

POLICY MISCALCULATIONS ON PAPUA

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I. INTRODUCTION

President Jokowi arguably has given more personal attention to Papua than any president since Soeharto, but his government has made at least three miscalculations in its policies there: that economic development would make political grievances go away; that past human rights violations would be easy to resolve; and that fraudulent local elections could be safely ignored.

All Indonesian governments have made the same assumption about economic development, although “development” also has too often been equated with funds made available rather than actual poverty alleviation: Papua remains the poorest province in Indonesia according to the 2016 Human Development Index. Jokowi has made serious efforts to lower prices for basic goods, reduce the isolation of remote areas by building more roads, build markets for Papuan women and increase access to education (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless the political wing of the independence movement inside Papua has grown more active, not less. Higher levels of income and education do not automatically mean greater loyalty to the Indonesian state.

The second miscalculation was that outstanding human rights cases could be speedily resolved, producing increased trust and good will on all sides. The government had little understanding of the depth of trauma and anger in Papua over human rights violations, particularly in the central highlands or the the complexity of the cases it chose to examine. It had little idea of the obstacles it would encounter when in March 2016, it promised that all cases would be resolved by the end of the year. More importantly, it showed little interest in to dealing with the much larger issue of holding security forces accountable at the command level for human rights violations in Papua. The credibility of the committee set up by the Coordinating Ministry on Political, Legal and Security Affairs (hereafter Security Coordinating Ministry) to resolve the cases was also undermined by the way it was used as a public relations tool to demonstrate its human rights bonafides to diplomats from Pacific countries.

The third assumption was that other goals could be achieved without addressing the abysmally poor administration of local elections. Papua is now moving into in full election mode, with direct elections for governor and seven district heads scheduled for June 2018. The current governor, Lukas Enembe is Papua’s first governor from the highlands, which is also the stronghold of the independence movement. He has presided over the expansion of highland political power, including through supporting the creation of new districts that have decisively shifted provincial political power away from the traditional coastal elite. With vast sums of money available for patronage, local elections in Papua, especially in the highlands, have turned into a sordid spectacle of fraud, corruption and sometimes violence that Jakarta has never really tried to clean up. Specific election disputes go to the Constitutional Court in Jakarta to resolve, but no one has made an effort it would take to ensure credible voter rolls, informed voters, neutral local election commissions and a secret ballot.

Instead, the Jokowi government seems to have made a political calculation that Jakarta’s interests would be best served by bringing the governor onside and turning a blind eye to the tactics that he and others have used to get elected. This has resulted in widespread corruption, appointment of relatives and cronies, chronic absenteeism of local officials and failure to improve basic social services. By perpetuating poor governance, election fraud undercuts the economic development goals that President Jokowi himself has set.

This report examines the three assumptions in more detail.

- It looks at the current state of the independence movement and how the Jokowi government has responded, with a particular focus on the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) as the broad coalition working overseas and its main partner inside Papua, the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat,

KNPB). It argues that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry has been successful in blunting the ULMWP's bid for a broader role in the Pacific but the real challenge remains at home.

- It examines how the Jokowi government has handled the human rights issue and argues that while the approach thus far has been flawed, this is one area where genuine progress could be made if only there were the political will and sustained attention to follow through.
- It looks at the sorry mess that local elections in Papua have become, using the Tolikara district elections as a case study, and suggests that the best first step the central government could take if there is to be any hope of serious economic development is to get accurate statistics on how many people now live in Papua.

One note on terminology: the focus of this paper is on Papua province rather than the entire Papuan territory which is now comprised of two provinces, Papua and Papua Barat (West Papua). When we use the term "Papua", we are referring to the province, except when otherwise indicated. Independence activists use the term "West Papua" to refer to the entire territory, which in earlier incarnations was successively called the Dutch East Indies, West New Guinea, West Irian, Irian Jaya and Papua.

II. THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT: ULMWP AND KNPB

Since December 2014, the main short-term objective of the Papuan independence movement has been to acquire full membership in the body known as the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). MSG, a subgroup of the Pacific Islands Forum, consists of four Pacific nations – Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Fiji – and one non-state actor, Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste (FLNKS), representing the indigenous Kanaks of New Caledonia.¹ Papuan activists believed that membership would boost international recognition for their quest for self-determination. They also believed, correctly, that they had a greater chance of support from Pacific island states than from Western governments.²

ULMWP's political struggle has overshadowed the very sporadic, low-level actions of pro-independence guerrillas, mostly those operating in Puncak, Puncak Jaya and Intan Jaya in the central highlands. Militarily, they are insignificant. The Indonesian government has always seen the political movement as much more of a threat, which is why it was so determined to block the Papuan MSG bid and acquire membership itself. The struggle led the Papuans to build a single organisation, ULMWP, that has concentrated on international lobbying, and the Jokowi government to develop a sharper political focus on the Pacific. The government also made a concerted effort to undercut the Papuan argument that its Melanesian culture was different from the rest of Indonesia by arguing that five provinces had substantial Melanesian populations. It used the same argument to bolster its own bid for membership in MSG.

The most important impact of ULMWP has not been overseas, however, but at home where its coordination with KNPB has given the latter a tighter focus and a broader appeal. Despite being effectively banned as a separatist organisation, KNPB's activities have increased in number and geographic reach during the Jokowi administration. Its members are routinely arrested en masse but few are charged or brought to trial. Its activities also command a considerable amount of sympathy among elected highland politicians such as the head of the provincial parliament,

1 MSG was formed in Port Villa, Vanuatu on 14 March 1988 in support of the Kanak efforts through FLNKS to win autonomy from France.

2 They say they reached the first conclusion after being told repeatedly during lobbying trips in Europe that the West was fundamentally racist and unlikely to support a black movement. See *ULMWP: The Unification and Reconciliation of the Melanesian People in West Papua*, May 2015, pp.21-27.

who has repeatedly said that Papuans should be allowed to voice their aspirations, particularly to their elected representatives. At the same time, many Papuans in coastal areas and non-Papuans in migrant communities, especially around Jayapura, see the highlanders who take part in KNPB rallies as responsible for crime and social vice. Pro-independence groups argue that the influx of non-Papuans to Papua is by government design and may render indigenous Papuans extinct in their own land.³ This means that any clashes between migrants and indigenous Papuans or between coastal and highlander communities, regardless of the cause, is likely to be given a political spin. The 2018 governor's race, with highlander Enembe up for re-election, may be particularly fraught.

A. *The First Steps*

The critical first step toward the birth of the ULMWP was to overcome internal rivalries and build a united front. The political wing, like the armed wing commonly known as the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), was traditionally divided between coastal and highland groups, and efforts by different leaders to form umbrella groups around 2004-2005 only created new rifts.⁴

By 2011, there were four main groups of political activists:

- Federal Republic of West Papua (Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat, NRPFB), established in 2011 and dominated by coastal leaders.⁵
- West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), founded by the late John "Otto" Ondawame in 2005. Like the above "Federal Republic", it was also dominated by Papuans from the coast. Its base was Vanuatu, where Ondawame and his fellow WPNCL leader Rex Rumakiek lived.
- The Free West Papua Campaign. Based in Oxford, U.K., this was headed by Benny Wenda, a highlander from Wamena who worked with European solidarity groups and became the best-known advocate and fund-raiser abroad for Papuan independence. He helped found and works closely with two advocacy organisations, International Parliamentarians for West Papua and International Lawyers for West Papua, both based in the U.K.⁶
- West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB) and West Papua National Parliament (Parlemen Nasional Papua Barat, PNWP). KNPB was founded in 2008 by a group of highland students and has been the main organiser of mass political demonstrations inside Papua, many of them coordinated with Wenda's activities abroad.

³ See Markus Haluk, *Papua di Ambang Kepunahan*, Jayapura, 2015.

⁴ For a detailed background and analysis, see IPAC, "The Current Status of the Papuan Independence Movement", Report No.21, 24 August 2015, pp.19-25. For independence supporters, the term "OPM" technically refers to the whole movement, political and military combined, while the armed fighters are the National Liberation Army of West Papua (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat, TPN-PB). In common parlance, OPM is generally used to refer to the guerrillas.

⁵ This was effectively a new name for the West Papuan National Authority (WPNA), a group dominated by coastal leaders. WPNA was led inside Papua by Edison Waromi and Forkorus Yaboisembut and outside by Jacob Rumbiak and Herman Wanggai, based in Australia. Forkorus was elected president of the NRPFB at the so-called Third Papuan Congress in 2011 and almost immediately arrested on rebellion charges; he was released in 2014. The Third Congress was a pro-independence gathering whose name was intended to evoke the First Congress, held in 1961 before integration with Indonesia and the Second Congress, held during the "Papuan Spring" of full freedom of expression and association in 2000, during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid.

⁶ International Parliamentarians for West Papua was founded in 2008 in London, International Lawyers for West Papua was founded in Guyana in 2009.

In 2011 it began setting up “people’s parliaments” at the district level and in April 2012, it established the PNWP, with Benny Wenda as its international spokesman. KNPB has long had a better grassroots base than any other pro-independence group. Although publicly committed to non-violence, some of its members have been involved in violent crimes against non-Papuans.

The push to join MSG originally had come from Otto Ondawame who in 2013 had applied for full membership on behalf of his Vanuatu-based organisation, the WPNCL. MSG rejected the application but invited the Papuans to reapply as an “inclusive and unified” body.⁷ A “reconciliation team” in Papua was tasked with building an alliance among the different factions of the independence movement.⁸ By late 2014, three coalitions had emerged: the WPNCL under Rex Rumakiek, who took over after Ondawame’s death in September 2014; the NRFPB under Edison Waromi; and Benny Wenda and the KNPB.⁹

In December 2014, delegates from all three gathered in Saralana, Port Vila, Vanuatu, with squabbling among them until the last minute.¹⁰ On 6 December, however, all agreed on the Saralana Declaration that formally established ULMWP as a united body for pursuing the goal of independence.

Over the next two months, a ULMWP working group hammered out a statute, spelling out that the main purpose was “to represent the aspirations of the people of West Papua in the struggle for self-determination through peaceful means.” It also appointed a five-person executive committee consisting of Octovianus Mote (NRFPB), secretary-general; Benny Wenda (PNWP); Rex Rumakiek (WPNCL); Jacob Rumbiak (NRFPB) and Leoni Tanggahma (WPNCL). All were Papuans living abroad.¹¹ On 4 February 2015, it resubmitted an application to MSG for full membership.

B. The Indonesian Response

Indonesia engaged in intensive lobbying to prevent the new group from gaining the international recognition that full membership would confer. In March 2015, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi visited Fiji, bringing \$20 million in aid and promises of strengthened trade and development cooperation, as well as Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.¹² In May, President Jokowi travelled to Papua New Guinea, offering partnerships on everything from air travel to oil and gas exploration.¹³ Both Fiji and Papua New Guinea have consistently supported the Indonesian government position on Papua, though officials in Port Moresby have sometimes provided facilities for Papuan activists.¹⁴

7 *ULMWP: The Unification and Reconciliation of the Melanesian People in West Papua*, op.cit., p.42.

8 The team consisted of Sem Awom, an activist from a prominent Biak clan, many of whose members have been involved in the independence movement; Cris Dogopia from Waghete, Deiyai, then a teacher at a Catholic school in Jayapura; and Simeon Alua, an activist from Jayawijaya representing the PWNP.

9 IPAC interview with Markus Haluk, Jayapura 23 January 2017.

10 Forkorus Yoisebut did not agree to the unification because he believed his group, the NRFPB, had been recognised as the legitimate representative of the Papuans in 2011. Gen. Richard Yoweni, a senior OPM commander, was also unhappy and in the end decided not to attend.

11 Mote is based in the U.S., Wenda in the U.K., Rumakiek in Vanuatu; Rumbiak in Australia and Tanggahma in the Netherlands.

12 “Menlu Indonesia-Fiji lakukan pertemuan bilateral”, www.antaranews.com, 2 March 2015.

13 Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, “Inilah Kesepakatan Kerjasama Yang Dicapai Dalam Kunjungan Presiden Jokowi Ke PNG,” <http://setkab.go.id>, 12 May 2015.

14 In December 2014, the Papua New Guinean prime minister made his personal jet available to fly five Papuan independence leaders to Port Vila for the meeting that led to the birth of USMWP.

The Jokowi government also initiated a program aimed at undermining the Papuan claim to be culturally different from the rest of Indonesia. This it did by creating Melindo, an acronym for “Melanesia Indonesia”, an organisation claiming to represent the five provinces of Indonesia with Melanesian populations: Maluku, Maluku Utara, West Nusa Tenggara, Papua and Papua Barat, together totalling 11 million people. It ensured that Melindo had a large delegation at the 20th MSG summit in Honiara, Solomon Islands from 24-26 June 2015 where the decision on membership was expected to be announced.¹⁵

In the end, ULMWP was granted observer status, as representing “Melanesians living abroad”. Indonesia was elevated from observer, which it had been since 2011, to the hitherto unknown status of “associate member”, in recognition of its Melanesian population (the Melindo argument had worked). Vanuatu, Solomons and FLNKS had all supported full membership for the Papuans, but Fiji and Papua New Guinea, after intense Indonesian pressure, did not go along.

As ULMWP focused on building support networks in the Pacific, Indonesia continued to focus on its ties to Melanesia. In October 2015, it sponsored a Declaration of Melanesian Indonesian Brotherhood in Ambon. The governors of the five provinces with Melanesian populations were supposed to attend, but Lukas Enembe was one of three who failed to show. He later dismissed the whole exercise as political maneuvering and said that the declaration would not solve any of Papua’s problems.¹⁶

C. *The Opening of the ULMWP Office*

Meanwhile, ULMWP members set up a working group to publicise the results of the meeting inside Papua through demonstrations and rallies. They also decided to set up an office in Wame-na, the Papuan heartland, so all could see that ULMWP had a grassroots base and was not just a diaspora organisation.¹⁷

From the groundbreaking ceremony in August 2015 through the construction, most people were under the impression that the building would house the office of the LaPago branch office of the Papua Adat Council.¹⁸ But word went out a few days before the opening that there would be a major event to inaugurate the building. In the early afternoon of 15 February 2016, with thousands at the site, the organisers officially put out a signboard with the names of ULMWP and the Lani-Pago Customary Council. They read out a statement from Octovanius Mote that was unambiguous in its call for independence:

From this home, all of us, Papua liberation fighters who are now united in a single platform called the United Liberation Movement for West Papua, will venture out to convince the world and will bring home the independence which has been robbed by

15 The Melindo delegation included Frans Alberth Yoku and Nick Messet, two prominent pro-Indonesian Papuans whom Jakarta regularly produces to meet foreign visitors as proof that even OPM founders have accepted Indonesian sovereignty. A pastor from East Nusa Tenggara and a peace activist from Maluku, Hilda Rolobessy, also took part. ULMWP members were scornful of Melindo. Said one: “If Maluku, North Maluku and East Nusa Tenggara are included, someone should ask the people there if they think of themselves as Melanesian. Why are they only now claiming to be Melanesian? Where were they when the Papuan people who struggled for a Melanesian identity were accused of separatism and killed?” IPAC Interview with Markus Haluk, Jayapura, 23 January 2017.

16 “Gubernur: Melanesia Brotherhood Indonesia Penuh Kepentingan Politik,” *Tabloidjubi.com*, 22 October 2015.

17 The working group consisted of Markus Haluk, a longtime activist from the central highlands, representing the Federal Republic of West Papua; Victor Yeimo, head of KNPB and former political prisoner, representing PNWP; and Sem Awom of the WPNCL. IPAC interview with Markus Haluk. 23 January 2017.

18 La Pago is one of seven Papuan customary areas that today includes the *kabupaten* of Jayawijaya, Lani Jaya, Pegunungan Bintang, Nduga, Yahukimo, Yalimo, Mamberamo Tengah, Puncak, Puncak Jaya, and Tolikara.

other nations in this world.¹⁹

The next day, police came to remove the signboard. According to the then provincial police chief, Irjen (Pol) Paulus Waterpauw, the first-ever indigenous Papuan in the job, ULMWP was an organisation opposed to the Indonesian government and was therefore banned. Those responsible for the inauguration of the office would be held legally accountable. Police summoned seven people for questioning, but in the end no one was charged.²⁰

D. *Moving into New Arenas*

In March 2016, then Security Coordinating Minister Gen. (Ret.) Luhut Panjaitan, sitting in Jayapura with Gov. Enembe at his side, announced a new “holistic” approach to development in Papua that would involve education, health, infrastructure development, socio-economic empowerment and resolution of human rights issues.²¹ He also promised a larger role for indigenous Papuans. Minister Luhut followed the trip to Papua with a lobbying trip to the Pacific. In Fiji, he promised US\$5 million and a company of TNI engineers to help rebuild parts of the country destroyed by Typhoon Winston earlier in the year. A senior official in his entourage acknowledged that the aim of the trip was to use diplomatic means to reduce the influence of the ULMWP.²²

If Luhut’s trip was part of a stepped-up Pacific campaign abroad, the campaign at home – in addition to cracking down on KNPB – continued to focus on showing how Melanesian culture was intrinsically Indonesian, rather than exclusively Papuan.

In June 2016, the Minister of Home Affairs issued Regulation No.39 establishing the Forum for Brotherhood of Indonesia’s Melanesian People (Forum Persaudaraan Masyarakat Melanesia Indonesia, FPMMI). This was a governmental body, led by the Minister of Home Affairs nationally with the governors of the five provinces with Melanesian populations as branch heads. But it was a security body more than a cultural forum. The main goal was “to guide and protect stability and public order against the possibility of threats to national integrity”.²³ The deputy coordinators at the provincial level were to be appointed from the police, the regional military command and the state intelligence agency.²⁴ The Forum was also tasked with building harmony and mutual trust, conducting a “dialogue forum” with adat and clan leaders and disseminating information on relevant government policies.²⁵ Thus, while Indonesia tried to downplay the ULMWP’s status, its efforts at home and abroad showed how seriously it took the emergence of the new group and how determined it was to oppose it.

ULMWP and the Indonesian government were both determined to press their cases at the next MSG summit in the Solomon Islands on 14 July 2016. Both came away with successes and

19 Markus Haluk, *Wave of Solidarity in West Papua in Search For Recognition As Melanesians, Behind The Establishment of The ULMWP Office*, United Liberation Movement For West Papua, May 2015, p.15

20 The others were Dominikus Sorabut, Enggelberth Sorabut, Piter Wanimbo, Dokter Gunawan, Bonny Mulait, Yesaya Dimara and Pastor Jhon Jonga. Jhon Jonga was included because he had led prayers and given a lecture at the opening ceremony. Waterpauw later said that Edison Waromi and Markus Haluk would be held responsible, but no charges were brought.

21 “Pemerintah akan melakukan pendekatan kesejahteraan untuk papua, operasi militer adalah opsi terakhir,” <https://polkam.go.id>, 31 March 2016.

22 “Bantu Fiji, Indonesia ingin redam gerakan pembebasan Papua,” www.bbc.com, 28 March 2016.

23 “Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia Nomor 39 Tahun 2016 tentang Penyelenggaraan Forum Persaudaraan Masyarakat Melanesia Indonesia, Section II, Article 3,” available at <http://www.kemendagri.go.id/produk-hukum/2016/07/25/penyelenggaraan-forum-persaudaraan-masyarakat-melanesia-indonesia>.

24 Ibid, Section III, Article 5(3).

25 Ibid, Section II, Article 3 and Section III, Article 5.

failures. The MSG made no change to ULMWP's observer status, a victory for Indonesia, but rejected an Indonesian proposal that membership should be restricted to states.

In the meantime, ULMWP moved its efforts to the United Nations General Assembly, consciously following the model that Jose Ramos-Horta had set for East Timor in the 1980s. The aim was to get as many countries as possible to mention Papua in their formal statements, either in terms of calling for self-determination or for an international investigation of human rights abuses. In 2013 only Vanuatu had done so. In 2014 and 2015, the Solomon Islands also raised the issue. At the 71st General Assembly in September 2016, the number of countries mentioning Papua jumped to seven (Vanuatu, Solomons, Tuvalu, Nauru, Tonga, Marshall Islands and Palau) though in 2017, it was back to four.

The support from Micronesian nations was the result of the Solomons' decision to establish the Pacific Island Coalition for West Papua in July 2016, after its efforts to secure full membership in MSG for the ULMWP failed. Most of these countries chose to focus their reference to Papua on human rights concerns and a call for dialogue, but as far as ULMWP was concerned, the involvement of Micronesia was significant progress. The next goal was to get more support from Africa and the Caribbean.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The Jokowi government understood from the beginning that human rights had to be a strong element of its Papuan policy but senior staff underestimated how complex and politicised the problem had become or how trivial some of its initiatives seemed given the magnitude of what Papua had suffered in the past. By late 2017, it was clear that little progress had been made, even in terms of meeting the government's own objectives.

President Jokowi began his administration with the good intentions of releasing Papuan political prisoners but immediately ran into difficulties with prisoners who rejected presidential clemency if it meant acknowledging guilt.²⁶ In the end, only five men accepted pardons – ironically all who had been involved not in peaceful protests but in an OPM raid on a military post in Wamena in which two soldiers were killed. Even with the five, the government ran into criticism, and with other bureaucratic problems that arose, the plan to release more was quietly shelved.

The government also promised to resolve outstanding cases but gradually whittled down the number that it could address across Papua and West Papua to three: the shootings in Paniai in December 2014, after Jokowi became president; security force operations in 25 villages in Wamena in 2003, following the OPM attack noted above; and the retaliation by paramilitary police in Wasior, West Papua for the OPM killings of five police and one civilian in 2001, resulting in four dead, five disappeared and 39 tortured. Even those three were stalled in late 2017, though the government could push harder if there were sustained attention from the top and a willingness to intervene in what amounts to a stand-off between the National Commission on Human Rights (known by its Indonesian acronym as Komnas-HAM) and the Attorney General's office.

26 See KontraS, "Berikan Amnesty dan Abolisi ke Papua dan Maluku," press release, 9 May 2015.

The problem is that human rights concerns are not just history: they are ongoing, even if they do not constitute “slow-motion genocide” as some commentators allege.²⁷ Addressing the past, even if it were done thoroughly and impartially, would not make the issue go away.

Like many ethno-nationalist groups, Papuan independence activists also have used human rights arguments to advance their political goals. ULMWP cited massive human rights violations as a reason for applying to MSG for membership in the first place, attributing the problem both to racial differences between Melanesian Papuans and the rest of Indonesia, as well to Papuan integration into the Indonesian republic. In its view, shared by many Papuans, human rights concerns cannot be resolved without addressing the root political cause, hence the demand for self-determination.²⁸ The government’s determination to reject ULMWP claims became as much a reason for addressing human rights as wanting to put relations with Papuans on a better footing. The story of how the “Integrated Team”, set up to resolve past cases, turned into a public relations exercise to respond to Pacific critics is a case in point.

A. *The “Integrated Team” to Resolve Outstanding Cases*

The final communiqué of the 46th Pacific Islands Forum summit in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in 2015 declared:

Leaders recognised Indonesia’s sovereignty over the Papuan provinces but noted concerns about the human rights situation, calling on all parties to protect and uphold the human rights of all residents in Papua. Leaders requested the Forum Chair to convey the views of the Forum to the Indonesian Government, and to consult on a fact finding mission to discuss the situation in Papua with the parties involved.²⁹

The Indonesian government rejected a formal request to send a human rights fact-finding mission led by PNG Prime Minister Peter O’Neil but invited a delegation to visit Papua under government auspices to better understand the situation there. Responding to Pacific concerns became an additional rationale for a more high-profile approach to human rights in Papua.

President Jokowi had already instructed his Cabinet in January 2016 to work on resolving seven outstanding human rights cases across Indonesia, from the killings in 1965 to the shooting of students in 1998. The only two in Papua were the Wamena and Wasior cases.³⁰ In March, the president instructed Security Coordinating Minister Luhut Panjaitan to focus on the outstanding rights cases in Papua and resolve them within a year and on 16 April, Police Chief Waterpauw convened a meeting of Papuan activists, local officials, representatives of the military and police, and religious leaders to discuss which cases should be considered “serious” human rights violations -- which under a 2000 law means those tantamount to crimes against

27 See for example Jay Griffiths, “Indonesia’s ‘slow-motion genocide’”, www.theguardian.com, 30 December 2010; Jim Elmslie and Camellia Webb-Gannon, “A Slow-Motion Genocide: Indonesian Rule in West Papua”, *Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity*, Vol 1 No.2, 2013, pp.142-165; “Slow-motion genocide for West Papua ethnic minorities and Christians,” Asia News.it, 3 September 2016 and many others.

28 IPAC interview with Edison Waromi, Jayapura, 15 April 2017.

29 Forty-Sixth Pacific Islands Forum 8-10 September 2015, “Forum Communique”, www.forumsec.org, p.4.

30 See the end of year performance report of the Security Coordinating Ministry, “Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja 2016, Deputy Bidkor dan HAM”, in which it reports a 100 per cent success rate for achieving its objectives. https://polkam.go.id/konten/unggah/2017/07/Lakin_Deputi_III_Tahun_2016.pdf, p.24. On 1965, its recommended solutions were to avoid blame, avoid doing anything to spread hatred or vengeance, ensure that the government’s actions are backed by law and have no long-term negative effects, show the government’s sincerity in addressing the issue, and use 1965 as a lesson that no such incident should happen again. Ibid, p.25-26. For all unresolved serious human rights cases, it recommends non-judicial solutions.

humanity.³¹ The media was also invited to the meeting: the government wanted full coverage for its efforts. Two days later, most of the same participants flew to Jakarta to meet with the coordinating ministry.

On 18 May 2016, the ministry issued Decision No.40, formally setting up an “integrated team for addressing human rights violations in Papua” that was to complete its work by October 2016. The minister promised that the team would be independent and its work fully transparent, but the exercise quickly became linked to the government’s strategy to undermine the ULMWP. (Within months, the government had invited the ambassadors from Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomons to Papua to observe the team’s work.)³²

The team consisted of 34 individuals representing government security, law enforcement and intelligence agencies; investigators from Komnas-HAM – though they decided against taking part, deciding it was inappropriate for them to do so – and the attorney-general’s office; and seven Papuans, only a few of whom had credibility in the human rights community.³³

After reviewing outstanding 64 cases, the Integrated Team decided to press for resolution of twelve.³⁴ One by one, different problems arose. Several were eventually deemed to be ordinary crimes. In the only case to have taken place on Jokowi’s watch, the Paniai shootings on 8 December 2014 in which five teenagers were killed and seventeen other protestors wounded, the case never got beyond the preliminary investigation stage. Police said they could not pursue it because the families of those killed refused permission for the bodies to be exhumed,

31 According to Indonesian Law 26/2000, human rights courts were to be established to try “serious” human rights violations. The definition of “serious” generally tracks the statute of the International Criminal Court. It includes genocide and crimes against humanity. The latter are defined as crimes that “are part of a widespread or systematic attack aimed at the civilian population” and include murder, enforced disappearances, forced displacement, arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence and “apartheid crimes.” (The need to prove “widespread or systematic” has been a repeated stumbling block for efforts at prosecution.) The first investigators are not the police but ad hoc teams set up by Komnas-HAM consisting of their own members and outside experts as needed; if the team from its preliminary findings determines that a serious human rights violation has taken place, it turns the dossier over to the Attorney General’s office for prosecution. (This investigative role was another reason why Ramanday’s presence on the team was questioned by other human rights activists.) Trials take place in one of four standing Human Rights Courts serving different regions; the one serving Papua is based in Makassar. Only one case from Papua has ever been tried there, a case involving a rampage by security forces in the aftermath of an attack on the Abepura police station in 2000. The trial was held in 2005 and ended in the acquittal of the suspects.

32 “Menkopolhukam Jamin Independensi Tim Terpadu Penyelesaian Pelanggaran HAM Papua,” Setkab.go.id, 20 June 2016.

33 They were Willem Zaman Bonay of Dewan Adat Papua; George Kaiba of Ormas Gema MKGR (a Golkar affiliate); Lien Maloali of Foker LSM; Jan Christian Arebo of Pemuda Adat Papua; Matius Murib, former head of the Komnas-HAM office in Papua; Marinus Yaung and Theo Hesegeg. Only the latter two had any credibility in the human rights community, and Hesegeg left in December after a dispute over his not showing up to meetings. The team was headed by Prof. Indriyanto Seno Aji, with deputies from the coordinating ministry. See “Mengapa Theo Mundur dari Tim Penyelesaian HAM Papua Bentuk Menkopolhukam?,” www.tabloidjubi.com, 4 December 2016.

34 The cases included the army’s response to the OPM’s hostage-taking in Mpunduma in 1997 and a demonstration in Biak in 1998 (neither could be prosecuted in human rights courts because the law setting up the courts only came into effect in 2000). Other cases include violations that occurred in the course of police operations following an attack on the Abepura police station in 2000; the disappearance of Aristoteles Masoka, the driver of murdered Papuan presidium council Theys Eluay in 2001; Wasior in 2001; Wamena in 2003; the shooting of Opinus Tabuni, an indigenous rights activist, in Wamena in 2008; the 2009 torture of Yawan Wayeni in Serui that police filmed on video; the shooting of KNPB activist Mako Tabuni in 2012; the breakup of the Third Papuan Congress and resulting arrests in 2011 and the shooting of five youths in Paniai in the course of a protest against police in 2014.

making a forensic examination of the bullets impossible.³⁵ In the Wasior and Wamena cases, the preliminary investigations carried out by Komnas-HAM were reportedly very poor, giving the Attorney-General's office a reason to send back the dossiers for more evidence, but the human rights body was slow to follow up.³⁶

At the meeting in Jakarta, some NGO members suggested that ambassadors from MSG countries and Australia be invited to observe and oversee the resolution of these cases. Luhut endorsed the idea, believing he could win support for the government's efforts. On 8-9 June 2016, he took a delegation to Canberra to speak on "Solving Security Issues in Indonesia". The delegation included three Papuans from the integrated team -- Matius Murib, Marinus Yaung and Lien Maloali – but their participation was highly scripted and they could only read from prepared notes.³⁷ A week later, Luhut took the ambassadors to Indonesia from Papua New Guinea, Solomons, Fiji and New Zealand to Papua to showcase the government's development efforts on Papua, with a view to the next MSG summit at which full members of ULMWP and Indonesia would again be considered.

B. Moves Against KNPB

In the meantime, support within Papua for ULMWP visibly grew as a result of KNPB's activities. KNPB in turn benefited from the sharper focus that ULMWP's search for international recognition provided. It began to broaden its base beyond just highlanders, though they remained the core of its support, and KNPB leadership was entirely drawn from this constituency. KNPB actions in support of ULMWP led to repeated confrontations with police and mass arrests, though few indictments.

On 1 July 2016, Police Chief Waterpauw issued Proclamation (Maklumat) No.Mak/245/VII/2016, which read:

In expressing opinions in public it is forbidden to incite the people, use separatist symbols or attributes or invite people to join separatist organisations such as the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), the Regional People's Parliament (Parlemen Rakyat Daerah, PRD), the Federal Republic of West Papua (Neg-

35 The incident began on the night of 7 December 2014 when a Toyota vehicle drove without lights in front of a pre-Christmas Christian youth camp in Bukit Togokutu, Kampung Ipakiye, Paniai Timur subdistrict. When about a dozen youths manning a post in front of the camp shouted at them about the lights, some men believed to be soldiers from the Uwibutu Post of the 753 Infantry Battalion of the Indonesian army got out to teach them a lesson. One fired three shots in the air; another beat up one of the youths, Henoik Yembo, with his rifle. The next day families of the youths went to the district police station to demand an apology and request payment for medical treatment. Police told them it would be settled the next day, but when the families returned with friends on 8 December, no one would meet with them. They decided to block the road in protest. Shortly thereafter a vehicle carrying soldiers tried to pass. The crowd suspected it was the same car that had been involved in the incident the night before. The crowd stopped it and forced the passengers, all soldiers, to get out, and then wrecked the car. The angry crowd tried to march toward the subdistrict police station, but it was surrounded by police and military. Police said some in the crowd were armed with spears, and they fired in self-defence. See Francisca Christy Rosana, "Kronologi Tragedi Berdarah Paniai Diungkap Ketua Adat," www.satuharapan.com, 14 January 2015; and "Versi Polisi, Ini Kronologis Bentrok Paniai yang Tewaskan 4 Warga," www.tribunnews.com, 8 December 2014.

(The latter was published before the fifth youth succumbed to his injuries.)

36 For the government's account of the obstacles it encountered and the reasons for not pursuing specific cases, see "Laporan Akuntabilitas Kinerja 2016," *op.cit.*, p.27-28.

37 IPAC interview with Marinus Yaung, Jayapura, 25 January 2017. Also present were Gen. (Pol). Tito Karnavian, then head of the national counter-terrorism agency, BNPT; then national police commander Badrodin Haiti; and Inspector Gen. Waterpauw.

ara Republik Federal Papua Barat, NRFPB), the National Parliament of West Papua (Parlemen Nasional West Papua, PNWP); the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), the National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN); and the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) which clearly oppose and intend to separate themselves from the sovereignty of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, NKRI), as well as to anticipate that these groups will be carrying political baggage. If this proclamation is not obeyed, then the police will under take actions in a proportional, procedural and professional manner and in a firm and measured way, while upholding human rights and in accordance with the law, beginning with breaking up activities to enforcing the law.³⁸

The proclamation also criminalised attempts to “seek support from outside parties” for the independence cause by deeming it “attempted rebellion”.³⁹ Human rights lawyers argued that the police were unilaterally expanding the definition of rebellion, without reference to any judicial ruling or legal precedent.⁴⁰

Even under these conditions, KNPB continued to undertake mass actions, sometimes focused on the provincial parliament but increasingly in different locations, coordinated through texting and social media. The multiple sites made it more difficult for security forces to monitor but easier for local supporters to attend, and they became a form of local entertainment, interspersed with dances or traditional ceremonies. In this way, KNPB’s campaign to make Papuans aware of ULMWP took off even as police action against it increased.

In August 2016, Gen (ret.) Wiranto, former armed forces commander and head of the Hanura political party, replaced Luhut as Coordinating Minister. One of his first acts was to accompany Luhut to Papua on an already scheduled trip with the Australian ambassador and Attorney-General. A Jakarta Post article summed up the purpose of the trip:

Having been accused of frequent abuses of human rights in Papua, the Indonesian government took a couple of senior Australian officials on a tour of the easternmost region on Thursday to see the peaceful state of the region.⁴¹

Police efforts to suppress KNPB continued. On 19 December 2016, KNPB actions in support of ULMWP, timed to coincide with the foreign ministers meeting in Vanuatu, resulted in a police raid on two units of a highland student dormitory in Waena, near the Cenderawasih University campus, that was known as the KNPB headquarters. Many KNPB activists were already out in the street when the police arrived. Some of the activists were reportedly beaten up and hundreds were brought to the Jayapura police station to be documented and questioned. The police formally declared two students, Hosea Yeimo, 20 and Ismael Alua, 24, as suspects on rebellion charges.⁴² They were released on 11 January 2017, and though there is no indication as of this writing that the case is being pursued, the charges were not dropped.

According to KNPB Secretary-General Ones Suhuniap, a total of 1,449 demonstrators were arrested in 2016; the Franciscan Peace and Justice Committee said the figure reached 1,700 and

38 Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, “Ini Maklumat Kapolda Metro Jaya Tentang Penyampaian Pendapat di Muka Umum,” <http://setkab.go.id>, 22 November 2016.

39 The actual wording was “Percobaan dalam delik makar tidak menjadi soal, karena tidak selesainya perbuatan adalah *suatu strategi mencari dukungan pihak luar*’. [Extending the concept [of rebellion] to include attempted rebellion is not a problem, because even if the attempt does not come to fruition, it may constitute a strategy of seeking support from outside parties].

40 IPAC interview with human rights lawyer, Jayapura, June 2017.

41 “Indonesia shows off peaceful Papua,” *Jakarta Post*, 12 August 2016.

42 There were charged with Article 106 of the Criminal Code.

that police had beaten some of those involved.⁴³ Few of the arrests led to formal indictments, and most of those hauled away to police stations were registered and then let go. The arrests seemed to have no deterrent effect on KNPB activities.

C. *The Wiranto approach*

Wiranto took a very different approach to Papua in his new role from his predecessor; his energy level was also lower. He reportedly was concerned that any effort to resolve human rights would undermine Indonesian sovereignty in Papua and there was a real question about whether the integrated team's mandate would be extended, especially as it had little to show after a year of work. In the end, the extension was approved but there was no longer the same drive from the Coordinating Ministry to get results.⁴⁴

In January 2017, Komnas HAM, tasked with redoing the three "serious" cases that remained (Wasior, Wamena and Paniai) and submitting the results to the Attorney General's office, announced that it had resubmitted the Wamena and Wasior cases, though by all accounts, the dossiers were poorly prepared – giving the prosecutors justification for further delays. At the May 2017 meeting of the U.N. Human Rights Council, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, responding to several interventions on human rights violations in Papua, stressed the government's commitment to the resolution of these cases, but no one in Wiranto's office or anywhere else seemed to be interested in expending political capital to break the standoff between Komnas HAM and the Attorney General's office.

The miscalculation of the Jokowi government was to think addressing human rights in Papua would be relatively easy. Resolution of a few past cases would be a step forward, but a tiny step given the untold number of lives lost and damage inflicted by actions of the security forces in the past, and ongoing issues of torture, excessive use of force, lack of accountability and restrictions on civil liberties.

D. *Pacific Diplomacy and Petitions to the U.N.*

Even if some of the major cases of the past were resolved, ULMWP and its Pacific supporters would surely continue efforts to link human rights and self-determination. But it was clear that Indonesian diplomacy was producing some results. While ULMWP was able to address the 48th Pacific Islands Forum summit in Samoa in early September 2017, the final Forum communiqué merely said:

Leaders recognised the constructive engagement by Forum countries with Indonesia with respect to elections and human rights in West Papua and Papua and to continue dialogue in an open and constructive manner.⁴⁵

It was noticeably weaker than the communiqué the year before which had read:

Leaders recognised the political sensitivities of the issue of West Papua (Papua) and agreed the issue of alleged human rights violations in West Papua (Papua) should remain on their agenda. Leaders also agreed on the importance of an open and construc-

⁴³ Aventinus Jenaru, OFM et.al., *Papua Diambang Kehancuran: Beragam Peristiwa dan Fakta Hak Asasi Manusia di Papua Tahun 2016*: SKPKC Fransiskan Papua, March 2017.

⁴⁴ IPAC interview with Marinus Yaung, a team member and activist with the NGO Solidaritas Pempuan Papua.

⁴⁵ Forty-Eighth Pacific Islands Forum, "Forum Communique," <http://www.forumsec.org>, 5-8 September 2017.

tive dialogue with Indonesia on the issue.⁴⁶

In the U.N. General Assembly, the focus of the Pacific countries was climate change. Only three countries mentioned Papua at all (Vanuatu, Solomons and Tuvalu) and the one Caribbean country that ULMWP managed to bring on board was St Vincents and the Grenadines.⁴⁷

ULMWP had another tactic to try, however. It issued a press release saying that on 26 September, it had handed over the “West Papua People’s Petition”, allegedly with the signatures of 1.8 million Papuans, to the Decolonisation Committee, also known as the Committee of 24.⁴⁸ There was no way of verifying the number or knowing whether the organisers used any safeguards against multiple entries, especially since it was possible to sign on electronically.

The petition read:

We call on you to urgently address the human rights situation in West Papua and to review the UN’s involvement in the administration of West Papua that led to its unlawful annexation by Indonesia and the human rights abuse that continues today. We call upon you to: appoint a Special Representative to investigate the human rights situation in West Papua; put West Papua back on the Decolonisation Committee agenda and ensure our right to self-determination – denied to us in 1969 – is respected by holding an Internationally Supervised Vote (in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 (XV)).⁴⁹

The problem was that the Venezuelan chair of the Committee told the press that he had not received any petition; the Committee respected the territorial integrity of Indonesia; and West Papua had no chance of being included on the Committee’s list of non-self-governing territories.⁵⁰

ULMWP was actually trying to collect signatures on two petitions, one that represented global support and one that represented West Papuans and non-Papuans resident in Papua. Both Benny Wenda and ULMWP on their respective web sites (both blocked in Indonesia) feature a photograph from 7 September 2017 of British Labour Party leader and possible future prime minister Jeremy Corbyn receiving a copy of the petition. Corbyn, a founding member of International Parliamentarians for West Papua, has repeatedly expressed his support for Papuan self-determination.

46 “Forum Communiqués”, <http://www.forumsec.org>, 11 September 2016 and 14 September 2017.

47 Vanuatu’s prime minister called on the U.N. Human Rights Council to investigate abuses in Papua. Solomons Prime Minister Sogavare condemned “consistent human rights violations” and bemoaned the lack of genuine act of self-determination. See <https://gadebate.un.org/en/72/solomon-islands>. For Indonesia’s reply see <https://gadebate.un.org/en/72/indonesia>.

48 The U.N.’s Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was set up in 1961 and meets every year to review the status of “non-self-governing territories” that fall within its mandate. The list includes Western Sahara, Falklands, New Caledonia and several Caribbean and Pacific territories (see <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselvgovterritories.shtml>). East Timor, now independent Timor-Leste, had been on the list during the Soeharto years and made effective use of the Decolonisation Committee meetings to boost its campaign for independence.

49 See text of petition on www.ulmwp.org

50 “West Papua independence petition does not exist, United Nations says,” <http://www.abc.net.au>, 29 September 2017. See also Indonesian Foreign Ministry statement, “Petition from Separatist Movement Benny Wenda Only Propaganda,” 29 September 2017.

IV. LOCAL ELECTION FRAUD

All the goals that the Jokowi government says it has for Papua are undermined by the appalling state of local elections, particularly in the central highlands. They are generally regarded as the worst-administered in the country with provincial election commissioners routinely cited for misconduct and voter rolls full of fictitious names. In many areas, voters do not even turn up because community-level brokers determine the outcome long before polling day.⁵¹ Candidates win because they are from a dominant clan, have powerful political backing, control the election machinery or have more cash to distribute than rivals -- and often all of the above. IPAC's assessment of the 2014 legislative elections noted:

The problems in Papua were so widespread and so varied that the head of the election ethics board explained that they could not hold election officials in Papua to the same standards as elsewhere because if they did, most election officials in the province would have to be fired.⁵²

Gov. Lukas Enembe, the former district head (*bupati*) of Puncak Jaya who was elected governor in 2013, has become the unquestioned political boss of Papua, and those who would be *bupati* in the central highlands challenge his favoured candidates at their peril. A report released in September 2017 that Papua had risen sharply on the Central Bureau of Statistics' "Democracy Index", showing improvement in civil liberties, political rights and democratic institutions, must therefore be treated with some scepticism.⁵³ If the government were serious about economic development and human rights protection in Papua, it would focus on cleaning up the local electoral system or instituting an incentive system that gave elected officials more rewards for school test results or numbers of children vaccinated than for triumphing at rigged polls.

A. *The 2017 Election in Tolikara*

A case in point is Tolikara, where a dispute related to the February 2017 election for *bupati* threatens to turn into serious violence as of this writing – and a candidate who challenged the Enembe machine in 2017 found himself arrested for a corruption charge going back to 2006.

Tolikara had been deemed *rawan* or restive in every electoral contest since 2012. It experienced four days of election-related riots in 2012, in a clash between supporters of the same two candidates running in 2017. In July 2015, it had also been the site of violence when indigenous Christians tried to prevent Muslim migrants from celebrating the end of Ramadan, and photos of a burned mosque went viral across the country.⁵⁴ Failure to run elections properly thus had the potential to be very costly because resentments could feed into existing tensions.

Tolikara is one of the poorest *kabupaten* in the central highlands, with no industry, mining, plantation crops, investment or tourism, and its residents dependent mostly on subsistence sweet potato and pig farming.⁵⁵ Revenue depends entirely on fiscal transfers from the central and provincial governments.

51 For a thorough analysis of local voting in Papua in the 2014 election, see Cillian Nolan, "Papua's Central Highlands: The *Noken* System, Brokers and Fraud" in Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati, eds., *Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism*, Singapore, 2016.

52 IPAC, "Open to Manipulation: The 2014 Elections in Papua Province," Report No.2014, 10 December 2014,

53 "BPS: Indeks Demokrasi Papua Meningkatkan Tahun 2016," *tirto.id*, 14 September 2017.

54 This incident is fully described in IPAC, "Rebuilding After Communal Violence: Lessons from Tolikara, Papua," Report No. 29, 13 June 2016. pp.2-3.

55 *Ibid.*, pp.2-3.

The *kabupaten* was carved out of Jayawijaya district in 2002 and when its first *bupati*, John Tabo, former head of the Jayawijaya district council, was elected in 2005, it had ten subdistricts (called *distrik* in Papua). Tabo oversaw the expansion to 46 subdistricts, primarily as a rationale for getting more money into remote areas, but also as a mechanism for rewarding the political loyalty of local clan leaders.

Tolikara was one of 10 *kabupaten* and one municipality holding elections for *bupati* in Papua in February 2017. The Enembe-backed incumbent, Usman Wanimbo, stood against Tabo, his old rival. From the beginning there were questions about the neutrality of the election commission and the accuracy of the voter rolls.⁵⁶

It was never clear how many people lived in Tolikara or were eligible to vote. The following table shows differing statistics between the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS), the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Population	2010	2012	2014	2017
BPS (central)	114,427	122,916	127,526	136,576
BPS (district)	262,000	292,000		
Home Affairs	244,824			226,520
Religious Affairs			232,980	298,179
Eligible Voters		171,470	177,384	216,261

For Home Affairs data, see [://www.kemendagri.go.id/media/filemanager/2015/08/18/9/1/91...papua.pdf](http://www.kemendagri.go.id/media/filemanager/2015/08/18/9/1/91...papua.pdf); for Religious Affairs data, see <https://papua.kemenag.go.id/files/gallery/d2abfdbe-8222-4ffc-8b65-f524c7590b10.pdf>

If the BPS statistics were correct, there were far more voters than people. Even in the unlikely event that the Home Affairs data were correct, the eligible voters as determined by the election commission constituted more than 95 per cent of the entire population – a highly questionable figure. Also, the sharp increase in eligible voters between the presidential elections in 2014 and the *bupati* election in 2017 appeared to have taken place almost entirely in the subdistricts dominated by Usman Wanimbo supporters.

In a petition to the Constitutional Court following his defeat in February 2017, Tabo listed dozens of violations including intimidation, expulsion of some of his witnesses and efforts to pay others to not show up and irregularities in vote-counting. The court was only interested in the latter, and in April ordered that the election be reheld in eighteen subdistricts where the counting had “not followed procedure”. The re-vote was held on 17 May with Wanimbo receiving almost three times as many votes as Tabo. A third candidate, Amos Yikwa (the deputy *bupati* for Wanimbo’s first term, 2012-2017), filed a criminal complaint against Gov. Enembe for “intervening” during the so-called quiet period when no campaigning is supposed to take place.⁵⁷ During a visit to Tolikara three days before the vote, the governor was videoed telling voters to choose Wanimbo. In May, he was formally declared a suspect, and though he and Yikwa agreed to settle their differences in June, the charges still stand as of this writing.

After the results in the eighteen districts were in, Tabo immediately petitioned the Constitutional Court again, citing numerous violations, including voting by children, manipulation of voter rolls, and evidence of fictitious voters, as well as the governor’s intervention, but in a Court

56 Ibid., p.13. Following the 2014 election, all five of the local KPUD members were formally charged with electoral fraud and the Electoral Ethics Council found they had taken money from Wanimbo Open to Manipulation.

57 “Polda Papua dan Gakkumdu akan Gelar Perkara Pilkada Tolikara,” kabarpapua.co, 20 June 2017.

decision on 31 July, he lost.⁵⁸ On 11 October, after trying and failing to see the Director-General for Regional Autonomy to protest the results of the election, a group of Tabo's supporters rioted at the Ministry of Home Affairs in Jakarta, damaging property and injuring a few officials. Eleven people, including their female leader, Wati Martha Kogoya, were arrested, and tensions between Tabo and Wanimbo supporters rose further.

On 16 October 2017, Usman Wanimbo was formally installed as *bupati* for a second five-year term.⁵⁹

On 26 October, Tabo was arrested in Jayapura on a corruption charge dating from 2006 when he was the Tolikara *bupati*. He was accused of moving Rp.32.6 billion rupiah (about\$2.4 million) in district funds to two personal accounts.⁶⁰ Church leaders noted that his arrest would not help lower Tolikara's political temperature; the timing of the arrest made it inevitable that it would be linked to the election dispute.

In the meantime, not much changed in Tolikara under the Wanimbo administration. A health survey conducted in May 2017 found that the head of the district health office had not shown up to work since being appointed, and the head of the district clinic and his staff had not been paid in close to a year.⁶¹

B. *The Need for Accurate Statistics*

One critical step that the Jokowi administration could take that could simultaneously help clean up Papua, reduce corruption and serve development goals would be to get an accurate head count of Papuans, including place of origin (a recommendation that IPAC has made repeatedly).⁶² It would provide a basis for cleaning up voter rolls and would facilitate planning for schools and job creation. The problem is that it would not serve the interests of almost any politician in Papua to have accurate statistics because it would almost certainly show lower figures than have been used to calculate general budgetary allocations from Jakarta, village development funds and local legislative seats.

Accurate statistics could also put the debate about in-migration of non-Papuans on a more factual footing in a way that could help with policy formulation. The best source of information is still BPS data from 2010 census, showing that while many coastal areas had significant migrant populations, the central highlands were still overwhelmingly populated by indigenous Papuans.⁶³ The combination of spontaneous migration from eastern Indonesia into transport and retail

58 The decision can be found here: http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/public/content/persidangan/putusan/14_PHP.BUP-XV_2017.pdf

59 Wanimbo has been periodically accused of corruption but not prosecuted. In August, the bupati of Mamberamo Tengah, complained to the police that they had not followed up on his report that Wanimbo, while serving as acting head of the finance office and head of the education office there in 2010, had worked with the caretaker bupati to embezzle Rp.18 million from a fund reserved for education. See "Bupati Mamberamo Tengah Desak Polda Periksa Bupati Tolikara Terkait Dugaan Korupsi Dana Pendidikan 18 Miliar Tahun 2010," lingkarpapua.com, 29 August 2017. An anti-corruption organisation led by one of Tabo's allies also reported Wanimbo to the Anti-Corruption Commission for allegedly misusing *kabupaten* funds between 2012 and 2014. See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ntqzOGqs1s>.

60 "Diduga Lakukan Tindakan Pencucian Uang Mantan Bupati Tolikar Ditahan di Rutan Mapolda," www.wartaplus.com, 26 October 2017.

61 "UP2KP: Pelayanan Kesehatan di Tolikara Sangat Memprihatinkan", tabloidjubi.com, 30 May 2017.

62 See IPAC, "Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Problems," Report No.2, 9 October 2013 and "Open to Manipulation," *op.cit.*, pp.6-10.

63 According to 2010 census data, indigenous Papuans were a minority in Merauke, Jayapura city, Mimika, Keerom and Nabire, while indigenous Papuans were more than 90 per cent in the highland districts of Tolikara, Lanny Jaya, Yahukimo, Intan Jaya and Jayawijaya.

sectors; major development projects, especially in agribusiness; administrative fragmentation, resulting in more civil service posts; and the search for more teachers has all resulted in a growing non-Papuan population.

V. DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF “DIALOGUE”

The need for a “dialogue” between the Indonesian government and Papuans has been a recurring theme of discussions on how to resolve conflict in Papua. But the word has meant different things to different parties. The Indonesian government has been adamant that there will be no negotiation as there was with the Acehese rebel group, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) that led to a peace agreement in 2005. There will also be no third party negotiator and no fundamental change in Papua’s political status. The government has periodically extended feelers to some of the pro-independence diaspora leaders but the latter are not interested in what Jakarta has to offer – generally some material incentive to return to Papua and support government programs. All initiatives on political dialogue thus have gone nowhere.⁶⁴

The MSG in particular has tried to promote a dialogue between ULMWP and the Indonesian government, a non-starter on all counts.⁶⁵ In January 2016, Solomons Prime Minister Sogavare told the ULMWP members before the media:

I have this idea of getting you- ULMWP and Indonesia- together to start dialogue and I will need your guidance. We would like to sponsor that. We will allow you to choose the agendas and talk face to face. Of course we’ll find some moderator to guide your discussions.⁶⁶

The idea that Indonesia would allow Sogavare, an avowed supporter of independence, to sponsor talks was ludicrous.

In May 2017, Gov. Enembe told the visiting Dutch ambassador that Indonesia should resolve Papua as it had Aceh, through dialogue with all parties concerned – including ULMWP, KNPB and the OPM.⁶⁷ The ULMWP’s Edison Waromi said he appreciated the government’s statement but would add a fourth party: the Papua Peace Network (Jaringan Damai Papua, JDP).⁶⁸

The fact that the governor himself made no reference to JDP may have been an indication of how much ground the network had lost since it started out in 2010 as a fresh effort to develop a unified Papuan voice in an effort to end violence. The idea was that through a series of public consultations across Papua and West Papua, a consolidated agenda for talks with Jakarta could be developed to resolve outstanding grievances, on the understanding that any such talks would take place within the framework of autonomy, and that there would be no questioning of Indonesia’s political status. After a promising start under the leadership of Father Neles Tebay and the late Muridan Widjojo, the effort lost the support of key figures in the Yudhoyono government in 2011, when a JDP congress seemed to tilt toward a pro-independence position.

64 See International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua”, Asia Report No.188, 11 March 2010 and “Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua,” Asia Report No.232, 9 August 2012.

65 It is a non-starter because it involves a foreign government; because Indonesia sees ULMWP as separatist; and because MSG’s idea of dialogue is tantamount to negotiation over self-determination.

66 “MSG Chair Considers Dialogue for ULMWP and Jakarta”, Prime Minister’s Press Secretariat Office, <http://pmpresssecretariat.com>, 21 January 2016.

67 Bintang Papua, “Selesaikan Papua Seperti Aceh, Gubernur: Pelu Libatkan ULMWP,KNPB dan TPN/OPM”. 5 May 2017.

68 Lihat Bintang Papua, Jumat 06 Mei 2017 “Jokowi Jangan Anggap Remeh ULMWP”.

Then Papuan activists lost interest as JDP activities in Papua waned and KNPB's popularity rose. With the emergence of ULMWP and its efforts on the international stage, JDP seemed to fade into irrelevance.

On 15 August 2017, however, President Jokowi met with fourteen Papuans representing different sectors of civil society. Father Neles, whom the others had chosen as spokesperson, expressed his appreciation to the president for his efforts on Papua but said that human development needed more attention. He proposed a series of discussions on sectoral issues – an idea that had already been raised a few years earlier during JDP talks with the government but never followed through. Jokowi agreed to the “sectoral dialogue” and appointed a three-person dialogue team consisting of Father Neles, Security Coordinating Minister Wiranto and presidential Chief of Staff Teten Masduki. Father Neles outlined his own concept of sectoral dialogue in an online op-ed. He said it was critical for the president to clarify the respective roles of each team member and to introduce them to elected and appointed officials at the national, provincial and district level to show that the dialogue had presidential endorsement, but that he was committed to ensuring its success.⁶⁹

Father Neles's willingness to give the non-political dialogue a chance generated harsh criticism in the activist community, both toward himself and JDP. The criticism intensified after another meeting hosted by the president's office on 13-14 September when it was decided the the issues covered would track Jokowi's five priorities for Papua, namely education, health, “people's economy”, infrastructure, and government administrative reform. Several long-term JDP members protested that this was Jakarta's agenda, and there should have been consultation with indigenous Papuans before selecting the sectors involved.⁷⁰ ULMWP and KNPB were predictably dismissive.⁷¹ Father Neles responded that if the government was opening space for dialogue, they should try to use it in a constructive way. The debate over the sectoral dialogue may have put JDP back on the map temporarily, but producing concrete benefits from such an amorphous concept will not be easy. Moreover, any dialogue will be overshadowed in the short term by two issues that are consuming Papua at the moment and arguably could have a greater impact on its future: the negotiations over the divestment of Freeport, the giant copper and gold mine in central Papua, and the 2018 elections.

An analysis of the Freeport negotiations is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that there is a high probability of continued tensions as different parties within Indonesia contend for huge economic stakes. Not only are different political actors in Jakarta staking out positions, but the provincial government made it clear that it wanted a bigger say – and a bigger share of future profits. After initially demanding a 20 per cent stake in the company for the province, Gov Enembe held a press conference in early October 2017 saying that he and the central government had reached an agreement on 10 per cent for the province.⁷² In the meantime, a series of shootings took place in September and October along the Freeport mining road, including the killing of a paramilitary police officer on 22 October 2017. The perpetrators had

69 “Ini Penjelasan Pater Neles Tebay tentang penunjukan dirinya oleh Presiden Jokowi,” www.tabloidjubi.com, 6 September 2017.

70 On 1 October, Theo Hesegem, the man who had pulled out of the “integrated team” on human rights, pulled out of JDP, citing the dialogue and criticising it as a fraud. He also cited the government's failure to settle the Paniai killings as a reason for refusing to work with Gen. Wiranto.

71 Octavianus Mote said that it was just a way of the government trying to bolster its position on Papua before the Pacific Islands Forum meeting and the U.N. General Assembly. (See “Sinyal Jakarta untuk Dialog ULMWP Tidak Tertarik,” <http://tabloidjubi.com>, 7 September 2017). The KNPB's Victor Yeimo said the perspectives, methods and goals were all wrong and that it had no chance of resolving the Papua conflict. See “Victor Yeimo: Cara Menyikai Dialog Sektoral,” www.papuapost.com, 15 September 2017.

72 “Papua Dapat Jatah Saham Freeport 10%,” www.beritasatu.com, 8 October 2017..

not been identified as of this writing, but any violence in the Freeport area can involve multiple actors with multiple interests. Even if the OPM is blamed, Papuans will be asking who else was involved.⁷³

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Despite the Jokowi administration's commitment to a "holistic" approach toward Papua, its emphasis has been overwhelmingly on economic remedies. The human rights aspect of its approach has not worked, though there are concrete steps it could take to achieve its goals. Its response to the growth of the ULMWP has been to try to limit its influence abroad through the Foreign Ministry rather than to understand why measures to suppress it at home are having little impact. The unwillingness to come to terms with the dysfunctionality of local elections in Papua virtually ensures that corruption continues and that intra-Papuan and indigenous-migrant conflicts grow worse. The impunity of the security forces in Papua continues to undermine whatever other measures the government undertakes.

One short-term measure the government can take is to appoint a professional task force, fully funded and free from the influence of politicians and political parties, to undertake a special census in Papua and Papua Barat and produce recommendations for how to address inflated statistics and swollen voter rolls. It is not enough to let the Constitutional Court receive petition after petition from aggrieved candidates in Papua and rule on the disputes. The Papuan politicians who receive spoils from the political system are often those assumed to be most loyal to the Indonesian state, but the corrupt electoral system can just as easily create distrust.

A second step, also technical, is to force the Attorney-General's office and Komnas HAM to work together on the Wamena and Wasior cases as well as the 2014 Paniai killings. If the latter two are ever to come to trial, as promised by Foreign Minister Retno in Geneva in 2017, Komnas HAM will have to bring its investigative reports up to a legally acceptable standard and then work through its differences with the Attorney-General's office to make sure both offices have the same understanding of basic concepts. They also need to agree on a workplan to bring the cases to trial, probably enshrined in a Memorandum of Understanding that is publicly endorsed by the president. Each agency needs to appoint a task force composed of experienced individuals freed from all other responsibilities so they can devote full time to the preparation of dossiers and prosecution. Without such attention, the problem of unresolved human rights cases will continue to fester.

Jokowi is likely to win big in Papua in the 2019 presidential elections, if only because he has shown interest in the welfare of Papuans more generally. But there is a difference between showing interest and winning trust, and on the latter, there is a long way to go.

⁷³ "Kontak Senjata di Papua, Anggota Brimob Tewas Tertembak," *viva.co.id*, 22 October 2017.

APPENDIX I

JOKOWI-KALLA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS IN PAPUA

The following statistics are taken from: *Third Year Report of Joko Widodo – Jusuf Kalla Government*, Part 2: Poverty Alleviation and Affirmative Action, “Empowering and Making Development More Balanced in Papua and Papua Barat”.

IPAC reproduces these statistics as an indication of what the government sees as its accomplishments but notes that the poor quality of statistics in Papua generally makes some of these figures questionable.

1. The Human Development Index in Papua rose from 56.75 in 2014 to 58.05 in 2016, and in Papua Barat from 61.28 to 62.21.
2. The Gini co-efficient measuring income inequality (across both provinces) declined from 0.41 in 2014 to 0.39 in 2016
3. The rate of economic growth (across both provinces) increased from 3.65 in 2014 to 9.21 in 2016.
4. The percentage of poor people **rose** from 27.8 in 2014 to 28.4 in 2016.
5. Life expectancy rose from 64.76 in 2014 to 65.09 in 2016.
6. Rate of children going to school:
 - 7-12 yrs, rose from 75.51 in 2014 to 81.04 in 2016
 - 13-15 yrs, rose from 73.27 to 78.14
 - 16-18 yrs, 53.28 to 61.96
7. 3,337,269 people in both provinces received health insurance cards (Kartu Indonesia Sehat)
8. With the “one price” policy for fuel, the price of gas was set at Rp.6,540 per litre, down from Rp.20,000-50,000 in most central highland *kabupaten* and Rp.50,000 to 100,000 in Puncak. [The state oil company Pertamina has had to bear the brunt of the cost.]
9. 3,259.45 km of roads were built across the two provinces.

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