six junior-high schools) that failed to submit accountability reports for Dana BOS. He suspected that the funds were pocketed by school officials instead of being used to improve the school facilities. Again, in January 2019, Banua instructed the local education office to stop payments to teachers from twelve schools that were no longer operating but whose teachers were continuing to receive salaries and allowances. In 2018 alone, Papua province received more than Rp.589 billion [\$41.8 million] under the BOS program for all its public schools.<sup>45</sup>

## V. INFLATING DATA FOR ACCESS TO SPOILS

---

As the above case studies show, a major incentive for inflating statistics is to get access to the enormous amount of money available for village-level programs. Former governor Barnabas Suebu created the first such program called Strategic Plan for Village Development (Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung, RESPEK) in 2007 through which every village in Papua would receive Rp.100 million [\$7000] directly from special autonomy funds administered by the province. It was designed in part to address the failure of special autonomy funds to reach very far beyond the major towns or the pockets of corrupt officials. The RESPEK program was well-designed and, in some places, reasonably well-run but it did create a strong incentive to create as many villages as possible in order to get access to the funds. The Jayawijaya district council sought to establish 600 new villages shortly after the program was announced, and much of the dramatic increase of villages elsewhere took place following its launching.<sup>46</sup>

Lukas Enembe, elected in 2013 as the first governor from the highlands, kept the basic concept but changed the name to Strategic Program for Village Development (Program Strategis Pembangunan Kampung, PROSPEK). Shortly after he took office, the Office for Villager Empowerment and Family Welfare (Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kampung dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, BPMKK) channelled Rp.515.59 billion around [\$36 million] to 3,919 villages in the province.<sup>47</sup> Tolikara, with over 500 villages, received Rp.66,852 billion [about \$4.7 million] for onward distribution, but the fund that was supposed to be for village infrastructure development too often ended up as cash hand-outs. Brawls over distribution were not infrequent; in Tolikara, a dispute between two *distrik* over the amount of PROSPEK cash received led in April 2016 to a clash in which one villager was killed and seventeen were seriously injured.<sup>48</sup> By 2018, Enembe acknowledged the program's failure.<sup>49</sup> PROSPEK was finally dropped from the provincial budget in 2019 – among other things so the governor could boost the budget for the 2020 Indonesian Games that for the first time ever will be held in Papua.<sup>50</sup>

By this time, however, an even more lucrative program was in place. In 2014, newly elected President Joko Widodo, signed a new law on villages, Law No.6/2014. The law made Rp.1 billion

44 IPAC interview with an elementary school headmaster in Musatfak, Wamena, 29 July 2019.

45 “Rp589 Miliar Dana BOS Papua Tahap Awal Mulai Dicairkan,” [www.kabarpapua.co](http://www.kabarpapua.co), 9 February 2018.

46 International Crisis Group, “Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict,” Asia Briefing No.66, 19 July 2007, p.4.

47 “Dana Prospek Papua Rp 515 Miliar,” [www.beritasatu.com](http://www.beritasatu.com), 8 October 2013.

48 “Konflik Pecah di Tolikara Usai Pembagian Dana Prospek,” *Tempo*, 24 April 2016.

49 “Gubernur Akui Prospek Gagal,” <https://papua.go.id/view-detail-berita-5134/index.html> [no date but appears to be 2018].

50 “Anggaran Gerbangmas dan Prospek dihentikan,” *Papua Today*, 21 March 2019.

[\$7,000] available for each village in Indonesia.<sup>51</sup> Funds were to be used for economic development projects such as fisheries, small scale businesses, or new agriculture projects. Village officials are required to propose a project and budget, with the help of a mentor (*pendamping*), to the kabupaten office for Empowerment of Villagers (Dinas Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kampung, DPMK). The budget is supposed to be displayed on a billboard at the village office for all to see. Funds are disbursed in two tranches. In the first, 60 per cent of the total budget is transferred to the village bank account between March and July, at the latest; and the remaining 40 per cent is delivered at the earliest in August. The mentor, from outside the village, is tasked with assisting throughout the entire process, from drafting the proposal and drawing up the budget, to implementing the program, to writing the accountability report.<sup>52</sup>

In practice, however, the village head has full control over the funds – and over the often fictitious accounting. Corruption is rife. In September 2017, for example, police arrested three officials from the Pegunungan Bintang government for skimming Rp.15 million \$1,000 from each of the 277 villages in the *kabupaten* on the grounds that this was a government tax. The total embezzled was about \$320,000 which was used by the officials to buy a small plane.<sup>53</sup> Despite numerous reports of misappropriation, embezzlement and ineffective usage of Dana Desa funds, the amount allocated from Jakarta steadily rose. In 2019, Papua received Rp.5.23 trillion [around \$371.2 million], a 20 per cent increase from the year before.<sup>54</sup>

Several interviews conducted in August 2019 illustrate how Dana Desa works in practice in Papua.

#### A. *Asolokobal, Kabupaten Jayawijaya*

“Primus”, the village head interviewed above, said that Dana Desa funds were directly distributed to the community in cash, not in the form of programs. This was partly because he remembered that Jayawijaya bupati, John Banua, had said in May 2018 that the funds belonged to the people and it was not right for the village heads to keep the money for themselves. Some village heads misinterpreted Banua’s statement as an instruction to hand out money directly to villagers. When the time for disbursement arrives, the community waits for the village head at the village office. He divides the cash among the nine hamlet heads, who then further distribute it to household heads.<sup>55</sup>

He said that everyone in the village receives cash. Young people in secondary school usually receive Rp.500,000. Anyone above high-school age, or over 18 years old, receives Rp.1 million [\$80], and those with small-scale businesses usually get Rp.2 to 3 million. The remainder is deposited by the village head.<sup>56</sup>

51 The new law was inspired by the National Community Empowerment Program (PNPM), an anti-poverty program initiated by Jokowi’s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (which itself was a continuation of the World Bank’s Subdistrict Development Program, KDP.) To acquire PNPM funding, villages were required to submit a proposal in open, deliberative meetings involving community leaders. In Papua, around 87 per cent of villages had secured PNPM funding for a variety of projects seen by locals as “development monuments” such as libraries or village halls, many of which were rarely used. See <https://www.insideindonesia.org/when-village-development-fails-2>.

52 Village mentors can be chosen from three backgrounds: professional expert staff in the village, cadres from Village People Empowerment (KPMMD), and “third parties” or consultants from local NGOs, university and so forth. See Kementerian Keuangan Republik Indonesia, *Buku Pintar Dana Desa: Dana Desa Untuk Kesejahteraan Rakyat*, 2017.

53 The government announced that it lost approximately Rp.4,159,553,504.00 (\$293,695.67) due to the embezzlement. “277 Dana Desa di Papua Disunat Buat Beli Pesawat, 3 Pelaku Ditahan,” [www.detiknews.com](http://www.detiknews.com), 27 September 2017.

54 “BPMK: Dana Desa Papua 2019 Naik Rp 900 Miliar,” [www.republika.co.id](http://www.republika.co.id), 17 June 2019.

55 IPAC interview with “Primus,” Asolokobal, 29 July 2019.

56 IPAC interview with Pegunungan Bintang village mentor, Jayapura city, 28 July 2019.



“Primus” said that writing the revenue realisation report is a painful process.<sup>57</sup> He said he had never used once used the village mentor, and all the reports he submitted to the DPMK described entirely fictitious projects. But he said that if he did not disburse the Dana Desa funds on the day the cash was delivered, he would be attacked by the community.

### B. Musatfak, Kabupaten Jayawijaya

In Musatfak *distrik*, one official said there was no mentor to help with the proposal or report writing. There was now a lucrative business in the provincial capital to produce the required paperwork.<sup>58</sup> “You know, those people who owns computer rentals and photocopy services in Wamena? They all can do it,” he said. The going rate for producing a report for one project was Rp.15 million, he said. The salary for a village mentor, by contrast was about Rp.4 million per month.<sup>59</sup>

The official said he had never seen any billboards in the village describing their projects or budgets, and village heads were not as open as in Asolokobal about distributing money.

They just disappear right away with the money! Once they get the money, they will forget their wives at home and go to a second wife near Wamena. After that they’ll buy a plane ticket to Jayapura and buy gifts for a third wife and they’ll rent a room there. They’ll return to the village once the date for the next phase disbursement is announced.<sup>60</sup>

Pastor Ivan Simamora, of the Musatfak parish said that the village heads should change their job title to “town head”, since they can only be found in the nearest towns, not in their own village.<sup>61</sup>

### C. Oksibil, Kabupaten Pegunungan Bintang

A village mentor from Oksibil, capital of *kabupaten* Pegunungan Bintang, said that the villages he oversees have never used his services to help write the reports required for Dana Desa. He said everything was done by a “third party” who worked at the DPMK, the institution that evaluates proposals and authorises disbursement of funds. The going fee was Rp.15 to 20 million [\$1000 - 1400], but it meant proposals were accepted immediately.

I was reprimanded by municipal officials as all of the reports submitted by the villages I monitored were scored C-. I said, “I did not write those reports. The people who wrote them were the village heads and the people at the DPMK. Just check on them!” But then they said, “Don’t you take a salary of Rp.6 million [\$425], from the Village Ministry [sic]? Why don’t you just do your job?”<sup>62</sup>

The same official described how Dana Desa quickly disappears. Pegunungan Bintang *kabupaten* is one of the most remote regions in the highlands and most of its *distrik* can only be

57 John Banua had temporarily halted the disbursement of the first phase of Dana Desa because out 328 total villages in Jayawijaya, only 49 had submitted the accountability report by the end of May 2018. “Penyebab Dana Desa Tahap I di Jayawijaya Tak Kunjung Cair,” [www.kabarpapua.co](http://www.kabarpapua.co), 27 may 2019.

58 IPAC interview with Musatfak *distrik* official, Wamena, 30 July 2019.

59 For local village mentors (PLD), salary ranges from Rp.2 to 2.7 million/month. Mentor for *Kabupaten* receives Rp.7.5 to 8 million/month, while the mentor for the province gets Rp.13.5 to 14 million/month. See Keputusan Menteri Desa nomor 58.1 tahun 2015.

60 IPAC interview with Musatfak *distrik* official, Wamena, 30 July 2019.

61 Interview with Pastor Ivan Simamora, Wamena, 30 July 2019. His statement was covered by Papua’s well known news outlet, Tabloid Jubi on 30 June 2014.

62 IPAC interview with Pegunungan Bintang village mentor, Jayapura, 28 July 2019.

reached by small-engine aircraft.<sup>63</sup> Village heads must charter a plane to go to Oksibil in order to submit their report and wait for the disbursement. Yet fiscal transfers are often delayed, and they sometimes have to stay in Oksibil for weeks, if not months, just to wait for the disbursement. In the meantime, they rack up debts with local shop owners, food stalls, and guesthouse owners since they came into the town without money. These debts can reach Rp.20 million [\$1400] if a village head stays in Oksibil for longer than one month. Local creditors will add heavy interest to the debt, knowing that these village heads will get a large infusion of money. After the Dana Desa funds are disbursed, the village heads pay off their debts, then get a plane to Jayapura to enjoy the proceeds.<sup>64</sup>

In some *distrik* the village officials have designated villages to which they can take government officials coming to inspect the implementation of Dana Desa, often the only ones with a functioning office, visible employees and documents that can be displayed to the visitors.

We just realised recently that we were being tricked. It just happened that it was raining, and we asked local people to take us to the nearest village office instead of following the guide provided by the *distrik* office. The office was a wreck. It had no documentation and looked like a jungle.<sup>65</sup>

Dana Desa is not the only program that local officials can draw on but it is one with the least accountability, despite the safeguards that legislators thought they were building into the law.

## VI. INFLATING DATA FOR ACCESS TO POWER

Earlier IPAC reports have documented how Lukas Enembe, now governor of Papua systematically used the creation of new *kabupaten* and inflated population data to shift political power from the coast to the highlands. A critical factor in his strategy was the local election law which mandates that the number of seats in local legislature is to be increased as population increases. In addition, Papua under the Special Autonomy Law is entitled to additional seats amounting to one-quarter of the total:<sup>66</sup>

**Table 2: Population size and number of DPRD seats**

Kabupaten Population	DPRD seats	Provincial Population	DPRD seats	DPR Papua
Up to 100,000	20	Up to 1 million	35	44
100,000-200,000	25	1-3 million	45	56 (2009-2014)
200,000-300,000	30	3-5 million	55	69 (2014-2019 and 2019- present)
Up to a max of 3 million and over	55	Up to a max of 11 mil- lion and over	100	N.A.

However, DPR Papua had only 45 seats for the 2004-2009 term because Papua province population in 2004 had already surpassed 2 million, but there was no regulation that specified how to appoint the representatives for these extra seats and or the criteria that they would have to meet, except that all would have to be indigenous Papuan. The regulation was passed

63 Out of 34 *distrik* in total in Pegunungan Bintang, there are only six *distrik* that can be reached by land transport. Each *distrik* has its own airstrip, but a Twin-Otter aircraft can land only at the *kabupaten* capital, Oksibil, and Batom.

64 IPAC interview with Pegunungan Bintang village mentor, Jayapura, 28 July 2019.

65 Ibid.

66 Article 6(4), Law No.21 of 2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Province <https://www.refworld.org/docid/46af542e2.html>.

coincidentally in the same year that the BPS estimation of Papua province surpassed 3,000,000 (See Appendix I). Thus, the number of seats for 2014-2019 increased to 69 (55+14) and same number applies for the 2019-2022 term.<sup>67</sup>

More seats in the *kabupaten* and provincial legislatures mean more power and more ability to control budgetary allocations. But more often than not, the allocation of more seats in Papua is based on wholly fictitious data and can become the trigger for violence. One case from 2013 is illustrative.

On 23 March 2013, in anticipation of the coming general elections in April 2014, the *kabupaten* government held a coordination meeting at a hotel in Wamena, attended by the bupati and other senior officials, the heads of political party factions in the DPRD and the local election commission (KPUD). Based on new population data from Home Affairs showing that the population of Nduga as of December 2012 was 194,142, the KPUD [local election commission], with the bupati's support, decided to increase the number of *distrik* from eight to 32 and the number of villages from 32 to 211. In the process, they added one electoral district, arbitrarily raised the number of eligible voters from 53,701 to 119,964, and increased the number of seats in the Nduga *kabupaten* council from 20 to 25, based on the alleged increase in population.

The DPRD members present opposed the creation of the new sub-districts, saying they had not been consulted, the changes had no basis in law, and the data on which the increases were based was completely fictitious. A fight broke out between the bupati's men and the DPRD members, in the course of which one of the former, the head of administration for *kabupaten* Nduga, Yustinus Gwijangge, was stabbed to death. The victim's relatives combed the streets of Wamena looking for the attacker, and fighting also broke out among the two sides in the village of Elekma in Distrik Napua, Jayawijaya.<sup>68</sup>

## VII. THE CHALLENGES OF THE 2020 CENSUS AND BEYOND

Understanding the consequences of population inflation and getting the 2020 census right will not solve Papua's multiple problems or prevent the kind of violence that engulfed Papua in August and September 2019. A more accurate headcount, however, could provide the basis for rethinking Papua strategy, from governance to security to fiscal accountability. It could also paint a more accurate picture of the demographic balance of migrants and indigenous Papuans, and of the internal migration of different Papuan ethnic groups.<sup>69</sup> The problem is that no one in the Jokowi government is giving the census the attention it needs.

As of August 2019, the BPS office in Jayawijaya had been instructed to set up a command post for a public information campaign about the census but was given no details on the campaign. The staff knew some kind of coordination with Dukcapil was envisioned but had received no details or training. No enumerators had been recruited, but there was a reason for this:

The problem of training and recruiting enumerators months in advance is that there is no guarantee that they will show up on the day of the census. From our experience, many

67 In accordance to the Perdasus No. 6 Tahun 2014, theoretically the 14 seats available ought to be represented by four representatives from the La Pago, three from Mee Pago three from Saireri, and two representatives each for Mamta and Ha Anim. "Tata Tertib DPRD," [www.dpr-papua.go.id](http://www.dpr-papua.go.id), accessed in 14 October 2019; see also "Papua Seleksi 14 Anggota DPRD Jalur Otsus," [www.beritabenar.com](http://www.beritabenar.com), 17 May 2016.

68 IPAC, "Carving Up Papua" op.cit, p.17.

69 Several Papuan *bupati* have commissioned BPS to conduct a census of indigenous Papuans only (Sensus Orang Asli Papua), including in Jayapura city, Nabire, Merauke, Keerom and Mimika. But the census itself is costly, over Rp 1 billion [around \$71,000], and thus not all *kabupaten* can afford it. IPAC interview with the head of Social Statistic Papua Province BPS, Bagas Susilo, Jayapura, 11 July 2019.

of our enumerators will be busy with other jobs or [...] have moved to different *distrik* or *kabupaten*. They're no longer available when we need them.<sup>70</sup>

There is a particular problem recruiting enumerators in the highlands, because if someone applies and then gets rejected for not meeting the criteria, he or she can take offence, mobilise others and suddenly there is trouble:

We had this happen during the 2016 Economic Census 2016, when we set up an open recruitment in *kabupaten* Yahukimo, and many people who registered got rejected. In the end we had to call the police to calm them down. After that, we stopped open recruitment in the highlands. We just use our networking at the *distrik* level. We contacted the village secretary or village head to hire the people that they can trust to participate in our enumerator training. The highlands are not a place where anyone can go. If our staff is not known in a particular *distrik*, he or she won't be able to operate there.

BPS has tried to hire teachers as enumerators but it depends on the timing, because if the census is conducted near the end of the school year, teachers will be busy with exams. As of August 2019, the Jayawijaya office did not know if the census would take place in May or September 2020.

The BPS staff also have to think about how to address conflict areas. Nduga, where there are frequent clashes between the Free Papua Movement and the military and major displacement took place after the massacre by the OPM in December 2018, the one woman who acts as local coordinator has to coordinate access with the local military command (KODIM). It remains unclear how the displaced from Nduga will be counted. In Tolikara, the BPS has identified four *distrik* that are considered as “not yet red and white,” or not fully controlled by the government, namely Goyage, Woniki, Airgaram and Bogonuk.<sup>71</sup>

“You cannot even bring camera, pen or paper there, they will shoot you right away,” said Tri Cahyo Affandi, the head of Tolikara BPS – reflecting both the reality of OPM support as well as the tendency of some officials to throw up their hands rather than breaking down the problem into manageable parts to find solutions. Conflict in Papua is as often intra-Papuan as it is between the state and pro-independence forces. As of August 2019, for example, it was considered unsafe to go to Tagineri *distrik* in Tolikara because of a boundary dispute in which three *kabupaten* – Lanny Jaya, Puncak Jaya and Jayawijaya – all claim part of its territory.

The Jokowi government's new team needs to meet as soon as possible to work out how additional training resources, particular in terms of extra enumerators and funds for helicopter transport, can be allocated to both BPS and Dukcapil. Knowing that local officials will try to preserve inflated figures, it is particularly important that enumerators be independent of both political parties and the local administrative structure. The churches, for the most part, can be an important ally, except where they are integrated into the local power structure.

Other steps that would help include:

- Hire additional trained and experienced staff for the BPS offices in the highland *kabupaten*. If financial incentives or bonuses are needed to attract qualified candidates from the State Statistician School, these should be made available. Ideally, each *kabupaten* Nduga, Lanny Jaya, Mamberamo Tengah and Yalimo should have its own BPS office before the census takes place next year.
- Ensure that BPS and Dukcapil have the appropriate technology, the technical assistance, and the security detail, needed to do a proper count in remote areas. The computer-

70 IPAC interview with the head of BPS Jayawijaya, Cendana Hapsara, Wamena, 29 July 2019.

71 IPAC interview with the head of BPS Tolikara, Tri Cahyo Affandi, Karubaga, 30 July 2019.

assisted census (CAPI) device can be rendered useless if the enumerator has to stay for days in remote region where access to electricity is limited or does not exist.

- Intensive training should be given all enumerators on how to detect fraudulent data, NIK numbers and KTP identity cards.
- Dukcapil and BPS need to move forward quickly to resolve differences in definitions of residence that can affect how data is collected.

Getting an accurate headcount may seem like the least of Papua's problems, given the violence that erupted in August and September. But inflated data has contributed to Papua's woes and getting as accurate a picture of the current demographic situation could provide the basis for rethinking Papua strategy more broadly.

## Appendix I

### Data Discrepancies among Different Government Agencies on Population and Registered Voters in Papua

[Note that the difference in BPS and Dukcapil statistics amounted to over 1 million people by 2013, with the Dukcapil data showing a 35.6 per cent larger population than BPS. The biggest discrepancy is in the highlands (16 *kabupaten*).

The local election commission (KPUD) uses Dukcapil's data to determine the number of voters for elections. Nationally, we know that 72 per cent of Indonesia's total population is over the age of 17 and eligible to vote.<sup>72</sup> But discrepancies persisted, even between Dukcapil and KPUD when both were using the same data. The KPU data for the highlands suggests that 85.86 per cent of people in the highlands were over 17 years old. In *kabupaten* Jayawijaya, Lanny Jaya, Tolikara and Pegunungan Bintang, the KPUD figures suggest that more than 90 per cent of people were registered as voters. In Puncak, the number of voters and population is almost equal, while in Nabire, there were more voters than the total population. Discrepancies were less in the coastal areas, though there were also indications of population inflation in the latter, especially Waropen. These differences further strengthen the argument that no one knows how many people live in Papua province.]

No	Kabupaten	2010		2013**			2018**		
		BPS (Census 2010)	KPU voter list 2009*	BPS	Dukcapil	KPU voter list 2013	BPS	Dukcapil	KPU voter list 2018
<b>Central Highland (La Pago region)</b>									
1	Jayawijaya	196,085	136,459	204,112	214,835	185,548	212,811	268,137	263,729
2	Tolikara	114,427	152,856	127,526	244,824	172,568	136,576	246,858	223,077
3	Pegunungan Bintang	65,434	66,089	70,697	114,381	78,566	73,473	107,353	96,859
4	Yahukimo	164,512	215,254	178,193	341,596	258,522	187,021	349,410	291,491
5	Mamberamo Tengah	39,537	26,169	45,398	43,312	29,216	47,487	44,788	33,265
6	Yalimo	50,763	29,336	57,585	83,693	66,827	60,822	118,829	84,048
7	Lanny Jaya	148,522	111,047	170,589	139,637	116,502	176,687	197,313	186,197
8	Nduga	79,053	35,324	92,530	194,142	54,336	97,012	106,354	94,216
9	Puncak	93,218	42,951	101,515	180,171	117,453	107,822	158,406	158,340
10	Puncak Jaya	101,148	106,900	113,280	255,224	141,657	123,591	215,106	180,430
<b>Western Highland (Me Pago)</b>									
11	Intan Jaya	40,490	-	44,812	90,045	61,424	48,318	137,050	82,110
12	Paniai	153,432	145,259	162,489	110,819	92,855	170,193	117,047	101,043
13	Deiyai	62,119	-	68,025	63,910	46,960	72,206	88,145	60,999
14	Dogiyai	84,230	78,909	90,822	15,324	80,341	94,997	112,513	89,543

72 Election Guide: Democracy Assistance and Election News, "Republic of Indonesia," [www.electionguide.org](http://www.electionguide.org).

15	Nabire	129,893	98,454	137,776	194,117	140,478	145,101	166,463	174,397
16	Mimika	182,001	141,594	199,311	305,138	175,987	210,413	306,517	233,125
<b>Total in the highland</b>		1,601,886	1,386,601	1,864,660	2,591,168	1,819,240	1,964,530	2,740,289	2,352,869
<b>North Coasts (Mamta and Saereri regions)</b>									
17	Jayapura	111,943	83,683	119,383	165,404	102,142	125,975	165,404	116,974
18	Jayapura city	256,705	204,213	275,694	491,870	241,344	293,690	417,492	297,603
19	Keerom	48,536	37,437	53,002	66,980	40,649	55,018	59,406	47,319
20	Sarmi	32,971	22,994	35,787	38,411	22,085	38,210	36,726	10,513
21	Mamberamo Raya	18,365	15,268	20,514	36,556	17,591	22,313	34,558	26,691
22	Biak Numfor	126,798	79,916	135,831	154,892	86,984	144,697	140,631	93,372
23	Supiori	15,874	10,999	17,288	21,259	11,304	19,104	21,014	14,545
24	Kepulauan Yapen	82,951	60,370	89,994	120,239	67,052	95,007	109,531	97,701
25	Waropen	24,639	10,874	27,723	32,629	20,381	29,480	32,541	33,978
<b>South Coast (Anim Ha region)</b>									
26	Merauke	195,716	127,841	213,484	221,886	129,650	223,389	221,886	130,924
27	Boven Digoel	55,784	38,613	61,283	51,848	36,812	66,209	58,093	31,224
28	Mappi	81,658	51,587	89,790	100,293	54,254	94,671	102,113	69,919
29	Asmat	76,577	48,575	86,614	100,141	56,287	92,909	103,074	69,110
<b>Total in the coastal</b>		1,128,517	792,370	1,226,387	1,602,408	886,535	1,300,672	1,502,469	1,039,873
<b>Total</b>		2,833,381	2,176,021	3,091,047	4,193,576	2,705,775	3,265,202	4,242,758	3,392,742
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2010 Census figures are available online from the BPS official website at <a href="https://papua.bps.go.id/dynamictable/2018/05/16/133/jumlah-penduduk-menurut-kabupaten-kota-dan-jenis-kelamin-2000-dan-2010.html">https://papua.bps.go.id/dynamictable/2018/05/16/133/jumlah-penduduk-menurut-kabupaten-kota-dan-jenis-kelamin-2000-dan-2010.html</a></li> <li>*Figures for KPU voter list in 2009 are taken from the KPUD Papua, which is cited by BPS in "Papua in Figures 2010." There is no available data from the Dukcapil for 2010. (The earliest Dukcapil population data available online was from 2006, prior the 2008 administrative fragmentation).</li> <li>** Figures for Dukcapil population in 2013 are taken from the Ministry for Home Affairs 2013 publication on <i>Buku Induk Kode dan data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan per Provinsi, Kabupaten/Kota dan Kecamatan Seluruh Indonesia</i>. The voter list is taken from the KPU official result for the 2013 gubernatorial election in Papua. The KPU 2013 voter list is also cited in Constitutional Court decision 14/PHPU.D-XI/2013, 11 March 2013.</li> <li>*** Figures for Dukcapil data on 2018 and the 2018 voter list are both cited in the KPU decree No 296/PL.01.3-Kpt/06/KPU/IV2018, on the stipulation for electoral districts and seats allocation for the DPRP and DPRD at kabupaten level of Papua province for the 2019 general election.</li> </ol>									

## Appendix II: Administrative Fragmentation in Papua province

**Table 1: Pemekaran in the central highland (formerly kabupaten Jayawijaya)**

Kabupaten	Number of distrik/villages					
	2000	2002	2005	2010	2015	2019
Jayawijaya	28/683	15/365	39/378	11/117	40/328	40/332
Tolikara	-	4/135	10/137	35/514	46/541	46/545
Pegunungan Bintang	-	6/88	10/90	34/277	34/277	34/277
Yahukimo	-	3/91	32/91	51/511	51/518	51/518
Mamberamo Tengah	-	-	-	5/27	5 /59	5/59
Yalimo	-	-	-	5/254	5 /299	5/300
Lanny Jaya	-	-	-	10/142	10/142	39 /356
Nduga	-	-	-	8/32	32/248	32/248
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28/683</b>	<b>28/679</b>	<b>91/696</b>	<b>159/1874</b>	<b>223/2412</b>	<b>252/2635</b>

**Table 2: Pemekaran of villages in Papua province**

Central Highland (La Pago)		2000	2002	2005	2010	2014	2019
1	Jayawijaya	683	365	378	117	312	332
2	Tolikara	0	136	137	514	541	545
3	Pegunungan Bintang	0	88	90	277	277	277
4	Yahukimo	0	91	91	511	518	517
5	Mamberamo Tengah	0	0	0	27	59	59
6	Yalimo	0	0	0	254	299	300
7	Lanny Jaya	0	0	0	142	142	356
8	Nduga	0	0	0	32	248	248
9	Puncak	0	0	0	80	80	205
10	Puncak Jaya	161	147	147	67	302	302
	Total villages	844	827	843	2021	2778	3141
Western Highland (Me Pago)							
11	Intan Jaya	0	0	0	37	78	97
12	Paniai	156	285	281	70	70	221
13	Deiyai	0	0	0	30	67	67
14	Dogiyai	0	0	0	79	79	79
15	Nabire	388	156	158	81	85	81
16	Mimika	174	85	85	85	86	152
	Total villages	718	526	524	382	465	697
	Total villages in coastal region	1562	1353	1367	2403	3243	3838
North Coast (Mamta and Saereri)							
17	Jayapura	266	132	132	142	144	144
18	Jayapura city	31	31	38	39	39	39
19	Keerom	0	48	48	61	61	91
20	Sarmi	0	98	98	86	102	94
21	Mamberamo Raya	0	0	0	58	59	60
22	Biak Numfor	82	225	187	187	262	268



23	Supiori	0	0	38	38	38	38
24	Yapen	257	111	111	111	145	165
25	Waropen	0	63	63	69	108	100
	Total villages	636	708	715	791	958	999
<b>South Coast (Anim Ha)</b>							
26	Merauke	519	144	168	168	168	190
27	Boven Digoel	0	88	88	108	112	112
28	Mappi	0	137	137	137	162	164
29	Asmat	0	139	139	147	211	221
	Total villages	519	508	532	560	653	687
	Total villages in coastal region	1155	1216	1247	1351	1611	1686

Source for table 1 and 2: Data collected from Indonesian Central Bureau Statistic (BPS) publication "Papua n Figures" for the years 2002, 2005/2006, 2010, 2015 and 2019.

### Appendix III: Map of Papua and Papua Barat Provinces.



## **INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)**

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website is [www.understandingconflict.org](http://www.understandingconflict.org).