

**RETRIBUTION VS REHABILITATION:
THE TREATMENT OF THE BALI BOMBERS**

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I. INTRODUCTION

Umar Patek, released nine years early on 7 December 2022, was not the first of the core team of Bali bombers to be released, and he may not be the last – but no one else is likely to be freed anytime soon. Four men who are serving life in prison for their roles in the 12 October 2002 bombing (Ali Imron, Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok, Sarjiyo alias Sawad and Abdul Ghoni alias Umar Wayan) have all sought to have their sentences converted into fixed terms. If granted – a decision which is ultimately up to the president -- their sentences would be commuted to 20 years, and since they have been in prison since early 2003, they would be eligible for immediate release. As of March 2023, however, there was no indication that President Jokowi, moving into his last year in office, had any inclination to sign off on their appeals.

Several factors could be at play. First, given all the other issues on the president’s plate as the 2024 elections loom, sentence conversions for the Bali bombers is not likely to be a high priority – though this could change after a new president is elected in 2024. Second, the president may not want a repeat of the firestorm caused by the release of Patek, especially in Australia, which lost 88 of its citizens in the bombing. For many of the victims’ families, in Indonesia as well as Australia, it was inconceivable that anyone with a direct role in such a devastating attack should go free, regardless of how reformed he was. For police and prison officials, however, Umar Patek, who prefers to be known by his real name of Hisham Alizein, represented the success of Indonesia’s “soft approach” toward terrorism. He became the model of a rehabilitated prisoner who showed remorse for his actions and repeatedly expressed his commitment to helping others disengage from violent extremism. Finally, President Jokowi has never shown any interest in rewarding rehabilitation per se, as indicated by his refusal to stay the execution of narcotics offenders sentenced to death, including two Australians, who became the subject of an international campaign for clemency in 2015.

Umar Patek’s release did not require a presidential decision. Because he had a fixed-term sentence of 20 years, he was eligible for systematic remissions (sentence reductions), and these could be granted at a lower level. It is much more complicated to convert a life sentence to a fixed term. Unless the president agrees, all four of the prisoners in question are likely to remain in detention, despite support from police and prison officials for their release. It should be noted that changing a life sentence to a fixed term is not the same as granting clemency. The latter is the sole prerogative of the president, in response to an appeal from prisoners, their lawyers or their families, and is very rare. Conversion from a life sentence to a fixed term, though it also requires the president’s approval, is somewhat more common and rests more on assessment from prison authorities, based on detailed evaluation of the prisoner’s behaviour while incarcerated, as well as a risk assessment of the likelihood of recidivism. The risk that any of the four with life sentences would return to violence is extremely low, but this is likely to weigh less than political considerations in the president’s response to their appeals.

II. THE ESSENCE OF THE CONTROVERSY

The debate over whether the four remaining “lifers” should be released reflects a debate playing out in the criminal justice and human rights communities around the world between “retributive” and “restorative justice” and the role of prisons more generally.

According to the “retributive” camp, punishment of criminals by the state is an appropriate response to wrongdoers, and the greater the crime the harsher the punishment should be. Sentences should be designed to give offenders their “just deserts” and any other aims, such as rehabilitation, should be secondary. Sentences should be designed to be “within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders.”¹ Thus, retributivists would argue that life without parole, as four of the Bali bombers received, was an appropriate response to the heinousness of their crime, and while their remorse, cooperation with authorities, or a combination of the above could be justified in saving them from the death penalty that three other bombers received, they were morally responsible for their actions and should serve their sentences in full.

The “rehabilitative”, “reparative” and “restorative” camps – all slightly different but united in their discomfort with retribution – argue that there are more meaningful ways to address the suffering of victims than demanding that the state inflict pain on the wrongdoers. They acknowledge the need to hold criminals accountable, but they believe that this can be done in a way that forces them to better understand the consequences of their actions, especially for the victims.² They also argue that any punishment should include the recognition that individuals have the capacity to change and should be given the opportunity to do so. Some human rights advocates, particularly in Europe, have been concerned by the increasing willingness of judges to hand down sentences of life without parole and believe that all prisoners should have “the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs which they have committed.”³ Such prisoners, these advocates believe, should have the chance to return to society, meaning that states must “set up procedures for considering the possible release of persons serving life sentences.”⁴

The Indonesian government has two procedures for doing this, as noted, allowing prisoners to seek clemency or seek conversion of their life sentence to a fixed term. A prisoner may only seek clemency once, but there is no limit to the number of times a “lifer” can seek a fixed term. As of June 2022, Abdul Ghoni had done so more than ten times.⁵ It should be noted that in the new criminal code, which will come into force in 2026, a life sentence can be converted to 20 years

¹ The American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, as quoted in Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom and Gregg D. Caruso, eds, *Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice*, Cambridge, 2019, p.23

² Howard Zehr, “The Little Book of Restorative Justice,” New York, 2014.

³ Opinion of Judge Power-Forde in Vinter case before European Human Rights Court, quoted in Dirk van Zylk Smit, Catherine Appleton and Georgie Benford, *Life Imprisonment and Human Rights* (Oxford and Portland), p.9

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.4.

⁵ “Terpidana Bom Bali 1 Abdul Ghoni Sudah 10 Kali Ajukan Remisi ke Presiden,” *Merdeka*, 24 June 2022.

after the prisoner in question has served fifteen, but any release would still require a presidential decision (*Keputusan Presiden*), and the changes in any case would not affect the four Bali bombers because it would not be applied retroactively.⁶

In the context of the debate over retribution vs rehabilitation, it is worth looking at what happened to all the others who were convicted for their roles before, during and after the bombing on 12 October 2002.

III. THE MAJOR PLAYERS: WHERE ARE THEY NOW?

Some 40 men, most of them members of Jemaah Islamiyah, were arrested in the aftermath of the Bali bombing (see Appendix 1). They fell into several categories: senior JI members who conceived, approved, or secured financing for the bombing; the core JI operational team that carried it out; young would-be *mujahidin* from Banten, a province west of Jakarta, who robbed a local gold store before the bombing to raise additional funds; JI members who assisted in various ways, helping find hotel rooms in Bali before the bombing and hide fugitives and weapons afterward; and a group in East Kalimantan who helped hide Ali Imron and Mubarak from the time they fled Java until they were arrested in January 2003.

A. The Senior JI Men

The top JI officials whose approval was critical to the bombing were Encep Nurjaman alias Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, then head of Mantiqi I, the regional division based in Malaysia and JI's main liaison with al-Qaeda; Arif Sunarso alias Zulkarnaen, then JI's head of military affairs; and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, then amir of JI. As of May 2023, Hambali was in Guantanamo, the only Indonesian ever held there, with a pre-trial hearing before a military commission having begun in April 2023. Zulkarnaen, arrested in December 2020 after nearly eighteen years in hiding, was in prison in the Metropolitan Jakarta police headquarters (Polda Metro Jaya), serving a fifteen-year term; and Ba'asyir, aged 84, was living quietly at home, after being released in January 2021.

Hambali was the initiator and the man who secured funding from al-Qaeda for the operation. His ties to al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan had grown since 1998, in part because Abdullah Sungkar had put him in charge of raising funds for military training, and al-Qaeda may have seemed a likely donor.⁷ He was sufficiently influenced by the February 1998 fatwa from bin Laden to push the JI leadership to focus more on military training and less on religion in

⁶ "Arti Penjara Seumur Hidup Menurut KUHP Lama dan Baru, Dipenjara Berapa Lama?", *kompas.com*, 21 March 2023. See also "Langkah Kemenkumham untuk Menyosialisasikan KUHP", <https://www.kemenkumham.go.id/berita-utama/3-langkah-kemenkumham-untuk-menyosialisasikan-kuhp-baru>, 22 February 2023.

⁷ Arif Sunarso testimony in trial dossier of Arif Sunarso alias Zulkarnaen alias Daud, Case No.759/Pid.Sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim, East Jakarta District Court, 2021.

preparation for attacks on Americans and their “lackeys”.⁸ The fatwa led directly to Hambali’s instructions to an elite JI group to plan attacks on American targets in Singapore and the Philippines. In 1999 and 2000, he arranged for training of JI members at Camp Faruq in Kandahar and sent the so-called al-Ghuraba group, mostly sons of JI members in Malaysia and Indonesia, to study in Karachi with periodic excursions to Pakistani-held Kashmir.⁹ Sometime in late 2001, he met with Zulkarnaen in Medan, and told him that JI had to conduct an operation against Americans and their allies as a response to the sufferings that the U.S. had inflicted on Afghanistan. He told Zulkarnaen to prepare his special forces unit for the job.¹⁰ Hambali was eventually arrested in Bangkok in 2003 and sent to a variety of CIA secret prisons or “black sites” where he was reportedly severely tortured before he ended up in Guantanamo.

On 17 February 2023, the U.S. Department of Defense issued a media advisory announcing that Hambali and two Malaysian colleagues would appear in a pre-trial hearing of a military commission in Guantanamo to be conducted from 24 April-5 May 2023.¹¹ The hearing could be the first step toward the trial of Hambali after 20 years of detention. If and when a trial takes place, it is not at all clear what would happen if he were to be convicted or released. Indonesian authorities consider him a major security risk and do not want him back, but it is not clear who else would take him. His fate is likely to be unresolved for several years to come.

Zulkarnaen is likely to be in prison for at least another decade, even if he were to receive remissions for swearing allegiance to the Indonesian state. As head of military affairs for JI from 1998 until 2004, he was in regular communication with Hambali and at his request, put together a special forces unit in 1998 that included most of the Bali bombing operatives. Its first operations were in Ambon after conflict erupted there in 1999, but it was also deployed for the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings.

In July 2002, Zulkarnaen called two members of the unit, Dulmatin and Imam Samudra, to a meeting in Solo to inform them of Hambali’s instructions to plan for an attack against foreigners.¹² He called a subsequent meeting, again in Solo, in August 2002 to choose a target. Everyone agreed on Bali. The entire operational team was present: Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, Amrozy, Ali Imron, Dulmatin, Imam Samudra, Umar Patek, Abdul Ghoni, and Johnny Hendrawan alias Idris.¹³ This was the critical meeting that drove the bombing forward. It was also the last direct involvement of Zulkarnaen in the planning. He met Amrozy two days after the bombing to get a full report and took part in a central command meeting in Tawangmangu, Solo several months later. Then he disappeared. JI members helped hide him, all over Central and East Java,

⁸ The fatwa of 23 February 1998 was issued in the name of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. It stated that the killing of all Americans and their allies, civilians and military, wherever they were, was an individual obligation for all Muslims. The full text is available at www.mideastweb.org/osamabinladen2.htm.

⁹ The group included Zulkarnaen’s son Aziz and Hambali’s younger brother Gungun.

¹⁰ Trial dossier of Arif Sunarso, op.cit.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Defense, “Military Commissions Media Invitation Announced for U.S. vs Encep Nurjaman et al. Pre-Trial Hearing,” 17 February 2023.

¹² The meeting took place at Hernianto’s house in Solo. Testimony of Hernianto in trial dossier of Amrozi, No.BP/01/I/2003/Dit Serse, Denpasar, Bali, 4 January 2003.

¹³ Testimony of Hernianto, op.cit.

moving him every few days or weeks. In 2007 he became a member of Jemaah Tabligh Cirebon and began doing *dakwah* across the country. In 2016 he took a new wife and moved to her house in Bekasi, outside Jakarta. He was preaching for Jemaah Tabligh in Lampung when he met several old JI friends and began receiving a regular monthly stipend for support. With their help he moved to Bandung, but by 2018, even Bandung had become unsafe, and he moved back to Lampung, where he was eventually discovered by the police, almost by accident, in December 2020.¹⁴

Zulkarnaen was not charged for the Bali bombing. The Constitutional Court had ruled in 2003 that the anti-terrorism law passed in 2003 could not be applied retroactively, although those already sentenced under the law before the ruling would not be affected. That left the possibility of charging him under the Criminal Code, but the statute of limitations for the most serious crimes was eighteen years – and for Bali, that statute had already expired. He was therefore found guilty of terrorism and sentenced to fifteen years for his involvement in JI, hiding another suspect (in this case, a wanted fugitive from Poso, Upik Lawanga) and withholding information from authorities. Without remissions, he would be due for release in 2036, by which time he would be 73 years old.

Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was released early on 8 January 2021 and has been largely quiet – but not remorseful – ever since. He was hospitalised in February 2023 for an undisclosed ailment and is believed to be in poor health. His go-ahead for the Bali bombing was always ambiguous, although he had earlier made clear his general support for jihad operations, including through bombs targeting civilians. Hambali had sought and received his blessing for the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings. In May 2001, Ba'asyir summoned Mukhlas to his house in Ngruki and gave him USD\$6000, SGD\$17,000 and RM15,000 from JI assets for jihad operations.¹⁵ By April 2002, Ba'asyir had already turned over his day-to-day duties as JI amir to another member of the central command, Abu Rusydan, but he was still formally in charge until his arrest in connection with the bombing.¹⁶ In 2004, Mubarok testified at Ba'asyir's first trial that he and Amrozy (executed in 2008) had visited Ba'asyir at his home in Solo in September 2002. In the course of their conversation, Amrozy asked Ba'asyir, "What do you think if some friends undertake a program in Bali?" Ba'asyir, according to Mubarok, responded, "It's up to you all, you know the situation in the field."¹⁷ It was never clear when Ba'asyir first learned that a major operation was in the works, but by September 2002, plans were so advanced that it was probably too late to stop them. In any case, Amrozy essentially was asking for Ba'asyir's opinion, not his permission. The judges in Ba'asyir's trial considered Mubarok's testimony insufficient evidence to link Ba'asyir to the bombing.

¹⁴ For details of his life as a fugitive between 2004 and 2020, see Verdict No.759/PID.SUS/2021/PN.Jkt.Tim in the case of Arif Sunarso alias Zulkarnaen bin Hadi Sholeh, 18 January 2022.

¹⁵ Witness testimony of Mukhlas in trial of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 24 January 2003. The funds were from the assets of Mantiqi 1, the JI command unit based in Malaysia.

¹⁶ Trial dossier of Arif Sunarso, *op.cit.*

¹⁷ Witness testimony of Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok in trial dossier of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 7 April 2004.

IV. TOP OPERATIVES STILL DETAINED

Of the eleven top operatives in the Bali bombing (not counting the two suicide bombers), three were executed in November 2008 (Mukhlas, Amrozy and Imam Samudra). Dr Azhari Husin was killed in a police raid in Batu, Malang in November 2005, following the second Bali bombing. Dulmatin was killed by police near Jakarta in 2010 in the aftermath of the breakup of a terrorist training camp in Aceh that he led. Two are free, Hisham Alizein alias Umar Patek, as of December 2022, and Mohamad Ihsan alias Idris alias Joni Hendrawan alias Gembrot, as of February 2009. Idris was charged with a supporting role in the 2003 Marriott bombing but escaped prosecution for the Bali bombing, in which he was a central player.

Four others, as noted above, were sentenced to life in prison, and as of 2023, were seeking to change their sentences to 20 years. They were:

- **Ali Imron**,¹⁸
- **Utomo Pamungkas alias Mubarok**,¹⁹
- **Sarjiyo alias Sawad**,²⁰ and
- **Abdul Ghoni alias Umair alias Umar Wayan**.²¹

These men, all roughly the same age, had a long history of working together. All had trained under Zulkarnaen at the JI military academy on the Afghan border and later, in 1998, after Zulkarnaen had become JI's head of military affairs, they became part of his special forces unit. All four, together with Amrozy, were part of the unit's logistics team, tasked with collecting and storing weapons and explosives. By the time of the Bali bombing, most of the team had known each other for more than a decade.

¹⁸ Ali Imron was born Muhammad Imron in January 1970 in Tenggulun, Lamongan, East Java, the youngest of eight siblings, and the brother of Mukhlas and Amrozy. As he makes clear in his 2007 autobiography, *The Bomber* (Sang Pengebom), he was particularly close to Mukhlas and wanted nothing more than to follow in his footsteps. He went first to Malaysia briefly in 1991, then to the Afghan border for military training. He returned home in 1996 and began teaching at Pesantren al-Islam in Lamongan, East Java, founded by one of his brothers as a JI affiliate school, modelled after the al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, Solo. He and the others were involved in several terrorist incidents prior to Bali. Like Ali Imron but several months earlier, he stopped in Malaysia en route to Pakistan for military training, joined JI when the split with Darul Islam took place in 1993, and returned to Malaysia in 1994. After a brief stint as a trainer in Mindanao, he also became a teacher at the al-Islam school.

¹⁹ Mubarok, only a month older than Ali Imron, was born in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta in December 1969. He entered the pesantren in Ngruki when he was fourteen and was inducted into Darul Islam when he completed the teacher training program there six years later. The teacher training program (Kuliatul Muallimin Islamiyah, KMI) was the pool from which many JI members were recruited in the 1990s and early 2000s.

²⁰ Sawad was born in 1971 in Solo, Central Java. After three years training in Afghanistan, he went to Mindanao via Malaysia and stayed there, fighting with the MILF for two years. He was twice involved in smuggling arms to Indonesia from Mindanao, once in 2000 and once in 2001, when he brought in 10 M-16s to deliver to Ali Imron. See witness testimony of Sarjiyo alias Sawad in trial dossier of Abdul Jabar, 23 April 2003.

²¹ Abdul Ghoni was born in Karanganyar, Solo in April 1968. He studied at state schools and briefly attended Muhammadiyah University in Solo, majoring in machine technology, but left after two semesters. A neighbor, who was a JI member, invited him to go to Afghanistan and he trained on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border from 1990-93. He joined JI in 1993, the year it was established. After his return from Afghanistan, he worked as an itinerant trader and dealer in motorcycles in Solo.

While all were initially detained at Kerobokan Prison in Denpasar, Ali Imron and Mubarok were moved around late 2003 or early 2004 to special quarters at the Jakarta Metropolitan Police Detention Center where they have been allowed to meet with journalists, academics, and a host of other visitors. Both have taken an active role in religious counseling efforts, directed not only at other prisoners convicted of terrorism but also at narcotics offenders. They have also taken part in seminars, discussions and various deradicalisation programs. Sawad and Abdul Ghoni were moved to Kedung Pane Prison, Semarang in late 2008 where they remained as of March 2023. Abdul Ghoni became a noted calligrapher there.

A. Terrorism Activities Before Bali

The four were involved in a range of violent extremist activity before the 2002 bombing, including the Ambon conflict, the August 2000 bombing in Jakarta that nearly killed the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia, the December 2000 Christmas Eve bombings, and the planning meetings for the Bali bombing.

Ali Imron, working with Zulkarnaen and the organization known as KOMPAK, helped supply Muslim forces after the outbreak of the Ambon conflict and in October 1999 helped set up a military training center for *mujahidin* in Waimurat, Buru in Maluku. The Waimurat training became famous for the JI, DI and KOMPAK luminaries who trained there.²² It was also where Ali Imron first met the suicide bomber who walked into Paddy's Pub in Bali in 2002.²³

From 1998, Ali Imron, as a member of Zulkarnaen's special forces, was involved in amassing firearms and chemicals and other materials for bomb-making at his home in Lamongan. Prior to the attack on the Philippine ambassador, Amrozy ordered him to prepare several sacks of fertilizers and several dozen detonators from his stash for the bomb. Ali Imron did so but had no further role in the bombing; Mubarok and Sawad, together with Amrozy and Dulmatin, mixed the chemicals at a friend's house in Cirebon, and Mubarok and Amrozy later brought them to Jakarta but had returned home by the time the bomb was detonated. Other JI friends were responsible for planting it.

In early December 2000, Amrozy, Ali Imron and Mubarok met Hambali in a hotel in Surabaya. The fighting in Ambon and Poso was at its worst, and Hambali told them that if Christians could attack Muslims on Idul Fitri (the holiday at the end of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month), as they had done in Ambon, then they could attack Christians on Christmas Eve.²⁴ Ali Imron and Mubarok would be responsible for the bombs in East Java; other JI members under Hambali's direction would coordinate bombings elsewhere. Hambali would cover all costs and they could pick up the detonators and timers at Dulmatin's. Ali Imron had enough explosives stored at his

²² They included the twins Saifuddin and Nurudin (Nurudin was killed fighting in Ceram, Maluku; Saifuddin went on to become a top fighter in ISIS in Syria under the name of Abu Walid); Abdullah Sunata and Asep Dahlan alias Asep Djaja of KOMPAK; Abdul Ghoni; Zulkarnaen; Hari Kuncoro, brother-in-law of Dulmatin; and Ali Hamka, later to arrested for his role in the 2016 Jakarta bombing.

²³ This was Feri alias Iqbal from Pemalang, Central Java. He had been a combatant in Ambon and North Maluku and had once visited al-Islam pesantren. See *Sang Pengebom*, pp.108-109.

²⁴ *Sang Pengebom*, p. 65

own house for the East Java job. Hambali asked them to choose which churches they wanted to target, and they chose three in the town of Mojokerto. They deliberately avoided Surabaya, because if bombs went off there, it would be harder to buy chemicals and fertilizer for future bombs.²⁵ Amrozy, Mubarak and Ali Imron each took one church. Three others, one of them Sawad, joined the team later. One man would plant a bomb wrapped like a present in a chair; a second bomb would be placed outside the church, to be detonated as people were running from the first. In the end, one person, a Muslim volunteer, was killed in Mojokerto, while across Indonesia – in Jakarta, Pekanbaru, Medan, Bandung, Batam, Mataram and Sukabumi as well as Mojokerto, a total of eighteen were killed and over 100 were wounded. Sawad testified that he received Rp.300,000 for his role; it is not clear how much the others received.²⁶

B. The Bali Bombing

In July 2002, Ali Imron first learned from Amrozy about plans for an attack on Bali using a car bomb. Mubarak was also present. Hambali had been urging an attack on the U.S. and its allies, but it appears to have been Imam Samudra, in May 2002, who first came up with the idea of a Bali attack in response to the killing of Muslims by Hindus in Gujarat, India.²⁷ On 14 August, Amrozy invited Ali Imron to a meeting at the home of another JI member near Ngruki, with the whole team of operatives designated for the project: Mukhlas, Imam Samudra, Amrozy, Ali Imron, Abdul Ghoni, Sawad and Idris.²⁸ All agreed that Bali would be the target but for a variety of reasons, the Gujarat massacre no longer seemed to be the main rationale. The meeting was the first time Idris appears in a major role, but he was deeply involved from this point onward. Mukhlas explained to the group that this attack would be the beginning of a jihad against America and its allies, and that Imam Samudra would be the field coordinator. They tried to plan it to coincide with the anniversary of 9/11, but the planning took longer than expected.²⁹ They agreed on three bombs: a one-ton car bomb, a motorcycle bomb, and an explosive vest. Dulmatin, Abdul Ghoni, Umar Patek and Sawad were assigned to mix the chemicals. All but Dulmatin would make the bombs; Dulmatin would prepare the firing device and detonators. Ali Imron and Amrozy were in charge of securing the explosives and arranging transport. Idris would bring the money and arrange accommodation in Bali.

By the end of August all the materials had been purchased, with cartons of fertilizer stored at Amrozy's house in Lamongan. On 8 September, six members of the team, including Ali Imron and Mubarak, went to Bali. The next day, Ali Imron and Imam Samudra did a preliminary survey of the three tourist areas of Kuta, Sanur and Nusa Dua. On 10 September, after buying a used motorcycle, they continued the survey and chose Sari Club and Paddy's Pub, subject to the others' approval. On 18 September, Idris arrived from Java with one batch of fertilizer. On 22

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Sarjiyo alias Sawad, witness testimony in trial dossier of Abdul Jabar, No.953/Pid.B/PN Jkt Pst., 23 April 2003.

²⁷ Testimonies of Hernianto and Mukhlas. The rationale later changed to include Bali as a place of immorality and vice where citizens of "America and its lackeys" could be targeted.

²⁸ Testimony of Ali Gufron alias Mukhlas al. Sofwan al Abu Zaid al Abu Baqis as witness in Abu Bakar Ba'asyir trial, 5 Dec 2002. The meeting took place at the house of the father-in-law of Hernianto, a fellow JI member, in Grogol, Sukoharjo, near Ngruki.

²⁹ *Sang Pengebom* p. 76

September, Umar Patek, Abdul Ghoni and Sawad joined the team in Bali. On 27 September, Amrozy instructed Ali Imron to return to Java and take the remaining fertilizer from his house to Surabaya to ship to Bali. On the same day, Noordin Top and Dr Azhari, later to form a splinter group that would be responsible for a series of major bombings in Jakarta and Bali, came to Amrozy's house.³⁰ Amrozy brought Dr Azhari, a trained bomb-maker, into the operation. On 4 October, Dulmatin, Azhari, and Amrozy left in one car for Bali with Mubarok driving the car that would eventually be used as the car bomb, while Mukhlas, Azhari, Dulmatin and Ali Imron left in another. On 5 October the team began assembling the bombs in a rented house in Bali, using eight plastic filing cabinets as the casing for the car bomb.

Over the next three days, Azhari fitted the filing cabinet with detonating cords, and he and the others began filing the drawers with explosive materials. On 10 October, there was a slight change in plans. The car bomb was still planned for the Sari Club, with Feri alias Jimmi as the designated bomber, and the explosive vest for Arnasan alias Iqbal, the bomber at Paddy's Pub, but Ali Imron would substitute a briefcase bomb for the motorcycle bomb planned for the entrance to the U.S. consulate in Bali. Also, because it turned out that Jimmi could not drive, it was agreed that Ali Imron would drive the car close to the Sari Club, turn the wheel over to Jimmi, and get on the back of a motorcycle driven by Idris, who would be following behind. On 11 October, Azhari finished constructing the briefcase bomb and the explosive vest, and he and Amrozy returned to Java. Ali Imron gave careful instructions to Jimmi and Iqbal about what buttons to push and when and where to detonate their bombs, and then took them to the target sites to get familiar with the locations.

On 12 October, the day of the bombings, Abdul Ghoni and Umar Patek returned to Java, leaving Ali Imron and Idris as the major operatives still on Bali. Ali Imron attached the detonators to the bombs. At 8 p.m., he took a motorcycle to the U.S. consulate, but because of security could not place it at the entrance. He was forced to leave it on the sidewalk to the right of the consulate, smeared with human feces so no one would touch it. He went back to the house in Bali to pick up the two suicide bombers and then took them close to their targets. As planned, he got out and joined Idris on a motorcycle and they sped away, hearing a large explosion as they neared their house. The next day they took a bus to the Bali ferry terminal and safely made it back to Surabaya.

³⁰ Noordin Top and Amrozy were responsible for the 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta; the 2005 Bali bombing; and the 2009 bombing of the Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in Jakarta. Azhari died when he detonated an explosive vest as the police were closing in on him in Batu, Malang in 2005. Noordin died in a police operation after the 2009 bombings.

V. THE RELEASED OPERATIVES: UMAR PATEK, IDRIS, MASYKUR ABDUL KADIR, AND HERNIANTO

Three other men involved in Bali were released and one died in prison:

- **Idris;**
- **Umar Patek;**
- **Masykur Abdul Kadir;** and
- **Hernianto (deceased).**

Umar Patek and Idris were part of the core team. Idris should have been in prison at least as long as Patek, but because he was involved in a minor role the 2003 Marriott bombing, he was convicted of that and not for any role in Bali.

A. Mohammed Ihsan alias Idris

Long before Umar Patek was released in 2022, Mohammed Ihsan alias Idris alias Jhoni Hendrawan alias Gembrot had been freed without fanfare. Idris was a little younger than the others, born in 1973, and he was from Sumatra, not Java. A graduate of Ngruki, he was one of the operatives in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombing in Pekanbaru, Riau (his home town) and was brought into the August 2002 planning meeting for Bali by Imam Samudra.³¹ Idris served as driver for the team throughout their stay in Bali, and it was he who followed on a motorcycle behind the car with Ali Imron and the suicide bomber to the Sari Club on the night of the bombing. He evaded arrest for a few months longer than the others but was finally caught in Medan in June 2003. By this time, he had been involved in the preparations for what became the August 2003 Marriott Hotel bombing, although he was already in custody by the time that attack took place.³² He was initially indicted for his role in both bombings, but the judges in his case ruled that as the terrorism law was only passed after the Bali attack had taken place, he could not be charged retroactively, so only the Marriott charges stuck. (Legally, he could have been charged with premeditated murder under Article 340 of the Criminal Code, but at the time the prosecution strategy was to charge a suspect with one major crime and hold other charges in “reserve” for future use, if necessary.) He was sentenced to ten years in prison and was released in February 2009. By the time he was out, his first wife had left him and did not allow him to see their two sons. He moved to Bogor, where he married a student and made first a meagre living, selling shrimp crackers to foodstalls in the area, then a more lucrative one, running a car rental company.

³¹ “Mantan Terpidana Sebut Patek Anggota Tim Inti Bom Bali,” Beritsatu.com, 23 March 2012.

³² In April 2003, Idris helped move the explosives used in the bombing (ten cartons of “black powder”), which were left over from the Christmas Eve attack in Pekanbaru, from the place where they had been initially stored.

B. Hisham Alizein alias Umar Patek

Umar Patek, whose release caused such anger among victims and their families, had been a member of Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia before he went to Malaysia with Dulmatin, his childhood friend, to prepare for going to Afghanistan to train. He attended lectures by Abdullah Sungkar for the few months he was there, and then left to join other Indonesians at the military training camp on the Pakistan-Afghan border. He went to Mindanao briefly before returning to Indonesia. He too was involved in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings. His role was to help Dulmatin distribute the bombs in Jakarta, although he said he stayed in the car while others placed them in the churches.

After Bali, Umar Patek was on the run much longer than any of the other key players. (Zulkarnaen was in hiding longer but was not directly involved in the operation.) When preparations for Bali were complete but before the bombing, Idris drove Patek back to Java on Imam Samudra's instructions.³³ Afterwards, Patek took a circuitous route to the Philippines, where he was later joined by Dulmatin, together with Dulmatin's wife, children and brother-in-law.³⁴ They stayed under MILF protection until November 2005 when the MILF expelled them in the interests of pursuing peace negotiations with the Philippine government. They then joined the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), with Patek taking a major role as strategist in his capacity as a member of the ASG's highest body, the Majelis Syura.³⁵

While still with the MILF, Patek married a Filipina convert to Islam, who took the name Ruqqiyah. (In his post-release redrawing of his character, Patek notes that he invited her father, a Protestant minister, and all her family to the wedding at the MILF camp where he was living at the time, and persuaded the fighters there to forego the usual celebration of firing guns into the air so the guests would not be frightened. The anecdote was designed to show his essential tolerance.)³⁶

He returned to Indonesia in June 2009, without the knowledge of either Philippine or Indonesian authorities, and began immediately preparing to leave for Afghanistan where he was hoping to fight on behalf of Muslims whom he saw as oppressed by Western forces. He was arrested *en route* there in May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan just months before U.S. soldiers killed Osama bin Laden in the same town. He was extradited to Indonesia with his wife in August 2011. Far from being the hardened ideologue that many expected and feared, Patek began cooperating with authorities from the moment he returned, reportedly part of a bargain with Indonesian police that he would be fully forthcoming as long as they allowed Ruqqiyah to return with him. Both kept their sides of the agreement. His wife was briefly detained on immigration charges but then was allowed to live near the prison where Patek was held; she became an Indonesian

³³ "Mantan Terpidana Sebut Patek Anggota Tim Inti Bom Bali," Beritsatu.com, 23 March 2012.

³⁴ Dulmatin's brother-in-law, Hari Kuncoro, a KOMPAK member, came back with him secretly to Indonesia in 2009. He was arrested in 2011 and sentenced to six years in prison. He was released on 20 March 2016 and rearrested in 2019, trying to leave for Afghanistan where he hoped to join IS-Khorasan. He was released in January 2023.

³⁵ "Umar Patek dan Pembebasan Sandera Abu Sayyaf," kompas.com 8 April 2016.

³⁶ Metro TV, interview on "Kick Andy", 12 March 2023.

citizen in 2019.

When the Abu Sayyaf Group kidnapped several Indonesian hostages in 2016, Patek offered to help negotiate their release from his prison cell, since he knew the top commanders involved and knew they were deadly serious about deadlines.³⁷ He told an interviewer at the time that while he was still with the ASG, he had helped persuade them to release a hostage from the International Committee of the Red Cross whom ASG fighters had seized in 2009.³⁸ His offer was turned down, but Indonesian officials did consult with him.

Patek rejected the notion that the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) or its programs had anything to do with his willingness to work with authorities. It was a combination of self-awareness, his commitment to his wife, and the kindness of a few officials, including at Porong Prison in Surabaya where he served his sentence.

Patek became a media sensation after his release, giving a particularly detailed interview on the popular talk show, “Kick Andy” on 12 March 2023. He came across as contrite, indeed tearfully so, but downplayed his role in the bombing and omitted any mention of his role in the planning meetings. In his version, he only became involved in mixing the chemicals because Sawad was ill. He spoke of fleeing to the Philippines but only mentioned his role with the MILF, not with the more problematic ASG. When asked by the host why he did not pull out of the Bali team if he had misgivings about attacking civilians, as he claimed, he said he was not senior enough in the organization. He said he had no official position in JI and thus no influence, and the institutional culture was that everyone under the leader should “hear and obey.”³⁹

As Umar Patek adjusts to living as a free man, he will likely continue to help police with deradicalization programs. He is also active with the Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian (Peace Circle Foundation), a program for former prisoners run by Ali Fauzi.

C. Masykur Abdul Kadir and Hernianto

Masykur Abdul Kadir and Hernianto did not have direct roles in the 2002 bombing, but both were in a position to know that something big was underway and neither made any effort to report it. Masykur was a JI member living in Denpasar, Bali, who helped arrange accommodations and hire vehicles in Bali. He also met with the operatives after the bombing had taken place.⁴⁰ He claimed he was never informed beforehand by the others of what was about to happen. He was arrested in December 2002, after most of the key operatives were already in jail, and was charged under Laws 15 and 16 of 2003, adopted by the Indonesian parliament to effectively ratify two emergency anti-terrorism decrees issued by then President Megawati six days after the Bali bombing. The first defined and outlawed terrorism. The second allowed the first to be

³⁷ “Umar Patek dan Pembebasan Sandera Abu Sayyaf,” kompas.com 8 April 2016.

³⁸ The hostage involved was Mary Jean Lacaba, then 37, a Filipina. She and two others, a Swiss and an Italian, were seized on Jolo after visiting a prison there in January 2009. Reuters, “Three Red Cross workers kidnapped in Philippines, 15 January 2009.

³⁹ Interview of Andy F Noya with Umar Patek <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YDgG4fgfV10>.

⁴⁰ Another man named Makmuri alias Muri also helped with accommodation in Bali; he received a seven-year sentence.

applied to the Bali bombing. Maskyur Abdul Kadir was sentenced to fifteen years under the two laws. His lawyers then brought a case to the newly established Constitutional Court, arguing that Law No.16 was unconstitutional because the constitution forbade retrospective application of the law, and Maskyur had committed his crimes before the new laws were passed. The court judges ruled five to four in favour of Masykur but then the Chief Justice together with the then Justice Minister decided that the Court's decision itself could not be applied retroactively, so Masykur stayed in prison.⁴¹ He was finally released in 2010.

Hernianto was a relatively junior JI member and former Ngruki student who in mid-2002 was employed by Yayasan al-Aman, a JI charity headed by Zulkarnaen. Then aged 28, Hernianto was tasked with arranging the sites for several key planning meetings for the Bali bombing, including the critical one on 14 August 2002 that took place at his in-laws' house. He himself was not permitted to attend the discussions. He was also asked to find a place for Imam Samudra to rent in the months leading up to the bombing. Hernianto was arrested in December 2002 and, as a key member of the "Solo support network", received a fifteen-year sentence. In February 2006, however, he died of liver failure while in prison. His older brother, Herlambang, who was a veteran of JI training in Mindanao and fought in Poso, Central Sulawesi, for two years, was also arrested for helping hide some of the fugitives after the attack. He received a six-year sentence and was out in four.

VI. THE RING BANTEN ROBBERS

Of the five men who robbed a gold store in Banten with Imam Samudra's encouragement, ostensibly to help fund the Bali bombings, three are dead, and two have been model citizens since their early release in 2009. All were members of Ring Banten, a militant splinter of Darul Islam named after Banten, the province west of Jakarta where the group was based.⁴² Ring Banten was never part of JI but some of its members worked closely with JI during the Ambon and Poso conflicts, in the Bali bombing, and later, in the 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy. Several also attended JI schools, including al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo; Lukmanul Hakiem in Johor, Malaysia; and Darusysyahada in Boyolali, Solo. Members were implicated in the 2010 Aceh training camp; the January 2016 attack in central Jakarta by the group that became known as Jamaah Anshorul Daulah (JAD); and in efforts to join train with a pro-ISIS faction of Abu Sayyaf in Basilan, southern Philippines later in 2016. Members of one prominent

⁴¹ For a detailed analysis of the decision, see Simon Butt and David Hansell, "The Masykur Abdul Kadir Case: Indonesian constitutional Court Decision No 013/PUU-I/2003, *Australian Journal of Asian Law*, No.6, 2004, p.176 (Another man named Makmuri alias Muri also helped with accommodation; he received a seven-year sentence.)For the full decision, see Putusan Perkara Nomor 013/PUU-I/2003 Dimuat Dalam Berita Negara Republik Indonesia No.61 Tahun 2004, https://www.mkri.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/putusan_sidang_Putusan013PUUI2003.pdf.

⁴² See International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing", Asia Report No.92, 22 February 2005.

Ring Banten family unsuccessfully attempted to form a splinter group of JI in 2021. As of 2023, Ring Banten was said to be effectively disbanded.

A. The Connection to Imam Samudra

At the time of the Bali bombing, the link to Ring Banten went through Imam Samudra, who had grown up in Serang, Banten and was described by one man who worked with him in 2001 as one of Ring Banten's senior figures.⁴³ His former high school classmate, **Heri Hafidin**, who had also overlapped with him at Lukmanul Hakiem pesantren in Johor, Malaysia, introduced Samudra to three of the soon-to-be robbers in July 2002 and they then brought along the others. The five were:

- **Arnasan alias Iqbal**, who became the suicide bomber at Paddy's Pub;
- **Abdul Rauf alias Sam**, later sentenced to sixteen years. While he seemed to be rehabilitated after his release in 2011 (he was the beneficiary of several remissions, or sentence reductions), he joined ISIS shortly afterwards and died in 2014 as a suicide bomber in Ramadi, Iraq;
- **Andri Octavia alias Yudi**, also sentenced to sixteen years. He was released in 2012, pledged loyalty to ISIS in 2014 and was rearrested in 2018, together with his younger brother Indra, for JAD activities. Both received three-year sentences. Andri died in prison in April 2021 of natural causes, exacerbated by poor healthcare. Indra received a two-and-a-half-year sentence and was released in February 2021.
- **Junaedi alias Amin**, sentenced to fifteen years. He was released early in March 2009 and returned to working in an auto repair shop, owned by his parents.
- **Andi Hidayat alias Agus Barel** was released at the same time and became active in JAD. He ran a house in Cikampek where family members of pro-ISIS inmates could stay while visiting relatives in prison. As of May 2023, he was the only member of Ring Banten known to still be active in violent extremist networks.

Abdul Rauf, Andri Octavia, and Andi Hidayat had told Imam Samudra at this initial meeting that they wanted to go to Poso to fight. He suggested that they wage jihad at home first, so on 22 August 2002, some six weeks before the Bali attack, the group, now including Iqbal and Junaedi, robbed the Elita gold store in Serang, Banten, getting away with 2.5 kg in gold jewelry and some cash. At the time they believed they were raising money to help Muslims in Ambon. After they delivered the proceeds to Samudra, he summoned them all to Bali, and they arrived on 5 October. He never explained what was being planned. Idris picked them up after they arrived by ferry from East Java. The following evening, Abdul Rauf took part in a survey of Kuta, with particular attention to the locations of the Sari Club and Paddy's Pub. On 8 October, Junaedi and

⁴³ "Recycling Militants", p.29

Andi Hidayat had their turn to survey the area. The next day, Imam Samudra sent all of them except Iqbal home, saying they had all the people they needed. He still never revealed what exactly was being planned. They woke up to news of the bombing on 13 October. In retrospect, Imam Samudra appears to have wanted them to rob the gold store more to test their mettle than to provide additional funding for the Bali bombing. Hambali had secured all the money needed from al-Qaeda.⁴⁴

Four other Ring Banten members were detained for about ten months for their role in disposing of left over explosives from Bali. They were never tried.⁴⁵

Heri Hafidin, the man who first introduced Imam Samudra to the Banten men in July 2002 was himself arrested in February 2004 and sentenced to six years for having helped find Imam Samudra a place to stay after the bombing. He was given conditional release in December 2006 and returned to religious teaching, from a Salafi perspective, focusing on Islamic eschatology and end-of-time prophecies. He is believed to have joined JI. While he was never involved in violence, he periodically resurfaced as one or two steps removed from those who were. In 2021, four of his brothers – Imarudin, Hasanudin, Jamaludin and Ali Amin – and his own son were arrested for involvement in a JI splinter group that aimed, among other things, to purchase arms and exploit elections to attack migrant workers from mainland China working in Indonesia and lead to popular support for an Islamic state.

B. Ring Banten and Violent Extremism After Bali

While this report focuses on the Bali bombers, the collaboration of Ring Banten in other acts of terrorism was so important that we also thought a quick look at where the other major perpetrators were was warranted. The story of Ring Banten's involvement in the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing is described in detail elsewhere.⁴⁶ The key figures from the group included:

- **Heri Golun**, the suicide bomber in the embassy bombing.
- **Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois**, sentenced to death on 13 September 2005 and on death row in Karanganyar Prison, Nusakambangan as of May 2023.
- **Sapta Adi bin Robert Bakri alias Syailendra** alias Ismet Hakiki. Arrested in connection with Aceh training 2010, never charged for his role in the embassy bombing, but later admitted helping out. He was arrested in February 2010, sentenced to seven years and released in 2016. He was rearrested in 2018 for pro-ISIS activities but was released without charge.

⁴⁴ See testimony of Wan Min bin Wan Mat in dossier of Aly Ghufuron alias Mukhlas, No.Pol. BP/06/II/2003/Dit Reskrim, 11 March 2003.

⁴⁵ These were Pujata als Chuzefa, Aprianto, Fathurrahman and Iwang Fauzi. The father of Andri Octavia was Pujata's boss. Pujata was approached about taking part in Australian embassy bomb but wanted nothing to do with it.

⁴⁶ "Recycling Militants", op.cit.

- **Saiful Bahri**, accused of helping buy explosives and packing the van used in the embassy bombing. He was arrested in November 2004, given a ten-year sentence in 2005 and released in 2013.
- **Agus Achmad bin Engkos Kosasih**. Brought explosives from a house in Cengkareng, outside Jakarta, to an in-law's house in Cianjur, West Java a day before the embassy bombing. Sentenced to four years in July 2005, released in July 2007.

The key figure here is Iwan Dharmawan. Born in 1975, he is the nephew of the late leader of Ring Banten, known as Kang Jaja, who was killed by police in 2010, in the aftermath of the discovery of a terrorist training camp in Aceh. Rois had trained in Mindanao in May 1999 and had fought in Poso. After being sentenced to death for his role in the embassy bombing, he became the go-to consultant for many would-be mujahidin who visited him in prison. He once shared a cell with extremist cleric Aman Abdurrahman, and together they became strong ISIS promoters after 2014 within the prison complex of Nusakambangan. They were considered the chief motivators of the January 2016 attack on Jalan Thamrin in Central Jakarta, the first act of terrorism by JAD. Through his younger brother, Adi Jihadi, Rois helped finance travel to Syria, through Turkey, and to the Philippines. Adi Jihadi himself was involved in an effort to send JAD members for training to Mindanao and bring weapons back to Indonesia. He was caught, sentenced to six years in prison, and given conditional release in 2022 after swearing allegiance to the Indonesian republic.

Iwan Dharmawan seemed to grow somewhat less hardline after his stroke, but when he was approached in 2020 for a reconciliation meeting with one family of victims of the 2004 bombing, in a visit filmed by the BBC, he seemed largely unrepentant. When asked by a young woman whose mother had died on her fifth birthday as a result of the injuries she suffered from the bombing, why he had undertaken the bombing, He replied, "I didn't do it. Why should I admit to it?" When her widowed father introduced his daughter, Iwan told him, "I'm worse off than you. You're still with your children. My child doesn't even know me."⁴⁷ He nevertheless has reportedly submitted a petition for clemency to the president, an act not usually associated with hardline ideologues who reject the Indonesian legal system out of hand. Despite Adi Jihadi's apparent rehabilitation and Iwan's possible "softening", their history suggests that no one should write off Ring Banten just quite yet, even though as an organization, it has been largely disbanded. Some 40 former members, including a group that underwent military training in Saketi, Banten in 2001, are now working on a large coffee plantation in Gunung Karang, Pandeglang in Banten.

⁴⁷ BBC, "What would you say to the men who killed your mum?" [bbc.com](https://www.bbc.com/news/indonesia-53844444), 17 February 2020.

VII. THE MINOR PLAYERS

In addition to all the above, some 20 men were arrested for mostly minor roles, including helping to dispose of weapons, explosives and ammunition that Ali Imron had stored in Lamongan, or helping some of the fugitives hide in Java or East Kalimantan.⁴⁸ Most had three- or four-year sentences, and all were released after serving their terms. Many had been students of Ali Imron's at Pesantren al-Islam in Lamongan and therefore felt an obligation to help him. Most of these individuals stayed away from extremist networks after their release and joined an NGO for rehabilitated prisoners and their families called the "Peace Circle" (Yayasan Lingkar Perdamaian) led by Ali Fauzi, a half-brother of Ali Imron who has long been active in deradicalisation activities.

Only one person in this group was rearrested after release. Azhari Dipo Kusumo, a graduate of Ngruki, Mindanao veteran and senior JI official who ran the al-Ikhlas pesantren in Lamongan, was rearrested in 2021 in the wave of JI arrests that began in 2019. He had reengaged with JI under Para Wijayanto's leadership, and had gone to Syria in 2013 to meet ISIS and see what its teachings were like. In the JI structure that Para had established, he was part of the education division, and specifically the pesantren program that was critical to JI's recruitment.

VIII. CONCLUSION: RETRIBUTION OR REHABILITATION?

The history of the Bali bombers suggests that prison experience remains a difficult predictor of what former extremists will do once released. Abdul Rauf, by many accounts, was considered a fully rehabilitated prisoner, and a gentle, open person to those who met him. Yet not long after his release, in 2014, he died as a suicide bomber for ISIS in Ramadi, Iraq. He apparently had no interest in further violence in Indonesia, but should risk analyses aim only at the possibility of violence at home or commitment to defend Muslims further afield? Does cooperation with prison authorities while detained always presage continued commitment to cooperation once released? And does swearing an oath of allegiance to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) reflect a real conversion to pro-government positions or an action that can be defined as *taqiyya*, lying in the interests of protecting the Muslim community?

Nevertheless, when individuals sentenced to life imprisonment have contributed significantly to drawing fellow inmates out of or away from violent extremist organisations, the question needs to be asked whether the demand for retribution could become counter-productive, by denying them an opportunity to share new insights with a broader community or discourage others from committing similar crimes. The four men sentenced to life imprisonment still have many

⁴⁸ For details, see Appendix 1.

productive years ahead of them, considering how old they were when the Bali bombing took place. There is still time to think through whether any strategies of reparative or restorative justice could allow them to return to a life outside prison and at the same time address the deep sufferings and losses of their victims.

APPENDIX I: INDONESIANS INVOLVED IN THE 2002 BALI BOMBING

Note: The symbol @ is used for “alias”. Only the most common alias is used here. Jemaah Islamiyah is abbreviated JI, Ring Banten is RB. In the “Sentence” column, LWOP is “Life Without Parole”.

	NAME	ARRESTED	SENTENCE	RELEASED	ROLE and AFFILIATION	NOTES
1	Abdul Aziz@Imam Samudra	21-Nov-02	death		Top operative, JI	Executed 9-Nov-08
2	Abdul Ghoni@Umar Wayan	22-Apr-03	LWOP		Core team, JI	In Semarang prison
3	Abdul Rauf@Sam (dec.) RECIDIVIST	19-Nov-02	16 yrs	15-Aug-11	Bali-linked robbery, RB	Died in Ramadi, Iraq, 2014 with ISIS
4	Abdullah Salam	28-Feb-03	3 yrs	03-Jul-05	Hid Ali Imron	Ali Imron’s student at al-Islam, Lamongan
5	Abu Bakar Ba’asyir RECIDIVIST	18-Oct-02, 30-Apr-04, 09-Aug-10	18 mos, 2.5 yrs, 15 yrs	14-Jun-06, 08-Jan-21	JI amir at time of bombing	Made no effort to stop attack.
6	Ali Ghufron@Mukhlas	11-Dec-02	death		Key planner, JI	Executed 9-Nov-08
7	Ali Imron	13-Jan-03	LWOP		Core Team, JI	In Jakarta police HQ
8	Amrozy	06-Nov-02	death		Core team, JI	Executed 9-Nov-08
9	Andi Hidayat@Agus Barel	26-Nov-02	15 yrs	31-Mar-09	Bali-linked robbery, RB	Became pro-ISIS
10	Andri Octavia@Yudi (dec.) RECIDIVIST	29-Nov-02 08-Aug-19	16 yrs. 3 yrs	2012	Bali-linked robbery, RB	Joined JAD-Banten, died in custody 21-Apr-21
11	Arif Sunarso@Zulkarnaen	14-Dec-20	15 yrs		Motivator, planner JI	18 yrs as fugitive, head of JI military affairs
12	Arnasan@Iqbal	NA			RB	Suicide bomber
13	Azhari Dipo Kusumo RECIDIVIST	11-Mar-03 15-Aug-21	6 yrs 6 yrs	12-Dec-06	Helped Ali Imron flee, JI	Rearrested for JI activities, trip to Syria, 2013
14	Eko Hadi Prasetyo @Amin Abdillah	13-Jan-03	4 yrs	8-Mar-06	Minor role, hid Ali Imron,	Ali Imron’s student at al-Islam, Lamongan
15	Encep Nurjaman@Hambali	11-Aug-03 Bangkok	Indefinite (Gitmo)		Liaison to al-Q, Secured funds	Pre-trial hearing Apr 2023, lawyers requested 2025 trial.
16	Ervan	28-Feb-03	4 yrs	28-Sep-05	Minor role, helped Ali Imron flee	Lamongan
17	Feri@Jimmi					Suicide bomber
16	Firmansyah	9-Jan-03	4 yrs	30-Jan-06	Minor role, hid fugitives, JI	
17	Hamim Thohari	28-Feb-03	4 yrs	6-Oct-05	Minor role, hid weapon	Lamongan
18	Hamzah Baya	31-Jan-03	6 yrs	22-Dec-06	Hid Ali Imron, E.Kalimantan	Ali Imron’s student at al-Islam, Lamongan
19	Heri Hafidin	07-May-03	6 yrs	2-Dec-06	RB, Recruited gold store robbers	As of 2023, Salafi preacher; brothers started JI splinter.
20	Herlambang	31-Dec-02	6 yrs	28-Dec-06	Hid bombers	Trained in Mindanao

Continued next page

	NAME	ARRESTED	SENTENCE	RELEASED	ROLE and AFFILIATION	NOTES
21	Hernianto (dec.)	4-Dec-02	15 yrs	Died in custody, 03-Feb-06	Provided venue in Solo for planning mtgs	Brother of Herlambang; attended Ngruki
22	Hisham Alizein@Umar Patek	25-Jan-11 (Pakistan)	20 yrs	7-Dec-22	Core team, helped make bomb	Fled to Mindanao after bombing, returned June 2009. Released early. because of help to authorities
23	Imam Susanto	13-Jan-03	4 yrs	8-Mar-06	Minor role, hid Ali Imron (Kalimantan)	Attended Pesantren al-Islam, Lamongan
24	Joko Pitono@Dulmatin (dec.)	Shot dead 09-Mar-10			Core team, JI	Fled to Mindanao, returned 2007. Led Aceh training camp, 2010
25	Junaedi@Amin	21-Nov-02	15 yrs	31-Mar-09	Bali-linked robbery, RB	
26	Khoirul Anam	28-Feb-03	5 yrs	22-Aug-06	Minor role, helped Ali Imron flee	Husband of former student of Ali Imron's
27	Chatib@Khotib	22-Sep-03	3 yrs	14-Aug-06	Minor role, hid gun, ammo for Ali I	Not JI but KOMPAK
28	Makmuri@Muri	2002	7 yrs	31-Jul-07	Facilitated Bali transport, hotel	
29	Masykur Abdul Kadir	3-Dec-02	15 yrs	9-Jul-15	Found place to stay for team in Bali, JI, rented car	Won Constitutional Court case against retroactive application of 2003 anti-terrorism law (see text)
30	Moh.Ihsan Idris@Jhoni Hendrawan@Idris	30-Jun-03	10 yrs	28-Feb-09	Core team, JI	Prosecuted for role in 2003 Marriott, not Bali
31	Muhammad Rusi@Mujarod	2003	5 yrs	24-Oct-06	Helped Ali Imron flee to Kalimantan	Ali Imron's student at al-Islam, Lamongan
32	Muh.Yunus	Late 2002	3.5 yrs	16-Mar-07	Minor role, hid Ali Imron, Kalimantan	Once a member of Mujahidin KOMPAK
33	Nadhirin	03-Feb-03	5 yrs	22-Aug-06	Minor role, helped Ali Imron flee	From Lamongan, brother of Chatib@Khotib, parent of student at al-Islam, Lamongan
34	Nurfitrotullah	11-Aug-2003	3 yrs	7-Feb-05	Minor role, helped Ali Imron flee	Ali Imron's student at al-Islam, Lamongan
35	Nurminda	11-Aug-03	3.5 yrs	13-Apr-05	Minor role, helped Ali Imron hide guns and ammo	Lamongan
36	Puryanto	13-Jan-03	4 yrs, 8 m	17-Aug-06	Minor role, hid Ali Imron in Kalimantan	
37	Samsul Arifin	2003	3 yrs	17-Aug-05	Minor role, hid Ali Imron in Kalimantan	Ali Imron's student at al-Islam, Lamongan
38	Sarjiyo@Sawad	22-Apr-03	LWOP		Core team, JI	In Semarang prison

Continued next page

	NAME	ARRESTED	SENTENCE	RELEASED	ROLE and AFFILIATION	NOTES
39	Sirojul Munir	2003	6 yrs	24-Oct-06	Minor role, helped Ali Imron in Kalimantan	Parent of Ali Imron's student at al-Islam, Lamongan
40	Sofyan Hadi	31-Jan-03	6 yrs	22-Dec-06	Minor role, helped Ali Imron in Kalimantan	Ali Imron's student at al-Islam, Lamongan
41	Sukastopo	31-Jan-03	3 yrs	16-Feb-05	Minor role, helped Ali Imron in Kalimantan	Parent of Ali Imron's student at al-Islam, Lamongan
42	Sumarno	2002	3.5 yrs	13-Apr-05	Minor role, helped Ali Imron hide guns and ammo	Relative and former student of Ali Imron's in Lamongan
43	Utomo Pamungkas@Mubarok	13-Jan-03	LWOP		Core team, JI	In Jakarta police HQ
44	Zahri (dec.)	28-Feb-03	6 yrs	6-Mar-08	Minor role, helped hide gun, ammo and explosives	Relative of Ali Imron, died of natural causes, 8-Feb-21.

INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist, and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website is www.understandingconflict.org.
