INDONESIA’S VILLA MUTIARA NETWORK: CHALLENGES POSED BY ONE EXTREMIST FAMILY

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Villa Mutiara group, a network of over 80 ISIS supporters in the city of Makassar, South Sulawesi, exemplifies the challenges the Indonesian police face in tackling violent extremism. Those challenges include post-release monitoring; preventing a new generation of extremists from following in the footsteps of their parents; addressing the historic attraction of the concept of an Islamic state; and separating the agendas of law enforcement and politics.

Most members of the Villa Mutiara group were arrested after the March 2021 bombing of the Makassar cathedral, less for their role in the bombing per se than for a range of pro-ISIS activities. Several had pledged loyalty to the ISIS leadership in a 25 January 2015 ceremony at the Makassar headquarters of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), an anti-vice organisation that mostly campaigned for more state attention to morality and orthodoxy. The Indonesian government used the FPI-ISIS crossover to demonstrate that FPI was a dangerous organization, at a time when it was trying to discredit its political activities and justify its banning.

The significance of the Villa Mutiara group, however, was not the FPI links of its members. It was the way an enormous network was built around a single family. The clerics associated with the network helped anchor it in a struggle for the implementation of Islamic law in Makassar that stretched back decades to the Darul Islam movement; to radicalization spawned by the communal conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi that erupted after Soeharto fell in 1998; and to the war in Syria and the declaration of Islamic State in June 2014.

The family extends over four generations. The government needs to ensure that arrests and deaths of relatives at the hands of police do not serve as an inspiration to younger members to seek vengeance or otherwise continue the struggle through violence. Law enforcement and prison officials understand this and have paid particular attention to the ten women in the network, all of whom have renounced violence.

It also needs to devote more time to understanding the social networking aspects of the religious study groups called pengajian. These groups should be studied not just for the substance of their teachings, which vary from group to group, but for the ways that they serve to forge friendships, business relationships, and political bonds, among women as well as men. They often lead to exclusive social media chat groups, where non-religious interests merge with religious doctrine to bolster personal ties.

II. THE FAMILY

The family at the core of the Villa Mutiara group consisted of seven siblings, most of whom had married multiple times and several of whom had adult children who also had multiple marriages. In total, with spouses and children, the extended family in the network came to more than 50 members. A sketch of the relationships can be seen in Appendix 1.
The siblings were:

- Muh. Rizaldy: the eldest and head of the network, was killed during arrest on 6 January 2021 together with his son-in-law, Sanjay Aziz. His eldest son was killed in Syria fighting with ISIS.
- Zulkifly: not involved and not arrested;
- Akbar Muslim: the non-ISIS brother later to be accused by Rizaldy of being a police informant, but arrested in 2021 for discussing a possible attack on police in revenge for Rizaldy’s death;
- Ulfa Handayani: together with her third husband, Rullie Rian Zeke, the suicide bombers of Jolo cathedral in the southern Philippines in January 2019. One of her daughters was on trial in Jolo as of early 2023; another daughter was in military custody there. Their husbands were killed fighting with the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG). One son was also with ASG; another was in prison in Syria. The eldest daughter was in prison in Indonesia.
- Aulia Saleh: not prominent but arrested in 2021;
- Ulfina: not involved and not arrested; and
- Zulfikar: another key figure in the network. His wife, Rosnina, was also arrested.

The family came from a middle-class Muhammadiyah background, and all the siblings were active in Muhammadiyah youth activities while attending state schools. One of the brothers’ friends from these activities, Agus Salim, became involved in FPI, later becoming the head for Makassar. It was he who drew them into the organisation as adults, around 2011. Rizaldy would have been in his mid-30s at the time.

The declaration of the ISIS caliphate in June 2014 attracted huge interest in Makassar, including in FPI, especially after a YouTube video circulated of FPI leader Habib Rizieq Shihab appearing to support it during the 16th anniversary celebration of FPI’s founding on 17 August 2014.¹ Rizieq’s statement came only two months after the proclamation, and very few (including Rizieq) had any clear idea of what ISIS would become. All that mattered was that the caliphate had been reborn and that it was going to apply Islamic law in full – and in the eyes of those who campaigned for formal application of shari’a, this could only be a good development.

FPI-Makassar therefore decided to hold a mass public rally (tabligh akbar) at its headquarters on 25 January 2015 to swear a loyalty oath (bai’at) to ISIS leader al-Baghdadi. The pledging ceremony attracted some 200 people, mostly FPI members and but also students of one of Makassar’s best-known radical clerics, Ustad (teacher) Basri, who led the pledge. A second ceremony took place at Basri’s school on 26 January.

Basri was born in Sidrap, South Sulawesi in 1965, the year that the founder of Darul Islam-Makassar was killed by the Indonesian army. He himself had a Darul Islam background and

¹ The video was shown on 30 December 2020 by Coordinating Minister Mahfud MD as the government was trying to convince the Indonesian public that FPI was a terrorist organization and that therefore the government’s decision to ban it was justified. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TDa0AtI-rk.
was known as an activist scholar.\(^2\) Almost from the day that the caliphate was announced, Basri had sworn loyalty to its leader and led discussions in Makassar about Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) and how to support it. In his view, all of Indonesia’s many ills – injustice, poverty, oppression and brutality, growing vice and immorality, increasing frequency of natural disasters – were taking place because Indonesia was a democracy and not an Islamic state, and now here was one that could serve as a model.\(^3\)

Ust. Basri, then aged 50, was not just promoting the caliphate. He was raising funds for mujahidin from Makassar to join it in Syria, including his son, nephew and nine other students.\(^4\) His son was killed there in March 2015. Basri was arrested on 24 April 2015, ostensibly for his role in a November 2012 attack on the convoy of the then governor of South Sulawesi, but also for ISIS fund-raising.\(^5\) Rizaldy, furious over the arrest, accused his brother Akbar of being the informant (jasus) who led the police to Basri.\(^6\)

III. RIZALDY DECIDES TO GO TO SYRIA

By this time, Rizaldy had become fully committed to ISIS. He and his brother Zulfikar had left FPI and had become regular participants in pro-ISIS discussions, first under Basri and then after his arrest, under another teacher at Basri’s school, Ust. Bustra.

Rizaldy was already thinking of going to Syria. Sometime in late 2015, Rizaldy’s eldest child Naufal, also known as Novan, then in his mid-twenties, said good-bye to his parents, told them he and a friend were going to work in Jakarta, and left for Turkey with the intention of

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\(^2\) Basri reportedly trained on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as a DI-Makassar member in the 1980s. He then continued his studies in Pakistan at a Deobandi school that was part of the Wifaqul Madaris network through the equivalent of a master’s degree in Islamic law. He returned to Indonesia in 1994 and settled in Jakarta where his house became a gathering spot for activists from South Sulawesi, and he helped many get into the premier Salafi institute in Jakarta called LIPIA (Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic), a branch of the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Riadh, Saudi Arabia. The school became known as a refuge for wanted fugitives, though Basri himself never took part in military affairs or jihad operations. At the end of 2005, he took in Syamsudin alias Abu Uswah after the latter was involved in a violent incident in Mamasa, West Sulawesi. Several other fugitives from the same incident, including Daeng Koro alias Abu Autad and Kholid, also ended up at Basri’s Ar-Ridho school. Later, Erwin Madani alias Jodi, sought in 2005 attack in Loki, West Ceram, Maluku, also stayed there, as did some of those who took part in January 2007 armed clash with police in Poso.

\(^3\) Verdict in the case of Bustar, Lc alias Ustad Bustar alias Abah bin Tahang, No.811/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim, East Jakarta District Court, 19 January 2022.

\(^4\) “Danai Simpatisan Gabung ISIS, Basri dihukum 8 tahun”, medcom.id, 23 February 2016.

\(^5\) Basri’s involvement consisted of giving a green light to one of the perpetrators, Awaluddin. Awaluddin had come to tell him of the plan for the attack, which consisted of throwing a grenade at the convoy. Basri reportedly told him, “If you think you can do it, go ahead, but if you don’t have the capacity, don’t. Don’t just experiment.” “Ustadz Basr Bantah Perintahkan Aksi Teror terhadap Gubernur Sulsel Syahrul Yasin Limpo,” panjimas.com, 5 December 2015.

\(^6\) Trial dossier of Mohammad Akbar Muslim alias Abdi bin Moh. Saleh (alm), Case No. 817/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim, East Jakarta District Court, 2021.
joining ISIS. He was in periodic communication with them after he successfully crossed into Syria until he was killed in 2019.  

In early 2016, Rizaldy, his wife Darny alias Diah, and their other five children obtained passports, raised funds, got tickets to Turkey and left Makassar for Jakarta, only to be stopped at the Jakarta airport. After being interrogated at length by Detachment 88, they were allowed to go home. Rizaldy’s mother had sent the non-ISIS brother, Akbar, to the airport to try and stop them, but his efforts were unsuccessful and only ended up with him getting interrogated by police as well. Akbar’s relations with Rizaldy deteriorated further.  

After the foiled attempt at hijrah, Rizaldy began a new pro-ISIS discussion group in 2016 at the Jawahirulzarqa mosque in Villa Mutiara, his housing complex in Makassar. All of the participants were living in the complex, some through arrangements made by Rizaldy to move in like-minded ex-FPI members. Ust. Bustar led the meetings every Sunday, first for women, then for men with about 20 in each group. The discussions focused on the standard extremist subjects: jihad as physical battle; jihad harta or waging war through fund-raising and financial support; hijrah, or emigration to a place where Islamic law is applied; the evils of democracy; and the ten actions that can lead to expulsion from Islam, in addition to Qur’anic exegesis and the basics of Islamic law. Eventually, neighbours complained about these sessions, and Rizaldy’s group was forced out sometime in late 2017 or early 2018. Members then moved to a small mosque attached to Rizaldy’s house. 

The group became known as Anshar Daulah Villa Mutiara but was largely independent of Jamaah Ansharul Daulah (JAD), the main pro-ISIS coalition in Indonesia. Participants included most of Rizaldy’s siblings (but not Akbar) and their spouses. Rizaldy’s daughter, Fadillah Mutmainah, was one of the women involved. She was married to her father’s militant associate, Sanjay Aziz. Sanjay wanted to go to Syria, Fadillah did not, and did not want her husband to go either. At one of these study sessions, Fadillah asked Ustad Bustar what Islamic law had to say on whether a wife could forbid her husband to wage jihad. Ustad Bustar said that a wife could not forbid or obstruct her husband if he wanted to fight against those who were not believers or who did not uphold Islamic law like the Indonesian government, the military and the police.

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7 Verdict in the case of Darny alias Diyah, Case No.1067/Pid/Sus/2021/PN Jkt Timur, 4 April 2022.  
8 Trial dossier of Mohammad Akbar Muslim alias Abdi bin Moh. Saleh (alm), Case No. 817/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim, East Jakarta District Court, 2021.  
10 There was some contact with JAD members, but the Villa Mutiara group was largely independent. In 2016, Andi Baso, later to become son-in-law of Ulfa and Rully, had been designated by JAD-Kalimantan to receive arms from Mindanao that Suryadi Mas’ud had purchased in late 2015 and early 2016. They never managed to get the weapons back to Indonesia before Suryadi was arrested and Andi went to Mindanao where he was killed.
IV. ANOTHER SIBLING LEAVES FOR SYRIA AND MINDANAO

Ulfa Handayani, fourth eldest of the seven siblings, and her family also tried to go to Syria. In March 2016, Ulfa; her husband, Rully (Rullie) Rian Zeke; and four of her children – Yusuf, Rezky Fantasya (better known as Cici); Ahmad, and Aisyah – all left for Turkey. They had to stay in a safehouse in Istanbul, waiting for a signal that never came that it was safe to go.

In December 2016, while the family was still in Istanbul, Ulfa’s eldest child, a daughter named Ainun Pretty Amelia, joined them. Then aged 17, she had just divorced her abusive third husband, and her mother urged her to come to Turkey. She arrived with her daughter, then a toddler. The whole family was caught by Turkish authorities in October 2017 and two weeks later deported to Jakarta. When the time for deportation came, however, Yusuf, then aged 16, was nowhere to be found. It turned out that he had joined a separate group without his parents’ knowledge and had made it safely across the border into Syria. He was arrested when the last stronghold of ISIS in Syria, the city of Baghouz, fell in 2019. Under the name of Yusuf Isma’il Saleh alias Abu Hudaifah al-Indunisi, he was sent to al-Shaddadi prison.

The deported family, meanwhile, was held for three months at a Ministry of Social Affairs shelter after they arrived back in Jakarta and then were allowed to go home. They stayed at Akbar’s apartment in Jakarta for a month before returning to Makassar, where Detachment 88 had asked Akbar to keep an eye on them. By June 2018, when the most important holiday in Islam, Idul Fitri, took place, Ulfa’s husband Rully had secretly left for Mindanao, although as far as Ulfa’s siblings knew, he had found work in Kalimantan. The family gathering for the holiday was tense. Rizaldy again accused Akbar of being a jasus and would not talk to him.

In November 2018, Ulfa got word from Rully that she and their children should join him in the Philippines. He instructed them to go to Sabah, where they would be guided to Mindanao by a fugitive from Kalimantan working there, Andi Baso. Three days after Ulfa and three of her children arrived – Cici, Ahmad and Aisyah – Andi married Cici, a teenager. He then guided them to Mindanao in January 2019, and on 27 January, Ulfa and Rully, who had joined an Abu Sayyaf camp on Jolo in the Sulu archipelago, detonated themselves with explosive vests at Our Lady of Mt. Carmel cathedral in Jolo city. Twenty-three people died, including Ulfa and Rully.
Andi was killed in an ASG clash with the Philippine military in late August 2020; Cici, then aged 17, was arrested on 10 October 2020, heavily pregnant. She subsequently gave birth to a son. Her younger sister Aisyah, then aged 12, was arrested on 23 June 2021. She had been married since March 2021 to an ASG fighter, Rudymar Habib Jihiran alias Gulam (reportedly killed in a clash with the Philippines army on 21 February 2023). A debriefing note at the time stated that though Aisyah only had a kindergarten education, she was fluent in Tausug, Indonesian, Malaysian, Turkish and English. Their brother Ahmad, 14 years old when Aisyah was captured in 2021, was reported to have been “adopted” by Mundi Sawadjaan, one of the leading pro-ISIS Abu Sayyaf commanders, and as of early 2023 was believed to be still fighting with Mundi’s group. Cici as of January 2023 was on trial in Jolo on terrorism charges and Aisyah remained in Philippine military custody.

V. THE IMPACT OF THE JOLO BOMBING ON VILLA MUTIARA

The suicide bombing of Ulfa and Rully at Jolo cathedral inspired some of the Villa Mutiara members to undertake their own jihad operation (amaliyat). They asked Rizaldy to change the topic of their study sessions from the methods of Islamic State to the theory and practice of jihad. Rizaldy refused, on the grounds that not all members of the group were prepared to conduct an operation. Indeed, some members grew fearful after the Jolo bombing that their connection to Ulfa and Rully could make them suspects, and Rizaldy was concerned that if the study sessions shifted to a focus on jihad, these individuals would leave the group entirely. Ustad Bustar was also adamantly opposed to any violent operation. Rizaldy then suggested to the would-be bombers that they form a separate group. The main Villa Mutiara group would continue to focus on Islamic State; the others could plan an attack.

Around 10 militants then began to meet at the ar-Rayyan mosque in Bontoala, Makassar. The ar-Rayyan group was led by Zulfikar, youngest of the siblings, then aged around 38. Rizaldy would occasionally attend. They discussed preparing an attack and the pros and cons of suicide bombing. They also formed their own WhatsApp group to discuss jihad; no one outside the ar-Rayyan members was allowed to join.

The three members most determined to undertake an operation were Sanjay Aziz, Rizaldy’s son-in-law (husband of his daughter, Fadillah); Adi Ariyanto, husband of Ainun (Ulfa’s eldest daughter); and Lukman al Farizi, a friend. Adi wanted to copy his in-laws’ actions and do something in Mindanao. He had been in contact with Andi Baso, telling him he would like to come to the Philippines. Andi was enthusiastic and told him that ISIS supporters there would welcome him. He also said that the travel costs were relatively cheap — the entire cost of travel there would be only about Rp.10 million (about USD$660). Lukman, however, was not interested in going overseas; he wanted to undertake an operation in Indonesia, especially as he knew he did not have enough money to go to Mindanao. He was still a

been witness there to the marriage of Cici and Andi, was deported to Indonesia in 2022 and was not arrested on his return.

16 He knew Andi as Asraf Miqdam, the name he used in Makassar,
bachelor then, but he hoped to find a wife so that he could emulate the actions of Ulfa and Rully and carry out an attack as a couple.

In addition to its study sessions, the ar-Rayyan group also was active in conducting military preparation (‘dad) through physical fitness training, swimming and practice shooting with air guns. These training sessions were usually conducted jointly with the Villa Mutiara group. The ar-Rayyan also tried making bombs in 2019 and 2020, with Adi Ariyanto doing the electronic work and Lukman constructing the bomb. The first bomb they made generated only a small-scale explosion and the other failed, so they seemed to give up.

In October 2020, Lukman found a wife. Ainun had introduced him to a woman in her study group named Yoga Safitri Fortuna, better known as Dewi. Their marriage had taken place at Rizaldy’s house, with Ustad Bustar officiating. Lukman was now more determined than ever to carry out an attack like the Jolo bombing, especially now that he knew how to make bombs – and now that he had a wife who was willing to die with him.

VI. THE KILLING OF RIZALDY AND THE MAKASSAR CATHEDRAL BOMBING

It took a chance arrest in Malaysia in May 2019, five months after the Jolo bombing, for police in the Philippines to identify Ulfa and Rully as the bombers, through a DNA test on Ulfa’s parents. Police then honed in on the family in Villa Mutiara and began watching them. After Cici was arrested by the Philippines police, it turned out that she had been in communication with her relatives, asking among other things for money. It was her inability as a teenager to stop using her smart phone that probably led the Philippines military to pinpoint both Andi’s location and her own. Her arrest prompted another police visit to Ulfa’s parents to inform them of the arrest in the Philippines of their granddaughter. Even before then, however, Detachment 88 had detected the Villa Mutiara group’s training activities.

On 6 January 2021, Detachment 88 moved in on Villa Mutiara to arrest the family for pro-ISIS activities. They shot dead Rizaldy, then 46, and Sanjay Aziz, then 23. Police said the two had tried to resist arrest with a machete and an air rifle (although such claims are rarely questioned or investigated to see if non-lethal methods could have been used). They also arrested eighteen others, including Zulfikar and Zulfikar’s wife, Rosnina; his sister, Aulia Sen; Rizaldy’s second eldest son, Fikri alias Dede; Ulfa’s eldest daughter, Ainun Pretty Amelia, and Ustad Bustar. By early March, the number detained had grown to 30, all charged under the strengthened 2018 anti-terrorism law. But except for Zulfikar, who was detained, and Sanjay Aziz, who was killed, the ar-Rayyan group largely escaped this first wave of arrests.

The focus of police questioning was overwhelmingly on the group’s connection to FPI. The Jokowi government had just banned FPI and arrested its leader, Rizieq Shihab, in December, 17 For details of the arrest in Malaysia and the network in West Sumatra and Sabah that led to the identification of the Jolo bombers, see IPAC, “Learning from Extremists in West Sumatra”, Report No.62, 28 February 2020, p.12.
part of an ongoing effort to stamp out radical Islam.\textsuperscript{18} It was in their interests to portray FPI as a gateway to terrorism, if not a terrorist organisation itself, and focused on the January 2015 mass oath-taking to ISIS leader al-Baghdadi at FPI-Makassar headquarters. A senior FPI official, Munarman, had attended that meeting, together with hundreds of other FPI members, and was later arrested on terrorism charges for doing so. He was found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison. The names of all the FPI members who had joined the pro-ISIS study groups run by Bustar and Rizaldy were also documented.

Then, on 28 March 2021, Lukman al-Farizi and Dewi, who was four months pregnant, carried out a suicide bombing at Makassar cathedral.\textsuperscript{19} They were the only ones killed; some 20 people were injured. The motivation for the bombing was almost certainly Lukman’s anger over Rizaldy’s death and his determination to avenge it. It is not certain why he chose the cathedral rather than the police as a target, but it may well have been his determination to follow the example that Ulfa and Rully set in Jolo. The bombing prompted a new wave of arrests, bringing the total arrested in connection with the Villa Mutiara network to 57.

\section*{VII. THE FOCUS ON FPI}

The Villa Mutiara group was dangerous and would likely have engaged in more violence had key members not been arrested. But the police focus was almost exclusively on its connection with the FPI, rather than on how Rizaldy was able to build a network centered on his own family. It is true that most of the siblings in Rizaldy’s family had been enthusiastic members of FPI until April 2015, when their old friend Agus Salim forced them to choose, FPI or ISIS but not both. All of the siblings except Akbar chose ISIS. In the entire FPI membership, only about a dozen chose to leave FPI, and almost all were arrested in early 2021 as the police swooped in on Villa Mutiara.

Police left most of the ordinary FPI members in Makassar alone, but in May 2021, they arrested Agus Salim, and the commander (\textit{panglima}) of FPI’s security wing, Abdur Rahman Lengkong. They were tried and sentenced to four years in prison minus time served on 30 March 2022, solely for helping organise the 25-26 January events. It did not matter to the judges that these events had taken place more than six years prior to their arrest, or that Agus Salim had required his members to revoke their ISIS oath if they wanted to remain with FPI.

The fact was that the political context had changed dramatically since January 2015. This was a time when euphoria over the new caliphate was still high and before anyone in Indonesia had a clear idea how it would turn out. It was before the January 2016 attack in central Jakarta, the first major act of violence by a pro-ISIS group in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{20} It was before the major anti-Ahok mobilisation (late 2016) and the realisation that hardline Muslim


\textsuperscript{19} Fish bombs are illegal explosives used by fisherman to bring fish to the surface where they can be easily caught.

\textsuperscript{20} This is not counting violence in Poso, which had an unbroken string of post-conflict terrorist attacks going back to 2001.
mobilisation could be an existential threat to the state. It was before the systematic tightening of political controls on hardline organisations, starting with Hizbut Tahrir in 2017. It was before the Surabaya bombings and the new anti-terrorist law (2018). And, of course, it was before the return of Habib Rizieq from exile in Saudi Arabia and the outlawing of FPI. However objectionable FPI’s anti-democratic majoritarian behaviour was, the enthusiasm of its leaders for ISIS at the time hardly amounted to terrorism.

The focus on FPI, however, has blurred any clear analysis about what Villa Mutiara means for the future of terrorism in Makassar.

VIII. THE ISSUES GOING FORWARD

The Villa Mutiara network was larger than even the 2021 arrests suggest. It gave rise to one rather hapless splinter in Makassar, led by Ade Supriadi (arrested), and linked up with a group in Papua, described in an earlier IPAC report.21

But what happens to network members after they are released, or to their children, understanding that the children of those arrested or killed in police operations become particularly susceptible to suggestions by family or peers that they take up the cause of their parents?

The siblings who constituted the core of Villa Mutiara network have now produced children and grandchildren. They obviously should not be stigmatised because of the associations of their parents, but every effort also should be made to ensure that they have exposure to the widest possible social circles. At the same time, authorities need to understand that the others in the community may see links to terrorism as a channel to privileged treatment and sometimes financial assistance. If violence is the key to post-release assistance, does this become an incentive to more violence?

The family links are so powerful that even though the ten women of the Villa Mutiara network as of early 2023 had all renounced violence, the danger remains that some of the family members could still find the old teachings from their study group compelling, or a few of the younger generation could find a misguided heroism in the actions of their elders. No one should be complacent that the danger of violent extremism in Makassar is now over.

## APPENDIX 1: THE VILLA MUTIARA NETWORK

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<th>DESCENDANTS OF POPPI AND MUH.SALEH (dec)</th>
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