

INDONESIA: THE DANGER OF MIDDLE-AGED EXTREMISTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The three convicted extremists portrayed in this report – Abu Umar, Sulthon Qolbi and Saiful Muhtohrir – are examples of men in their fifties who are particularly dangerous because they have leadership credentials that are increasingly hard to find. Across Indonesia, violent extremist groups have seen their leaders arrested, killed, co-opted or weakened by age and infirmity. Others, like Jemaah Islamiyah’s Para Widjayanto, have opted out of violence. Very few people are left with the qualities that these men possess: combat experience; religious knowledge; time in prison; and proven commitment to the struggle for an Islamic state.

Their trajectories suggest that the risk of a resurgence of violent extremism in Indonesia will depend less on what happens in Syria or Afghanistan, though both bear close watching, but rather how well government authorities can manage the multi-generational homegrown groups that have a proven ability to recruit and unite disparate factions.

Abu Umar and Sulthon Qolbi served lengthy prison terms on terrorism charges and were released more than five years ago. They were rearrested in 2023 and 2024 respectively, having re-engaged almost immediately with their former associates. Saiful Muhtohrir, a recidivist with a history of violent attacks, will be released in February 2025 and is considered high-risk.

All three fought in the communal war in Ambon in 1999-2000 and saw that conflict as a vindication of their commitment to wage war against perceived enemies of the faith. It also led them to apply the teachings of the global jihad to a local context. In a way, the histories of these three men constitute a snapshot of how violent extremism evolved in Indonesia after the fall of President Soeharto in 1998.

With the current leadership vacuum in the old networks, any revival of violent extremism in a now largely peaceful Indonesia may depend on one or two middle-aged jihadists taking the reins. These three will be closely monitored, inside prison and out, but their stories are a reminder that is not always the young, self-radicalised hotheads who constitute the biggest security risk.

II. SULTHON QOLBI, REARRESTED NOVEMBER 2024

Sulthon Qolbi, born 14 March 1970 in Sumenep, Madura, was arrested for the second time in November 2024.¹ Sulthon, who also went by the names of Asadullah and Arsyad, had been a member of Mujahidin KOMPAK, a militia formed to defend Muslims in Ambon after fighting between Christians and Muslims erupted there in 1999. He made Ambon his home, and as the communal conflict waned around 2003-2004, he became involved with other militants in several terrorist attacks on Christians. In May 2005, his associates attacked a security post guarding a Christian community in Loki, West Ceram, Maluku, killing five paramilitary police (Brimob) and their cook. The attack was planned at Sulthon’s house, he claimed to have ordered it, and he also reportedly supplied the weapons used.²

¹ There is some confusion over Sulthon Qolbi’s age. When he was arrested in 2005, trial documents said he had been born on 4 March 1970. His state identity card lists 23 March 1980 as his birthdate. But he was the fourth of six children and the fifth is 52 years old, so the 1970 date is apparently correct.

² For details on the Loki attack, see International Crisis Group, “Weakening Mujahidin Networks in Indonesia: Lessons from Maluku and Poso”, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005.

Investigation into the Loki attack revealed the complex network of violent extremists in Ambon, in much the same way that investigation of the beheadings of three schoolgirls in Poso, Central Sulawesi, a few months later, revealed the extent of the extremist network there.

The Loki attackers included another man from KOMPAK, Asep Jaya, now serving a life sentence in Porong, Surabaya; Abdullah Umamity, an Ambonese member of Darul Islam (DI), married to the daughter of a DI leader from West Java and now serving a life sentence in Karanganyar Prison, Nusakambangan; three men from Mujahidin Kayamanya, a group from Poso with close ties to KOMPAK, all of whom were eventually arrested; Kisman Marinda alias Abu Zar, from Ceram, serving a life sentence in Permisan prison, Nusakambangan; and Ikhlas, a DI member from Riau, Sumatra, who was fatally shot by a police officer in the course of the assault.³ Several other top figures in Indonesian violent extremism were involved in various support roles, including Syaiful Muhtahir.⁴

Sulthon Qolbi managed to flee Ambon and find shelter in August 2005 in an Islamic boarding school in Ogan Komering Ilir, South Sumatra, where he worked as an Arabic instructor. Not long after his arrival, he joined forces with another fugitive who had settled in South Sumatra, a JI member from Singapore named Fajar Taslim, to form a jihadi cell aimed at killing Christians who were converting Muslims. A botched attempted murder of a young pastor outside Bandung, West Java on 16 October 2006 led to Sulthon's arrest. This was before Indonesian police and prison data had been fully digitalised, and the Bandung police had no idea that Sulthon was wanted for the Loki attack. It took six weeks to make the connection, and when it was, with the help of convicted Bali bomber Ali Imron, Sulthon was transferred back to Ambon in December 2006.⁵ From the moment he was placed in detention there, Sulthon began recruiting ordinary criminal offenders so successfully that Ambon police pleaded to have him transferred. He was moved to Porong Prison in Surabaya shortly thereafter and received a fifteen-year sentence in 2007. In 2012 he was moved to Nusakambangan and remained there in various prisons until his release in 2018.

Following his release, he moved to Central Java. At the urging of a former prisoner whose wife was friends with his wife, he joined several pro-ISIS chat groups on WhatsApp, though he never formally swore a loyalty oath (*bai'at*) to the ISIS leadership. He was reportedly giving pro-ISIS lectures on a routine basis between 2021 and 2024 at the Al-Ikhlas mushola (small mosque) in Ngruki, Solo where the famous al-Mukmin boarding school of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir is located. Among the participants were at least two former prisoners.⁶ He also led fitness training for would-

³ The Poso men included Erwin Mardani alias Jodi and his brother, Rusli Mardani alias Uci, both originally from Toja Una-Una with strong links to DI. Uci was captured in 2008, given a five-year sentence, and released in 2013. Jodi was only caught in 2013, eight years after the attack. sentenced to ten years and released in December 2020. At the time of his arrest, he was also involved with DI-Makassar.

⁴ Those playing a supporting role included Muhammad Choirul Anam alias Bravo, a top JI commander who helped restructure JI militarily after 2007 and played a key role in sending cadres to Syria. At the time of the Loki attack, he was running a pesantren on Ceram under the name of Ustad Batar and provided shelter for the attackers. He was arrested in 2015 on an unrelated charge and released in 2022.

⁵ After Sulthon was arrested in Bandung, his wife turned up, seeking help, at the Al-Islam pesantren run by Ali Imron's family in Lamongan, East Java. The school had strong KOMPAK connections in the past. Word got back to Ali Imron in prison that the man being held in Bandung was the mastermind of the Loki attack, and Ali informed the police.

⁶ The ex-prisoners were Imam Buchori from Pekalongan and Helmi but of the several ex-prisoners named Helmi, it is not clear which one was involved.

be jihadists around Solo and Klaten, Central Java. He was arrested on 4 November 2024 in Karanganyar.⁷

III. SAIFUL MUHTOHRIR, TO BE RELEASED IN FEBRUARY 2025

Another of the middle-aged militants is Saiful Muhtorir alias Nazarudin Muhtar alias Harun alias Abu Gar. Born 24 April 1973 in Cilacap, Central Java, he is about to be released from Karanganyar Prison, Nusakambangan on 25 February 2025. He remains hardline, even after fully serving a nine-year sentence for terrorism and some engagement with IDENSOS, the deradicalisation unit of Detachment 88, Indonesia's counter-terrorism police. Saiful has as long a history of violent extremism as Sulthon Qolbi and played a peripheral role in the Loki attack. He also has the dubious distinction of being the man who introduced radical cleric Aman Abdurrahman to violence.

Like Sulthon Qolbi, Saiful Muhtohrir, who became a Darul Islam member in 1994 when he was 21, fought in Ambon in 2000 at the height of the conflict. Under the guidance of fellow DI member Ahmad Sayid Maulana, he went to Poso in 2001 and came to lead a DI training camp in Pendolo, on the shores of Lake Poso, eventually working together with a DI fighter from Banten named Kang Jaja.⁸ Kang Jaja ran a splinter of DI known as Ring Banten, and after concluding his young recruits needed military training, invited Saiful to come from Poso to teach them. Saiful agreed and seems to have begun the training sometime in late 2002 in an area near Cigarug, Kebon Pedes, Sukabumi, West Java. Among the trainees was Heri Golun, later to become the suicide bomber in the 2004 attack on the Australian embassy in Jakarta.

Around the same time, Saiful had met Salafi scholar Aman Abdurrahman at a mosque in the Tanah Abang area of Jakarta in late 2003 and impressed upon him the need for *i'dad* (military preparation for jihad).⁹ Aman asked Saiful to train his followers, and beginning about December 2003, Saiful proceeded to train about a dozen men in how to make pipe bombs and Molotov cocktails, stressing that the bombs were to be used against people – idolaters and hypocrites – not against property.¹⁰ He was teaching a class of Aman's followers in Cimanggis, outside Jakarta, on 1 February 2004 when a bomb exploded prematurely, partially destroying the house where the training was being held. The explosion led to the arrest of Aman and eight others, but Saiful managed to escape back to the old DI training ground in Pendolo.

Unlike Sulthon Qolbi, who was reported to possess unusual personal charm, which made him a first-class recruiter, Saiful had a history of irritating almost everyone he met. He was expelled from Pendolo after annoying the locals and moved back to Ambon around June 2004, where he became involved trying to help some of the Loki attackers flee. Saiful was arrested on 19 May 2005 and sentenced to nine years in prison, minus time served, the following year. He was released in April 2011.

⁷ “3 Terduga Teroris yang Ditangkap Densus 88 di Jateng Berencana Melakukan Aksi Teror,” kompas.com, 5 November 2024.

⁸ Ahmad Sayid Maulana, a DI veteran of Ambon, Poso and Mindanao, was shot and killed by police on 12 May 2010 in the aftermath of the discovery of a terrorist training camp in Jantho, Aceh.

⁹ The at-Taqwa Mosque was known as a gathering place for ex-Ambon fighters, especially those who had been members of Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN).

¹⁰ International Crisis Group, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing,” Asia Report No.92, 22 February 2005, p.30.

Four years later, in November 2015, as euphoria was still high among Indonesian Islamists over the declaration of Islamic State and the restoration of the caliphate, Saiful resurfaced at the founding meeting of Jamaah Anshorul Daulah (JAD) in Batu, Malang, East Java, where, in a conversation with Aman Abdurrahman over speaker phone from his prison cell, he was appointed JAD amir for Ambon and head of JAD military forces.¹¹

Shortly thereafter, Saiful went with several others to visit Aman and Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, the field coordinator in the Australian embassy bombing, in Kembang Kuning Prison, Nusakambangan. Aman beckoned him to come close and whispered to him so that other visitors could not hear that the head of the ISIS government had instructed him to undertake an action similar to November 2015 bombing in Paris that had killed 130 people. Rois would be the coordinator. Saiful agreed.¹²

The result was the 14 January 2016 attack on Jl. Thamrin in central Jakarta in front of the Sarinah department store. Four civilians were killed, and a Dutch UN official was seriously injured as were 23 others. The four attackers were all killed. Saiful was responsible for picking up the arms that were used in the attack from one of Rois's contacts. For his role and his contacts with other members of the group, Saiful was arrested on 19 February 2016 in Malang, East Java. He was sentenced to nine years in prison in November 2016, the last six of which have been spent in Karanganyar Prison, Nusakambangan.

Saiful Muhtorir refused to apply for conditional release, for which he would have had to swear loyalty to the Indonesian republic. Police remain hopeful that he will stay disengaged from violent extremist networks after his release, but they are taking no chances, and he will be carefully monitored.

One footnote on the case: another person arrested in connection with the 2016 Jakarta attack, Fikri Luthfillah, who was a minor at the time, was released in 2019. He was rearrested in October 2023 for taking part in pro-ISIS activities with Abu Umar, below, and was sentenced to five years in prison.¹³ His home base was Kebon Pedes, Sukabumi, West Java, the same subdistrict that produced Hery Golun.

IV. MOHAMMED ICHWAN ALIAS ABU UMAR, REARRESTED OCTOBER 2023

Abu Umar is another recidivist with a long history in Darul Islam and a proven track record of reviving old networks. Born in Jakarta on 30 June 1970, he, like the others, is in his fifties and appears to be as radical as he was in his youth. He, too, served in Ambon but also has ties to groups in Sulawesi, Malaysia and the Philippines as well as to Jakarta and West Java. He was released from his last imprisonment in 2019 and began contacting former members of his network almost immediately. His goal this time around was to unite all the militant Islamist

¹¹ Supreme Court of Indonesia, Verdict No. 140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN.Jkt.Sel in the case of Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman, 5 June 2018, <https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/0eb5394484848c3e48c0c8252911645c.html>

¹² Ibid, p.24.

¹³ See Supreme Court of Indonesia, Decision No.407/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Tim in case of Fikri Luthfillah, 9 October 2024, <https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/zaef902852637eea8a18313034373132.html>.

groups committed to an Islamic state, including JAD, DI, Hizbut Tahrir, Khilafatul Muslimin and a host of smaller factions. He was also interested in resuming jihad in the Philippines, if his unity plan did not work.

Only an individual as senior as Abu Umar would have the capacity to unite such different groups.¹⁴ He was recruited into Darul Islam in 1988 as a high school student and was formally inducted in 1990 when he was 20. From 1995 to 1997 he was an active member of DI/NII in West Jakarta, and in 1997, he was selected as one of ten men to go to a DI training camp in Mindanao that had been set up on the grounds of the MILF's Camp Abu Bakar. He returned to Indonesia after six months. In 1999, after the eruption of the Ambon conflict, he was among the young dissidents who chafed at the DI leadership's lack of action and unwillingness to deem the conflict there a jihad. He helped found Batalyon Abu Bakar, a breakaway faction involving some 60 men who were recruited to fight in Ambon. Company F (Kompi F) of the battalion became a group known as Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN) and undertook several bombings and fund-raising robberies (*fa'i*) around Jakarta. AMIN was also involved in the attempted murder in March 2000 of Matori Abdul Jalil, later to become Indonesia's defence minister. The attack was planned at Abu Umar's house, and he then became a fugitive.

After a brief stint in Ambon, he moved around with his large family (two wives, several children and stepchildren) until they finally settled on Sebatik, an island off the coast of Kalimantan that is split down the middle between Indonesia and Malaysia. He taught in a Muhammadiyah elementary school there but also used his spare time to acquire arms for DI/NII, mostly from Mindanao, building a network in Tawau, Malaysia to do so.

In 2005, after a wave of arrests in Malaysia that included some of his contacts, Abu Umar decided to leave Sebatik and move to Bogor. He joined the DI group in Jakarta that included Uci – one of the Poso brothers involved in the Loki attack. (Uci had married into a prominent West Java DI family.) Abu Umar managed to build a large DI organization in Jakarta over the next few years, taking over some of the religious study groups run by his old associates from Batalyon Abu Bakar. He also was amassing an arsenal, collecting arms and explosives from Poso with Uci's help, and conducting military training courses in South and Southeast Sulawesi with the help of DI-Makassar. Five such trainings were carried out in August 2007, July 2008, October 2009 and February 2010 and February 2011.

Abu Umar also sent a few members of his group to the Aceh training camp that was broken up by police in January 2010. He then helped hide fugitives from the camp and from a few attacks in North Sumatra that were carried out in retaliation for police actions in Aceh. In early 2011, Abu Umar divided his followers into three cells for planned attacks on police but none of the groups got even close to carrying them out. They also became interested in anti-Shi'a attacks, but again did not get much further than the discussion stage.

On 4 July 2011, Abu Umar was arrested for trying to smuggle in arms from Mindanao. He was keeping alive his connection to Mindanao not just for weapons. He had also sent his stepson, Farhan Mujahid, to train with the Abu Sayyaf Group.¹⁵ Abu Umar was sentenced to ten years in

¹⁴ For background on Abu Umar, see International Crisis Group, "How Indonesian Extremists Regroup," Asia Report No.228, 16 July 2012, and IPAC, "Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia", Report No.5, 2 December 2013. The trial dossier from his 2012 trial also contains a wealth of information.

¹⁵ Abu Umar had married the widow of Sarmo, a DI fighter killed by a mob after his attack on Matori Abdul Jalil in 2000. Farhan was Sarmo's son, who had studied at al-Mukmin in Ngruki from 2005 to 2008.

prison on 14 May 2012. Soon afterwards, on 31 August 2012, Farhan, who had returned to Indonesia from the Philippines some time earlier, tried to attack a police post in Solo and was fatally shot.

Abu Umar was known during his incarceration in Pasir Putih prison, Nusakambangan, as being anti-ISIS but he seems to have gradually shifted his position to support any organisation that supported full implementation of Islamic law. When he was released in 2019, he moved back to Bogor, West Java, but he immediately began phoning his old contacts. Through his DI connections, he began gathering together members of DI, Firqah al Hamzah, JAD, Hizbut Tahrir and others.¹⁶ One large group that he brought in was a pro-ISIS halaqoh, or discussion group in Kebon Pedes, the old DI stronghold where Saiful Muhtohrir had first trained Heri Golun. Among the participants in the halaqoh was Fikri Luthfillah, the minor who had been arrested in connection with the 2016 Jakarta attack.

Abu Umar also called back to his friends in Sebatik after his release, asking how they all were and urging them to stay engaged. In 2023, he phoned again and asked if any of the old colleagues there had children that they could enroll in a new Qur'anic school that he had set up in Bekasi, a Jakarta suburb. One Sebatik cadre, Amiruddin, agreed to enroll two of his grandchildren in May 2023. After delivering the children, Amiruddin, Abu Umar and others discussed routes to the Philippines and whether it was still possible to go to there for jihad.¹⁷ Amiruddin told them that friends in Tawau could facilitate a sea crossing to Mindanao, but they needed a passport first to get past Malaysian police. They could tell the police that they were coming to Tawau for shopping, and then once clear, cross to Mindanao by boat.¹⁸ Before the trip could take place, however, Abu Umar was arrested.

V. CONCLUSION

The recidivism of Abu Umar, Sulthon Qolbi and Saiful Muhtohrir underscores the risk posed by older extremist leaders who have been frustrated time after time in their efforts to fight for an Islamic state. These men were not just inspired online as many of the younger ISIS supporters have been. They saw firsthand in Ambon and Poso in 1999 and 2000 how Muslims in their own country could be killed in sectarian conflict, were radicalised as a result, and acquired the combat experience that is a prerequisite for violent extremist leadership.

The good news is that Indonesia's counter-terrorism police are well prepared for the release of Saiful Muhtohrir, just as they were for the release of Sulthon Qolbi and Abu Umar and made sure they were rearrested before they could do any harm. With some 300 prisoners convicted of terrorism being released each year, however, sustained monitoring is a major challenge.

¹⁶ Supreme Court of Indonesia, Decision No. 401/Pid.Sus/2024/PN JKT.TIM in case of Abdullah Indra Kusuma alias Muhammad Ichwan alias Abu Umar, 16 July 2024, <https://putusan3.mahkamahagung.go.id/direktori/putusan/zaef9028120c92f08f7c313034353234.html>

¹⁷ Supreme Court of Indonesia, Decision No. 542/Pid.Sus/2024/PN Jkt.Tim in case of Amiruddin alias Pak Tami bin Tabbo, 16 December 2024.

¹⁸ Ibid, p.13.

APPENDIX I: COMPLETE CATALOGUE OF IPAC PUBLICATIONS

AUGUST 2013 TO FEBRUARY 2025

Note: All reports will remain available on the IPAC website (www.understandingconflict.org) through 2025 but are also available through JSTOR; the UN's refworld.org; the Library of Congress and other sites. The website is searchable by keywords.

1. *“Indonesian Extremists and the Rohingya Issue”*, 5 August 2013
The attempted bombing of the Ekayana Buddhist Centre in Kebon Jeruk, West Jakarta, on 4 August 2013 shows how anger over violence against the Rohingya have made Buddhists a target of radical extremists.
<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/INDONESIAN-EXTREMISTS-AND-THE-ROHINGYA-ISSUE>
2. *Mesuji: Anatomy of an Indonesian Land Conflict*, Report No.1, 13 Aug 2013
Government forces planning the imminent eviction of thousands of squatters from a plantation in Sumatra must avoid excessive force and ensure that no one with a legitimate claim is removed. The case shows the complexity of land conflicts in Indonesia where almost every actor has been both a perpetrator and a victim of a perceived injustice, and how the conflict changes as local politicians begin seeing new arrivals not as illegal squatters but as potential votes.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/328def2c684b760c476a5998b55d69ba.pdf>
3. *“A Note on Recent Police Shootings Around Jakarta”*, 19 August 2013
The spate of shootings in the greater Jakarta area in July and August 2013 suggests that the group or groups involved may be consciously adopting an urban guerrilla strategy.
<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/A-NOTE-ON-RECENT-POLICE-SHOOTINGS-AROUND-JAKARTA>
4. *Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia*, Report No. 2, 1 September 2013
The expected release of well over 100 convicted extremists in Indonesia over the next few years does not necessarily mean a heightened security threat, but it does underscore the need for better post-release monitoring. The report looks at the practice of early release and how many prisoners serve far less time than their original sentences, the impact of a single regulation limiting sentence remissions for convicted terrorists, and particular issues in seven major prisons.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/f045654d99f3c91ff5314e9df5f16754.pdf>
5. *Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Problems*, Report No. 3, 8 October 2013
The rapid proliferation of new districts in Papua is strengthening the political influence of highlanders at the expense of the traditionally dominant coast, but it is also producing new conflicts and complicating the search for peace.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/c1cb5eb411282c8a7c3d84dd19c5c0b1.pdf>

6. *Otsus Plus: The Debate over Enhanced Special Autonomy for Papua*, Report No.4, 24 November 2013
The report explores how a controversial proposal to amend a 2001 law on special autonomy was suddenly transformed into a detailed, practical program for improving the lives of indigenous Papuans, thanks to a group of academics and civil society activists in Manokwari, Papua Barat. Unfortunately, no one in the government took the Manokwari draft seriously.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/e9194349f3f1595696c3bc3ccc9d52ec.pdf>
7. *Weak, Therefore Violent: The Mujahidin of Western Indonesia*, Report No.5, 1 December 2013
The weakness of Indonesian extremists today may be propelling them toward violence as the lack of training, combat experience, or religious credentials leaves attacks as the only way to gain legitimacy. The report looks at a short-lived group based in West Java, the Mujahidin of Western Indonesia, as a case study. It also highlights the importance of the old Darul Islam insurgency and the role of a few individuals, including a DI activist, Abu Umar.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/98d11c56fcc3b6e6c23d59d15f8925da.pdf>
8. *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, Report No.6, 28 January 2014
Indonesian extremists are more engaged by the conflict in Syria than by any other foreign war in recent memory, including Afghanistan and Iraq. The report looks at the impact of the Arab Spring on Indonesians; the popularity of end-of-times prophecies; and divisions produced by the Syrian conflict within the Indonesian jihadist movement.
<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/Indonesians-and-the-Syrian-Conflict>
9. *Papua Update: The Latest on Otsus Plus*, Report No.7, 26 February 2014
Papuan drafting teams turned over the latest version of a draft law on enhanced special autonomy (otsus plus) to the central government on 15 February, but it is not clear who beyond a tiny elite in Papua province really wants it.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/d1744308ccfe5ab182c8770aa7f40a67.pdf>
10. *Aceh's Elections: A Do-It-Yourself Analysis*, Report No. 8, 30 March 2014
Local elections on 9 April 2014 will return Partai Aceh to power – the only question is the margin of its victory.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/29f080762357dcbf3dcb5277c594ceb3.pdf>
11. *Indigenous Rights vs Agrarian Reform in Indonesia: A Case Study from Jambi*, Report No.9, 14 April 2014
IPAC examines a case in Jambi, Sumatra where for the last decade, indigenous farmers have been trying to recover more than 3,000 hectares of customary land taken for a palm oil concession in 1986. Like many such conflicts in Indonesia, this one involves a powerful company, vested political and economic interests, contradictory laws and regulations, confusing lines of bureaucratic authority and poor historical data. But the differences between two strands of the civil society movement add another complication.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/8191cbccd31d120903bb828f8604afcc.pdf>

12. “How Papua Voted” (originally appeared on newmandala.org), 17 April 2014
The challenges to realising fully free and fair elections are legion in Papua and they are not only logistical – problems that exist elsewhere are generally even more extreme. Voter lists are routinely inflated by large margins (the full provincial voter list already exceeds the total 2010 population figure by over ten per cent, with the greatest variation in the central highland areas). <https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/How-Papua-Voted>

13. *Aceh’s Surprising Election Results*, Report No.10, 28 April 2014
Acehnese voters registered clear displeasure with the ruling Partai Aceh in national legislative elections earlier this month, even though the political party of former insurgents still came out on top.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/5c13969ed166423835ae4291ba544073.pdf>

14. *Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink*, Report No.11, 30 June 2014
Prevention programs of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) have not been as effective as hoped. At the same time, many local communities, some of them inspired by an anti-Salafi backlash, are taking action themselves against extremist preachers and radical media, while some prisoners are deciding on their own to move away from violence.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/eb2046294aea01114fff8e58263f4fd4.pdf>

15. *Timor-Leste after Xanana Gusmao*, Report No. 12, 15 July 2014
Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão may or may not step down later this year, but Timor-Leste still needs a transition to a younger generation so that its political institutions can develop.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/58caf429de482c266ea5f495fea64789.pdf>

16. *The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia*, Report No. 13, 23 September 2014
The report looks at the origins and development of the ISIS support network in Indonesia, starting with the involvement of a few Indonesians in a radical online discussion group run by the founder of the UK-based group Al-Muhajiroun in 2005. Pledges of loyalty from Indonesian extremists to ISIS could raise the risk of violence.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/11e0587d3c4b5c899df36aaed654cd82.pdf>

17. *Open to Manipulation: The 2014 Elections in Papua*, Report No.14, 9 December 2014
The report examines how the April legislative and July presidential elections in 2014 were conducted in Papua province, with particular attention to the improbable results coming out of the central highlands. The turnout was uniformly reported as 100 per cent--even in many areas where no one actually saw a ballot. The Jokowi administration should uphold the principle of one person, one vote and clean up voter rolls in Papua province to reduce the potential for fraud.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/59f5f2cbc4c1cb250d7a3b4c145580a0.pdf>

18. “Counter-Terrorism and the Rise of ISIS in 2014”, (originally published in Tempo), 14 January 2015 A review of Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts.

19. *Support for “Islamic State” in Indonesian Prisons*, Report No.15, 18 January 2015
Examines how alliances for and against ISIS developed among inmates, using two prisons as case studies. ISIS supporters are a minority among convicted terrorists in Indonesian prisons, and some of those who have sworn allegiance have done so for reasons that have nothing to do with ideology or religion. Relatively simple interventions by prison staff may be thus able to limit the influence of hardline ideologues.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/e02dc96062f17e38e21e46930224cfa0.pdf>

20. *Political Power Struggles in Aceh*, Report No.16, 9 February 2015
Rifts within the top ranks of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) suggest that a transfer of power to a younger generation is underway. This could have implications for the strength of GAM’s political vehicle, Partai Aceh. It could also affect relations with Jakarta.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/76d4f5e8017ccb097b7663948e2dcae1.pdf>

21. *Killing Marwan in Mindanao*, Report No.17, 4 March 2015
The Philippines government cannot afford to divorce counter-terrorism operations from the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Among the many tragedies of the operation against Malaysian Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan in Mamasapano on 25 January 2015 was that police saw his capture as so critical that they failed to use existing mechanisms to coordinate with the MILF. The resulting disaster, in which 44 police Special Action Forces (SAF) and eighteen MILF fighters died, has set back a peace agreement nearly two decades in the making.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/8331a4a7cc145226a1bd0261c9b8f7c6.pdf>

22. *Indonesia’s Lamongan Network*, Report No.18, 15 April 2015
A network of extremists in East Java illustrates how support for a local jihadi struggle in Poso, Central Sulawesi is linked to support for ISIS. Understanding that network could lead to more effective counter-extremism programs. The links go through women, Islamic schools, prisons, social media, and one radical cleric.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/225d70532bf6db9aa2afd1ccc22150d0.pdf>

23. *The Expanding Role of the Indonesian Military*, Report No.19, 24 May 2015
The Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) appears to be taking advantage of a weak president and unpopular police to try and regain some of the internal security functions that it lost as part of the country’s democratisation process. The government needs to strengthen civil control of the TNI and prevent the military’s mission creep into areas unrelated to its core function of defence.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/72e39bcf3525c0cdf14988ce10944845.pdf>

24. *The Sulu Archipelago and the Philippine Peace Process*, Report No.20, 28 May 2015.
A vital but often overlooked question about the peace process in the southern Philippines is whether the three provinces of the Sulu archipelago – Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi – will opt to join the new autonomous region for the Bangsamoro. The peace will be more

sustainable if they do, but it may require some carrots and sticks from Manila to persuade traditional politicians in the area to go along.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/ca386eeb7afc61f4c0daf6d4dd0fb423.pdf>

25. *The Current Status of the Papuan Pro-Independence Movement*, Report No.21, 24 August 2015

Examines the aims, capacity, leadership and activities of both the armed units of the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) and the various political groupings supporting independence in Papua and abroad. It notes that while President Jokowi has made Papua a particular focus of his administration, policies aimed at improving welfare, while welcome on their own terms, will not necessarily dampen pro-independence sentiment.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/05ab1f2f31ee54cfd3a4c0b38c893a44.pdf>

26. *Justice at the Crossroads in Timor-Leste*, Report No.22, 6 September 2015

Looks at the fall-out from the controversial decision to expel international judges in 2014 and the possibilities opened up by full “Timorisation” of the judiciary. The report’s detailed list of recommendations underscores the amount of work that needs to be done, especially on professional training, access to justice, and meeting basic fair trial standards.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/8d53b0add1a790f4bc1382c853fab51.pdf>

27. *Din Minimi: The Strange Story of an Armed Group in Aceh, Indonesia*, Report No.23, 14 October 2015

The rise and likely fall of the outlaw who served as a combatant during the final years of GAM’s insurgency. Din Minimi is portrayed by parties opposed to the GAM-led government as a Robin Hood who abducts corruptors and drug dealers and uses the ransom money to assist orphans and widows neglected by the GAM leaders now in power. In the process, he has attracted the attention of all who would like to see the discrediting of Partai Aceh, the GAM-led political party – including political rivals, intelligence personnel and extremists.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/1339ac7697df39d071492a86103dd502.pdf>

28. *Online Activism and Social Media Usage Among Indonesian Extremists*, Report No.24, 30 October 2015.

Social media usage among Indonesian ISIS supporters is not necessarily changing patterns of recruitment but it is ensuring that ISIS propaganda is reaching new audiences. The government will not be able to develop effective countermeasures unless it puts more resources into training skilled personnel to analyse the content of extremist communications.

<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/Online-Activism-and-Social-Media-Usage-Among-Indonesian-Extremists>

29. *Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence*, Report No.25, 1 February 2016

Competition among Indonesian ISIS leaders is increasing the risk of more violence at home, with radical cleric Aman Abdurrahman and his Syria-based follower Abu Jandal having fallen out with BahrumSyah, the top Indonesian ISIS leader in Syria. The report looks at the January 2016 attack on Jl. Thamrin in this context.

30. *Update on the Indonesian Military's Influence*, Report No.26, 10 March 2016.
The Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) continues to press for an expanded role in internal security, driven by distrust of civilian politicians, contempt for the police and the conviction that Indonesia is facing hostile powers using proxies to attack it through non-military means.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/2c2636898bb8b7eacb8da8667eda6cf4.pdf>
31. *The Anti-Shi'a Movement in Indonesia*, Report No.27, 27 April 2016.
The convergence of a non-violent hardline campaign against Shi'ism with a new determination of pro-ISIS groups to wage war at home is increasing the possibility of violent attacks on Indonesia's Shi'a minority. The report looks at the history of anti-Shi'a movement in Indonesia, the reasons for its newfound intensity, and the three groups involved in it.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/3803bb1aea71a25ae6cd0226199bd9aa.pdf>
32. *ISIS in Ambon: The Fallout from Communal Conflict*, Report No.28, 12 May 2016
Personal bonds forged in the Ambon and Poso communal fighting of the immediate post-Soeharto period continue to provide recruits, ideological reinforcement, protection and sometimes financial support for the extremist movement.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/18aa14365bc35be91ceb421316d91c3d.pdf>
33. *Rebuilding after Communal Violence: Lessons from Tolikara, Papua*, Report No.29, 12 June 2016.
July 2016 will mark the first anniversary of an outbreak of communal violence in Tolikara, a district of the Papuan central highlands, that involved indigenous Christians, Muslim migrants and poorly trained security forces. As the Jokowi government attempts to formulate a strategy toward Papua, it could usefully study the Tolikara case because it reveals how many overlapping problems are involved in one incident. It also shows how leftover grievances from the incident are likely to add to the potential for violence as Tolikara gears up for local elections next year.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/cd6f5531df5b529c08589d033bb73272.pdf>
34. *The Failed Solo Suicide Bombing and Bahrin Naim's Network*, Report No.30, 28 July 2016
An anti-vice vigilante group in Solo, Central Java has become the go-to source of recruits for Bahrin Naim, an Indonesian ISIS leader in Syria. Its members are young, underemployed, poorly educated and impressionable. Their involvement suggests that at least in Solo, Indonesia might usefully draw on lessons learned about curbing gang violence to formulate a prevention strategy.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/00fe988f115cc646f7630535734df360.pdf>
35. *Anatomy of an Indonesian Oil Palm Conflict*, Report No.31, 30 August 2016
More extensive consultation, better maps and a better grievance mechanism could have helped prevent a conflict at a palm oil plantation in Kubu Raya, West Kalimantan that has now dragged on for seven years. The longer it has gone on, the messier it has become, with

new parties that were never part of the original dispute and a dangerous ethnic dimension emerging.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/8592af417573862155350df436215580.pdf>

36. *The Anti-Salafi Campaign in Aceh*, Report No.32, 5 October 2016

A bid by traditionalist clerics in rural Aceh to increase their influence at the expense of urban rivals is drawing the local government into potentially discriminatory definitions of what constitutes “Acehnese” Islam. It is also taking on a dangerous political dimension as deputy governor and former rebel military commander Muzakir Manaf turns to the traditionalists to shore up his political base as he steps up his campaign for governor in elections scheduled for February 2017.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/474b568e3ac51b1260a92c1e278e7573.pdf>

37. *Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia*, Report No.33, 25 October 2016

Examines four pro-ISIS groups in Mindanao and how each has links to operatives from other countries in the region: the Basilan-based faction of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG); Ansarul Khilafa Philippines (AKP); the Maute group in Lanao del Sur; and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Each has had fighters, instructors or funding at different times from Indonesia or Malaysia and in turn has provided refuge, training sites, combat experience or arms. This means it is more important than ever for law enforcement agencies to have expertise on groups outside their own borders.

<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/Pro-ISIS-Groups-in-Mindanao-and-Their-Links-to-Indonesia-and-Malaysia>

38. *Update on Indonesian Pro-ISIS Prisoners and Deradicalisation Efforts*, Report. No.34, 13 December 2016

Prisons are overcrowded and understaffed, corruption is rife, and inadequate budgets make it easier for well-funded extremists to recruit inmates when they can offer extra food. No deradicalisation program is going to be effective unless some of these issues are addressed.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/e849921e0c7b405722dc9b5aba4614fa.pdf>

39. *Mothers to Bombers: The Evolution of Indonesian Women Extremists*, Report No.35, 30 January 2017

Looks at how the role of women in Indonesian extremist organisations has evolved over the last four decades. The combination of ISIS, with its universal mission, and communications technology, which has enabled women to share information and reinforce their own aspirations, has dramatically changed how women extremists see themselves.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/91adb789ab27a0e2eb90064fbdee594e.pdf>

40. *The Re-Emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah*, Report No.36, 26 April 2017

A rebuilt, restructured Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains a threat, not because it is likely to resume a campaign of violence but because it could give rise to a more militant splinter. The report explains how it rebuilt itself twice, after the Bali bombs and after a major crackdown in Poso in 2007.

<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/The-Re-emergence-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah>

41. *How Southeast Asian and Bangladeshi Extremism Intersect*, Report No.37, 8 May 2017
Southeast Asian and Bangladeshi extremism are becoming increasingly intertwined through migrant labor, overseas study programs, and the Syrian conflict, making the traditional distinction between South and Southeast Asia obsolete, at least as far as counter-terrorism is concerned. The urgent task now is for governments, journalists and NGOs across the region to better understand the interaction and look for interventions that can strengthen local resistance to recruitment.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/a458883b7c85f33a9f6489f480d569b1.pdf>

42. *Marawi, the “East Asia Wilayah” and Indonesia*, Report No.38, 20 July 2017.
The battle for Marawi in the southern Philippines is likely to have long-term repercussions for extremism in Southeast Asia and may lead to more attacks in the region’s cities; a more coordinated regional strategy among extremist groups; and strengthened capacity among pro-ISIS cells in Indonesia and Malaysia. Despite the calls for more regional counter-terrorism cooperation, there are formidable political and institutional obstacles at work. Nevertheless, some quick fixes could be put in place.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/abc31a7da5b2567d844e6c404c680ec6.pdf>

43. *The Radicalisation of Indonesian Women Workers in Hong Kong*, Report No.39, 25 July 2017.
Looks at how a tiny cell of some 50 extremist domestic workers developed within the 153,000-strong Indonesian migrant community in Hong Kong. The Indonesian government needs to work with overseas labor recruiting agencies and civil society organisations to ensure that migrant workers, particularly women, are not drawn into extremist cells.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/a0fb71a67e2c27d2f36baf53bce4ca0b.pdf>

44. *Policy Miscalculations on Papua*, Report No.40, 30 October 2017
Indonesian President Jokowi has given more personal attention to Papua than any of his predecessors but conflict there – among clans, between indigenous Papuans and migrants, between pro-independence groups and the state – remains high. Part of the problem may be the assumption that economic intervention alone can mitigate political grievances, but other miscalculations have come into play that impede efforts to improve Papuan welfare and reduce conflict.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/06e73c24f17c477d8a18f8124a804381.pdf>

45. *Post-Marawi Lessons from Philippine Detainees*, Report No.41, 26 November 2017
Examines the debriefings of seven suspects arrested in connection with the September 2016 bombing in Davao, carried out by a pro-ISIS cell in Cotabato. It looks at patterns of recruitment and radicalisation, training, financing and coordination with other parts of the pro-ISIS coalition, especially with the Maute brothers who later led the Marawi siege. The Philippine government needs to analyse the debriefings from these and other extremist suspects so that it can better formulate counter-terrorism strategies.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/051cdc4a65be72808233614759d55f8b.pdf>

46. *Extremists in Bandung: Darul Islam to ISIS – and Back Again?*, Report No.42, 11 February 2018

An in-depth look at a local command (*komando wilayah*, KW) of the Darul Islam movement. Many members of KW7 in Bandung, who had previously avoided violent extremism, were convinced that ISIS's control of territory in Syria and Iraq made it preferable to the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) that they claimed to support. They became the Bandung branch of an Indonesian pro-ISIS coalition, but some were reportedly having second thoughts with ISIS defeats in the Middle East. They might be persuaded to disengage altogether if the Indonesian government can manage their detention wisely.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/c1be5f8671772e60be0275df87d50c41.pdf>

47. *The West Kalimantan Election and the Impact of the Anti-Ahok Campaign*, Report No.43, 20 February 2018

West Kalimantan's election for governor on 27 June 2018 will be a contest between candidates divided by religion and ethnicity, exacerbated by the fallout from Jakarta politics, but local observers say the risk of violence is overstated. Local officials and community leaders should still work out a strategy that identifies potential flashpoints and anticipates scenarios that could lead to localised communal clashes so that preventive measures are in place as campaigning gets underway.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/f897e58dec839264e889cc7331c300c7.pdf>

48. *After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia*, Report No.44, 6 April 2018

The Islamist alliance that brought down the Jakarta governor in 2016 has broken up but it has made a major mark on Indonesian politics in two ways. It has left many politicians convinced that they need conservative Muslim support to win elections, and it has convinced many Islamists that they can achieve their social and political goals by working through Indonesia's democratic system. Still, the disunity in Islamist ranks suggests that hardliners may be a less potent force than is sometimes feared.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/0ebe239440b4fe06c3414c7d934e83cd.pdf>

49. *The 2018 Elections in Papua: Places and Issues to Watch*, Report. No.45, 31 May 2018

Local elections scheduled for 27 June 2018 across Indonesia include several races in Papua, including for governor and deputy governor, that have raised concerns about possible conflict. While small outbreaks of localised violence may take place, it is still remarkable how much aggrieved Papuans politicians choose to settle most of their electoral disputes through the formal court system, weak and corrupt as it is.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/632f7889e9b49fb9c10c45a6227bc36.pdf>

50. *Indonesia and the Rohingya Crisis*, Report No.46, 29 June 2018

The Indonesian government has tried to manage domestic anger over Myanmar's violence against the Rohingya by a combination of high-level diplomacy and humanitarian aid. Domestically, the policy has worked, but there is no indication that it has won any concessions on the Rohingya from Myanmar. The question is whether Indonesia can use its new seat as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to press for a

solution that includes greater access by humanitarian organisations and citizenship rights and freedom of movement for Rohingya inside Myanmar.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/546391ec64650065a3553f3173296fba.pdf>

51. *Managing Indonesia's Pro-ISIS Deportees*, Report No.47, 17 July 2018

Indonesia urgently needs a strategy for assessing, monitoring and reintegrating pro-ISIS deportees. As of mid-2018, well over 500 men, women and children had been deported, mostly from Turkey, after leaving to join ISIS but getting caught before they could do so. After a rudimentary two-week to one-month rehabilitation program at a government shelter, most were allowed to return home without further monitoring. A more structured debriefing, counseling and monitoring program is needed. Local officials also need training to understand how to balance vigilance with assisting reintegration into local communities.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/78da08093abe65985f7a9d7a43aeddf3.pdf>

52. *Indonesia and the Tech Giants vs ISIS Supporters: Combatting Violent Extremism Online*, Report No.48, 27 July 2018

The partnership between the Indonesian government and the big social media companies to remove violent content online is improving, but extremists are still finding low tech means around high tech blockages. The report looks at how extremists used social media to live-stream a riot at a police detention centre outside Jakarta on 8-9 May 2018, get clips of the riot to ISIS official media networks, and issue calls for reinforcements. It documents the history of interaction between the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (Kominfo) and companies such as Google, Facebook and Telegram. But even with improved government relations with the companies, it is not always clear where the lines should be drawn between acceptable, if offensive, political speech and hate speech, or between hate speech and criminal incitement.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/947856ecb3f217e8a7bb2fac1da605e0.pdf>

53. *Recent and Planned Releases of Indonesian Extremists: An Update*, Report No.49, 9 August 2018

Indonesia is facing an infrastructure crunch with unprecedented numbers of terrorist suspects arrested under a newly strengthened anti-terrorism law and not enough maximum security facilities ready to hold them. In the past, regular releases of convicted terrorists have kept the prison population manageable, but the rate of releases will slow, and many in the new intake will likely receive heavier sentences under the new law, keeping them in for longer periods. In the same period that 70 convicted extremists have been released, some 400 have been arrested, more than 280 since May 2018. This creates problems not just for the police who run the detention centres where these people are being held, but for the prosecutors, courts and prisons that will all have to cope with a dramatically increased caseload.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/9b6a31c12eb425e2440eb53c836684be.pdf>

54. *Update on Local Election Results in West Kalimantan and Papua*, Report No.50, 16 August 2018

The results of local elections in West Kalimantan and Papua show continued reliance on identity politics. West Kalimantan voters voted overwhelmingly along religious lines in an

echo of the Jakarta governor's race in 2016-2017, but if predicted violence did not materialize, one reason may have been the work of a Hoax Crisis Center led by NGOs and journalists committed to investigating, clarifying and where necessary rebutting provocative messages circulating online or on mobile phone texts. In Papua, almost everything that could go wrong with an election did. This is guaranteed to happen again until the voter rolls are overhauled and proxy voting thrown out.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/3d26f1521e1bb90abfbb1410325cc190.pdf>

55. *The Surabaya Bombings and the Future of ISIS in Indonesia*, Report No.51, 18 October 2018

Examines the state of pro-ISIS support five months after a group of families, including young children, targeted police and churches in a series of suicide bombings in Surabaya, East Java. The main lesson to draw is not that the use of children is the new modus operandi or that terrorists have grown more proficient. It is rather that defeats of ISIS in the Middle East have not weakened the determination of ISIS supporters to wage war at home. The government needs to pay particular attention to pro-ISIS members who are about to be or have been released from prison, because this is the pool from which new leaders will be drawn.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/05d4c5c5741b08a8b440b7033a18b927.pdf>

56. *Puritan Political Engagement: The Evolution of Salafism in Malaysia*, Report No.52, 21 December 2018

Salafism, the ultra-puritan stream of Islam, has evolved very differently in Malaysia than in Indonesia, with more of its leaders seeking political engagement, sometimes to avoid being labelled extremist. Notwithstanding superficial similarities between recent mass Islamist rallies in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, political Islam has followed very different trajectories in the two countries, which shows how mistaken it is to see Salafism as a monolith.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/05d4c5c5741b08a8b440b7033a18b927.pdf>

57. *Protecting the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas from Abu Sayyaf Attacks*, Report No.53, 9 January 2019

Military measures alone will not reduce the risk of Abu Sayyaf kidnappings or terrorist transit in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas. Regional initiatives such as the Trilateral Maritime Patrol (TMP) are useful for strengthening cooperation among the Indonesian, Malaysian and Philippine militaries, but they are unlikely to have much impact on curbing violent extremism. The trilateral countries should focus more on analysing ASG networks in Sulu and Sabah, strengthening civilian law enforcement, and improving the sharing of information, especially from debriefings of extremist suspects.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/37b15d9bf6b60c3d4ce6ad2d7d9f770b.pdf>

58. *The Jolo Bombing and the Legacy of ISIS in the Philippines*, Report No.54, 5 March 2019

Looks at the 27 January 2019 bombing of a cathedral in Jolo, southern Philippines, and what it reveals about the ongoing activities of cross-border pro-ISIS groups. It also underscores how critical it is for the new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) to succeed, because failure could mean more recruits to violent extremist splinters. The Duterte government needs to move beyond military operations

aimed at killing known extremist leaders, which only produces a new generation bent on vengeance, and understand why the ISIS message resonated so strongly in Mindanao.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/7c52c88a0cb4fd1e88ebd9a949b7046e.pdf>

59. *Anti-Ahok to Anti-Jokowi: Islamist Influence on Indonesia's 2019 Election Campaign*, Report No.55, 15 March 2019

Documents how the 2016-17 Islamist mass mobilisation against Ahok, the then Jakarta governor, evolved into an Islamist campaign against Indonesian President Jokowi. From the outset, the “212 Movement”, named for a huge anti-Ahok rally on 2 December 2016, was plagued by ideological and tactical differences, but the Jokowi government’s attempt to prosecute, co-opt or stigmatise its members helped unite the factions. Beyond their determination to defeat Jokowi and elect his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, in the 17 April 2019 elections, however, they remain a fractious alliance, with component parts differing sharply on long-term goals.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/5bbb17d8e785f4eebae749ca33abf0c3.pdf>

60. *The Ongoing Problem of Pro-ISIS Cells in Indonesia*, Report No.56, 29 April 2019

Pro-ISIS cells in Indonesia have been emboldened, not discouraged, by ISIS defeats in the Middle East although their capacity to undertake terrorist attacks remains low. Indonesian counter-terrorism police generally have a good handle on extremist networks and as Internet recruitment has increased, their capacity to detect extremist groups online has also grown. But the proliferation of cells remains cause for concern. In the wake of the Sri Lanka attacks, Indonesia needs to be particularly alert to the increased role of pro-ISIS women; possibly enhanced attraction of churches as targets; and the possibility of someone with international jihad experience entering the country.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/1c9357fe6007afec7d4034dabd4a8284.pdf>

61. *Explaining Indonesia's Silence on the Uyghur Issue*, Report No.57, 20 June 2019

The Indonesian government is under little pressure to address the systematic repression of China’s Uyghur Muslims because many Indonesians see the crackdown as a legitimate response to separatism; do not trust reports of human rights organisations; or believe the issue has been politicized in the context of Indonesia’s April 2019 presidential election. A largely successful Chinese campaign to woo Indonesian Muslims through highly controlled tours of Xinjiang, as well as largesse distributed to Muslim institutions, has also contributed to the silence.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/b3c994d34d5625be9f613c9e9ffd6a16.pdf>

62. *Indonesian Islamists and the Post-Election Protests*, Report No.58, 23 July 2019

The low Islamist turnout in protests following the April 2019 presidential election reflects a changing relationship between Islamists and the state, with the government moving more aggressively against “radical Islam” and wary Islamists avoiding risk. The challenge for President Jokowi in his second term is to ensure that policies aimed at undermining extremism do not exacerbate the political polarisation that the election revealed.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/d1cafd428de3bc4d68b5388e388daccb.pdf>

63. *Indonesia: Urgent Need for a Policy on Repatriation of Pro-ISIS Nationals from Syria*, Report No.59, 27 August 2019
Indonesia urgently needs a policy for repatriating its nationals from SDF camps and prisons in Syria as the latter are becoming a new area for ISIS activity. The Indonesian government could begin now to repatriate some of its most vulnerable citizens (unaccompanied children, for example), while postponing any decision about some of the adults. The briefing explores the pros and cons of repatriation and some of the problems that the government faces, from verifying nationality, to assessing risk to preparing potentially hostile communities to receive returnees. The longer the government delays action, the higher the risks of radicalization in the camps.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/2f286f50618bbebcfa562901d6ba881e.pdf>
64. *Numbers Matter: The 2020 Census and Conflict in Papua*, Report No.60, 29 October 2019
Inflated population statistics in Papua are a source of corruption, conflict and power struggles, but unlike many of Papua's troubles, this one has a possible fix: a major government effort to ensure that the 2020 census produces an accurate head count. Relevant agencies need to have the appropriate technology, technical assistance, and security detail to do a proper count in remote areas. Indonesia badly needs a new strategy for addressing conflict in Papua, and a new strategy depends on better data.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/3eeb3fe9b52f80224aa185ef2151fb21.pdf>
65. *The Growing Influence of Salafism in Muslim Mindanao*, Report No.61, 8 January 2020
The puritanical stream of Islam known as Salafism is making major inroads in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the southern Philippines. Salafism, often portrayed as a doctrine more suited to the 7th century than the 21st, is now exerting a strong appeal to younger Muslims, with celebrity preachers trending on YouTube and Facebook. Students with smart phones and Internet access are becoming more knowledgeable, more observant and more conservative than their parents. This could foster greater social conservatism in areas such as education, freedom of religion and women's rights.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/4196f040a9f5d4129c5239dd5d383f48.pdf>
66. *Learning From Extremists in West Sumatra*, Report No.62, 28 February 2020
Understanding how neighbourhood study groups turned into pro-ISIS cells with links to Afghanistan may offer clues to effective strategies to counter extremism. The report examines how two groups in Padang and Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, expanded their networks through trading and migration networks, direct exposure to radical clerics, and the process of fleeing to new areas to evade the police. It calls into question the wisdom of the Indonesian government's approach of treating radicalism as a problem of insufficient nationalism, curable by indoctrination in the state ideology, Pancasila.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/046e0a7a7e610d650cb46ebd9b95e0a9.pdf>
67. *Stopping Abu Sayyaf Kidnappings: An Indonesian-Malaysian Case Study*, Report No.63, 27 March 2020
The best hope for reducing kidnapping and terrorism in the Sulu Sea may lie in the domestic policies of the three countries involved – Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. Improving transnational information-sharing is still essential, but each country has much

homework to do if preventive efforts are to be successful. The report uses a case study of Indonesian migrant fishers in Sabah, Malaysia who became kidnap victims of Abu Sayyaf to analyse how changes in domestic policies need to take place before any multilateral mechanisms are likely to work.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/8a5f8832ae779ca4f179b4a405180bc4.pdf>

68. IPAC Short Briefing No.1:” Covid-19 and ISIS in Indonesia”, 2 April 2020

ISIS central has urged supporters to exploit the pandemic to attack the enemy at a time of weakness, and Indonesia needs to be prepared. Some Indonesian ISIS supporters, however, appear to less focused on new attacks than on how the virus may be yet another sign that the end of the world is near. Indonesian prison administrators, fearing an outbreak of COVID-19, have suspended visits and made other adjustments, but the potential for unrest is high, especially as ISIS central has exhorted its followers to use the pandemic crisis to free Muslim prisoners.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/360742cad6bd2a503522cb1e48a31908.pdf>

69. IPAC Short Briefing No.2:” Covid-19 and ISIS and Conflict in Papua”, 13 April 2020

The COVID-19 pandemic is exacerbating tensions in Indonesia’s Papua province and exposing the shortcomings of government policy there. Many Papuans already are portraying the virus as having been brought by non-Papuan migrants and the military, increasing hostility and suspicion toward both. OPM attacks and the added police and military presence have produced more displacement, creating new vulnerabilities to contagion in a province that already has the country’s highest poverty, worst health care and most poorly educated populace. Overall, the COVID-19 crisis has reinforced a sense of victimisation among Papuans that will only fuel more distrust.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/db04b59a87abeba35e3c49d236b3a48f.pdf>

70. IPAC Short Briefing No.3: “Covid-19 and the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT)”, 28 April 2020

The renewal of violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi in March-April 2020 is the direct result of local extremists seeing Covid-19 as an ally in the war against Islam’s enemies. The arrival of the virus gave the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT) new hope that victory was near, and thus buoyed, began a series of attacks. This short briefing explains how MIT recovered from military operations in 2016, how it used the emergence of COVID-19 as a chance for new recruitment, and what the future of MIT could be in Poso. MIT has shown a capacity for regeneration that suggests the need for more work in vulnerable communities.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/48abef25141fedbb63c04a98ffce2eb1.pdf>

71. IPAC Short Briefing No.4, “Religious ‘Super-Spreaders’ in Indonesia: Managing the Risk of Stigmatisation”, 18 May 2020

"Super-spreader" religious gatherings, Muslim and Christian, have produced multiple outbreaks of the Covid virus. The largest cluster was produced by a single meeting of the Muslim missionary organisation, Jemaah Tabligh, which has produced more than 1,000 cases in 29 of Indonesia's 34 provinces. A much smaller outbreak resulted from a meeting of the Bethel Church, a Protestant Pentecostal network. Two issues need immediate attention. One is the approaching Idul Fitri holiday, coming as Indonesians are increasingly

flouting regulations. Second is the situation of close to 1,000 Indonesian Tablighis, who remain stranded overseas by lockdowns. The government needs to arrange repatriation, map final destinations, establish quarantine centres and prepare communities for their return if social conflict is to be avoided.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/f6af01a662eb55a44ca5b7d7ae8d4299.pdf>

72. *Renewing, Revising or Rejecting Special Autonomy in Papua*, Report No.64, 29 July 2020
The need to revise a law on “special autonomy” (*otonomi khusus* or *otsus*) for Papua could be an opening for urgently needed new approaches to halt the worsening conflict there. The 2001 law granting limited autonomy to Papua authorised special funding for twenty years. If it is to be continued, the law will have to be amended before 2021. But political tensions are higher than ever as Papua experiences increased violence in the central highlands, ongoing fall-out from the 2019 anti-racism protests, and the spread of Covid-19. The prospects of a major course correction in Jakarta are slim.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/96d4663736cba6c422d2ace80f63cd5b.pdf>
73. *Indonesian Islamists: Activists in Search of an Issue*, Report No.65, 13 August 2020
Indonesian Islamists, who united to bring down the then governor of Jakarta in 2016, have not become the political force that many feared, and Covid-19 has made the one tactic they excelled at – mass rallies to force political change – too risky. The former partners in the 212 Movement are now less visible and more divided than ever. The report looks at the impact of the “betrayal” by the Islamists’ erstwhile political patron Prabowo Subianto in late 2019 when he defected to the Jokowi camp as defence minister; the arrival of Covid-19; the continued self-exile of FPI leader Habibi Rizieq Shihab; and the ceding of responsibility for political advocacy to other organisations.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/04b310a95a94776bcb7979c5eb440ba6.pdf>
74. *Terrorism, Recidivism and Planned Releases in Indonesia*, Report No.66, 4 September 2020
The issue of recidivism among those convicted of terrorism in Indonesia needs a closer look as well over 100 of these prisoners are being released each year. Most will not commit a second offence: the recidivism rate hovers around 10-11 per cent, depending on the definition used. If factors involved in recidivism can be identified, however, more targeted post-release programs might reduce that rate further.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/11651711078511163c667fa54a32c06f.pdf>
75. *Rohingya Refugees in Aceh: An Update*, Report No.67, 9 September 2020
The report examines the chronology of Rohingya arrivals in Aceh and various issues of refugee management, including attempted escapes, financial scams, and tensions between unpaid government-affiliated volunteers and salaried humanitarian workers. In addition to improving refugee management, Indonesia needs to upgrade a regulation that leaves the problem in the hands of under-resourced local governments and enact a law that will guarantee the rights of refugees, such as the nearly 300 Rohingya who landed in Lhokseumawe, Aceh on 7 September 2020.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/f620274baf965578b167447ebe9e4367.pdf>

76. *Extremist Women Behind Bars in Indonesia*, Report No.68, 21 September 2020
Indonesia has managed a rising number of women extremists in prison reasonably well, but the need for more women-specific protocols and more recognition of the work of women case officers (*wali*) is increasingly apparent. It is often the personal interactions with prison staff and fellow inmates, more than any specific programs, that are key to moderating behaviour.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/d59c46bb91d63760add85da1ccd85f76.pdf>
77. *The Decline of ISIS in Indonesia and the Emergence of New Cells*, Report No.69, 21 January 2021.
Examines the status of the major pro-ISIS organisations in Indonesia and a few smaller ones to understand the dynamics that have weakened them. The arrest of many top pro-ISIS leaders (an appendix lists more than 70) has led to disruption in the ranks and a sense among some members that the costs of involvement are too high. The difficulty of getting to Syria or any other jihad theatre has taken away a powerful ISIS draw. In a few cases where key extremist leaders have been persuaded to disengage, ordinary members have followed. The overall picture is of a manageable threat.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/bc65535bafbdeb094a56e382e6f6bb91.pdf>
78. *The Risk of More Violence in the Sulu Archipelago*, Report No.70, 15 April 2021
The Sulu archipelago in the Philippines could face new violence from disgruntled fighters of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), even as Sulu Governor Sakur Tan is claiming success in ending old feuds among the archipelago's political factions. Unity among Sulu's political families is likely to be fleeting and in any case is not entirely good news to the extent that it reflects increasing alienation of islanders from the regional government on the Mindanao mainland. The report examines the complex political divisions in the islands and how the October 2020 death of one key player -- former MNLF chairman Yusop Jikiri -- has increased the security challenges there.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/938f72ede545b2b9657c44894d76b7e8.pdf>
79. *The Crackdown on Islamist 'Radicals' in Indonesia*, Report No.71, 25 May 2021
Examines the trajectory of Indonesia's current campaign against Islamist extremism and its implications for civil liberties. It outlines how three aspects of the anti-radicalism campaign, that began in 2017, could have negative implications for democratic governance: vetting of civil servants and academic to prevent "radical" infiltration but with a definition of "radical" that can include criticism of the government; the involvement of the military in some aspects of the campaign; and the banning of two hardline Muslim organisations in violation of legal procedures governing mass organisations.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/abf26c9bb5aca50f1dbdc3b7fd374a4a.pdf>
80. *Extricating Indonesian Children from ISIS Influence Abroad*, Report No.72, 30 June 2021
The report urges the government to begin repatriating the neediest of its young citizens stranded abroad, mostly in SDF camps in Syria but also a few in the Philippines, Afghanistan and Iraq. It analyses the main challenges of repatriation – bureaucratic, diplomatic and logistic – but says there are several models that the Indonesian government could follow, including for post-return rehabilitation programs. Not every

detail of those programs needs to be in place before the returns begin – better to bring back the most vulnerable and modify the programs as needed.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/0123d7313ca92bc8129f54d57771ad95.pdf>

81. *The Impact of the Taliban Victory on Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah*, Report No.73, 6 September 2021

The immediate blowback to Indonesia from the Taliban victory in Afghanistan is likely to be greater from pro-ISIS groups than from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the organisation with the strongest historical ties to al-Qaeda. The new IPAC report answers the most pressing questions about JI's current status. It examines JI's goals and strategy; size and structure, transnational links; economic base; military capacity and the risk of violence; ability to rebuild; and the reported reaction of imprisoned JI leaders to the Taliban victory.

<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/The-Impact-of-the-Taliban-Victory-on-Indonesias-Jemaah-Islamiyah>

82. *Diminished Autonomy and the Risk of New Flashpoints in Papua*, Report No.74, 23 December 2021

The new 2021 Special Autonomy Law for Papua (Otsus) effectively ends the political autonomy granted in 2001. It makes three fundamental changes: diminished provincial power, greater fiscal control from Jakarta, and reconfiguration of political representation for indigenous Papuans. Unless the government initiates a policy reset to address longstanding Papuan grievances, the law will end up accelerating conflict more than it accelerates development.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/16603a77832a2aba574be7ad68fb7a80.pdf>

83. *How a Pro-ISIS Cell Emerged in Papua*, Report No.75, 3 February 2022

The 2021 arrests of more than a dozen suspected terrorists in Merauke, Papua – all of them non-Papuans from Sulawesi and Java – represent the most serious extension of ISIS influence into Papua to date. The Merauke cell shows how extremist ideology spreads through social media, marriage and migration. One of the most striking aspects of the Merauke group is that several members were former Salafis. There is no inexorable progression from Salafism to violence, and there has been strong resistance to violent jihad from most of the Salafi community. The Merauke case, however, shows how crossover can occur in the presence of a strong leader.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/564dae5140eda8a9a9682eeb34e7726a.pdf>

84. *Extremist Charities and Terrorist Fund-Raising in Indonesia*, Report No.76, 30 March 2022

Charities have emerged as an important source of funds for violent extremist organisations in Indonesia over the past two decades. The report documents how funds raised through humanitarian appeals, both from committed supporters as well as the unsuspecting public, defray organisational expenses, finance terrorist operations and support arrested members and their families. The Indonesian government has made major progress in stemming the flow of funds to terror groups since the adoption of a comprehensive anti-terrorist financing law in 2013. But more needs to be done to monitor charitable organisations suspected of terrorist links.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/9532b0bf29e52143445ad164f101bcec.pdf>

85. *Escalating Armed Conflict and a New Security Approach in Papua*, Report No.77, 13 July 2022
 Since 2018, attacks by the West Papua National Liberation Army (Tentara Nasional Pembebasan Papua Barat, TPNPB) have become more frequent and deadlier, and its activity in the central highlands has expanded to regions that had seen little insurgent violence in the past. More and more civilians are becoming victims of violence by both sides. The report looks at how and why the conflict has intensified and why the government's much-touted "softer" security approach has made little difference.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/bee931a2f167212f094a76778c93c4ab.pdf>
86. *Social Conflict in Indonesia During the Covid-19 Pandemic*, Report No.78, 24 October 2022
 The report tracks the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on social conflict in Indonesia and offers recommendations for mitigating the risk of social unrest in view of a widely anticipated economic downturn. Indonesia avoided large-scale social unrest, thanks in part to efficient distribution of economic assistance to low-income groups. But growing economic hardship was associated with a surge in vigilantism, youth brawls and clashes between members of mass organisations over control of resources in the informal sector.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/1cd9ef6b66e40fd1bd8bc755a72eb203.pdf>
87. *Jemaah Islamiyah's Military Training Programs*, Report No.79, 2 November 2022
 The capacity of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to rebuild after a punishing police crackdown may depend on its ability to protect the members it regards as its greatest assets: the dozens of young men trained in Syria since 2012. These men constitute the next generation of JI leadership, since they now possess the two qualities most valued by the organization: religious knowledge and military experience. If JI cannot protect them from arrest, its continued existence could be at stake. The report examines JI's efforts to recruit and train a new generation and looks at what we know about those who went abroad, those who returned home and those who have been arrested.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/849324a19b49112a8004848308f55c36.pdf>
88. *Decline in Violence by the Abu Sayyaf Group and Ongoing Risks*, Report No.80, 23 December 2022
 Extremist violence in Basilan and Sulu, strongholds of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines, has decreased substantially since the 2017 Marawi siege. In the past, various ASG factions, driven by a desire for status, income, and revenge, have shown a remarkable ability for regeneration after military crackdowns. This time, ASG members may have changed their calculus in light of a 2017 shift in military strategy that has focused more on incentives for surrender and reintegration of ASG fighters than on combat alone.
<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/793455f9bd1c811b97a3fc1d03c26d6b.pdf>
89. *Failure after Failure: Understanding one Indonesian Extremist's Recidivism,*" Report No.81 [restricted circulation], 9 January 2023
 A detailed background Agus Muslim, the suicide bomber who attacked a police station in Astana Anyar, Bandung, on 7 December 2022.
90. *The Search for an Islamic State in Indonesia: The Many Guises of DI/Nil*, Report No.82, 20 January 2023

As the influence of ISIS wanes, one of Indonesia's oldest extremist networks is coming back in focus. Darul Islam, a movement that proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) in 1949 has produced generations of violent splinter groups, one of which was linked to a suicide attack on a police station in Bandung in December 2022. The challenge for the government is how handle a network with tens of thousands of members, only a tiny fraction of whom will commit criminal acts. Its ideology, however, promotes jihad as the means to achieve a state governed by Islamic law. <https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/73a25ae38d45ea4619ec506040b11506.pdf>

91. *The Consequences of Renouncing Extremism for Indonesian Women Prisoners*, Report No.83, 2 February 2023

The key to accessing deradicalisation and post-release programs for extremist prisoners often rests on their renouncing violence and signing a declaration of loyalty to the Indonesian republic. Both women and men can face social ostracism from their old networks by taking this step, but the women prisoners can face particularly stressful consequences, including summary divorce by angry husbands. Authorities need to provide the women with the tools and support that can help them face these circumstances.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/e309e305470abdfea89ebbd1b863c9b3.pdf>

92. *Indonesia's Villa Mutiara Network: Challenges Posed By One Extremist Family*, Report No.84, 27 February 2023

One extended multi-generational family committed to violent extremism can pose major challenges for law enforcement. An Indonesian network in Makassar, South Sulawesi demonstrates how such a family can facilitate the process of radicalization, increase the vulnerability of children to recruitment, and complicate detention and post-release monitoring issues. In this case, the family network extends beyond Indonesia to the southern Philippines and Syria.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/29f090fe19b89cbdf7d5038a1f50518a.pdf>

93. *Retribution vs Rehabilitation: The Treatment of the Bali Bombers*, Report No.85, 29 May 2023.

The question of whether a new Indonesian president should convert the life-without-parole sentences of four Bali bombers to fixed terms reflects a global debate about retributive vs. restorative justice. For many, the heinousness of the 2002 Bali bombings that killed more than 200 people means that they should be given their "just deserts" and kept in prison until they die. For others, they should be given the opportunity to return to society if they are seen to pose a negligible risk to others and if their post-release activities can be designed to benefit the communities they harmed. All have been in prison for more than 20 years, a length of time that many countries consider tantamount to life.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/08bd4c329c9198ea375d3f7bfb71e916.pdf>

94. *Militants in Poso: Down But Not Out*, Report No.86, 27 June 2023

The report examines the status of violent extremism in an area that in 2000-2001 was the site of deadly communal conflict between Christians and Muslims and a stronghold of Islamist extremists thereafter. The Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT), founded in 2012, became the only territorially-based Islamist insurgency in Indonesia and one of the first

groups there to declare allegiance to ISIS. While most MIT fighters had been killed or arrested by 2023, several sources of potential extremist activity remained, including communal segregation, local alienation over security policies, and corruption in deradicalisation programs.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/a50d83c4f6838767106103f4f94e044a.pdf>

95. *Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia after Jokowi*, Report No.87, 16 July 2023

The report traces the ways that civilian oversight mechanisms of the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) and Ministry of Defence have declined since Jokowi took office in 2014. Jokowi did not deliberately set out to make the military more powerful, but his political interests coincided with the TNI's institutional aims – and with the personal political ambitions of his Defence Minister, Prabowo Subianto. IPAC explores the consequences of Jokowi's lack of interest in keeping the military in check and what the consequences could be if Prabowo, now a candidate for president, is elected in 2024.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/0fcbb118a3da12db27a600506bda588b.pdf>

96. *Violence in the Southern Philippines in the Lead-up to Local Elections*, Report No.88, 14 September 2023.

Political violence is likely to worsen, particularly in central Mindanao, as village elections, scheduled for late October 2023 in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), draw closer. These elections will put in place the get-out-the-vote machinery for the much more important vote in 2025, when voters for the first time will choose members of the BARMM parliament. Everything points to the traditional clans of Mindanao and the island provinces of Sulu, Basilan and Tawi-Tawi further entrenching themselves in 2025, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) losing control of the region it helped set up.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-88-Violence-in-the-Southern-Philippines-in-the-Lead-Up-to-Local-Election-18092023.pdf.pdf>

97. *Indonesian Islamists in the Lead-Up to the 2024 Elections*, Report No.89, 20 October 2023

Indonesian Islamists are unlikely to have any significant impact on the 2024 general elections or engage in violent protests if their candidates of choice are defeated. The Jokowi government has successfully marginalised the leading Islamist groups, and no candidate for president is likely to rely on their support for partisan advantage, even with the Gaza war as a backdrop.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-89-Indonesian-Islamists-in-the-Lead-Up-to-the-2024-Elections-20-10-2023.pdf.pdf>

98. *Ex-Militants in the Nickel Mining Industry in Central Sulawesi*, Report No.90, 31 January 2024

The employment of dozens of former extremist prisoners and ex-combatants from Poso in the booming nickel mining industry in Morowali, Central Sulawesi could pose a risk if social conflict erupts in the area and the former militants are pressured to take sides. The best guarantee against re-radicalisation is for the companies operating in the Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park (IMIP) to guard against rising tensions by promoting cross-ethnic activities, improving health and safety conditions, guaranteeing pay equity, and not suppressing worker complaints.

https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-90-Ex-Militants-in-the-Nickel-Industry-in-Central-Sulawesi_31-01-2024.pdf.pdf

99. *Managing Conflict in Papua: Suggestions for a New President*, Report No.91, 6 February 2024

The incoming president of Indonesia needs to learn from local initiatives in Papua if he wants to reduce the high level of deaths and displacement. After ten years, President Jokowi has left a pro-independence insurgency, the West Papua National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional – Papua Barat, TPNPB) that is better armed, resourced, and coordinated than it was when he took office. The report examines why various Papua initiatives attempted by post-Soeharto presidents have failed, in part because all have been marked by an effort to treat Papua as an undifferentiated whole, without in-depth knowledge of local actors and dynamics.

https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-91-Managing-Conflict-in-Papua-Suggestions-for-a-New-President_06-02-2024.pdf.pdf

100. *An Indonesian Deradicalisation Program that Works*, Report No.92, 27 February 2024

Charts the history of deradicalisation initiatives in Indonesia and examines one particularly successful program undertaken by IDENSOS, a unit of Indonesian Police Special Detachment 88. The keys to the success are careful targeting and sustained personal attention to the prisoner and his or her family, including helping them find jobs or income after release. The program depends on an incentive structure and on the involvement of respected prisoners who are seen as credible by other inmates.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-92-An-Indonesian-Deradicalisation-Program-that-Works-rev.pdf.pdf>

101. *Philippines: Political Jockeying and Violence before the 2025 Elections in BARMM*, Report No.93, 3 April 2024

The report analyses the different power blocs that will determine the outcome of the 2025 elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The elections, for an 80-seat parliament, will be the culmination of the peace process between the government and the MILF. The report explores the mechanics of the elections, the battle to control economic resources, the way in which traditional politicians have moved into king-maker roles, the implications of victory or defeat for the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and some of the contentious issues that are raising hackles.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-93-Philippines-Political-Jockeying-and-violence-before-the-2025-elections-in-BARMM.pdf.pdf>

102. *Keeping “Extremist” Pesantrens in Sight, Report No.94 [restricted circulation]*, 17 May 2024

Examines the role that a small number of Islamic boarding schools have played in the past in regenerating violent movements.

103. *Indonesians with al-Qaeda in Yemen*, Report No.95, 27 June 2024

Examines several 2024 trials of Indonesian extremists who sought training with AQAP from between 2013 and 2015. Their aim was to acquire military training for a vague future use, not for planning terrorist attacks at home. The attraction of Yemen was in part the belief at the time that the Sunni AQAP would ultimately prevail over both Shi’a Houthi and Western-backed leaders. The men tried were linked to the organisations Jamaah Ansharul Tauhid

(JAT), founded by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2008, and Jamaah Ansharul Syariah (JAS), a splinter that broke away from JAT after Ba'asyir swore loyalty to ISIS in 2014.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-95-Indonesians-with-Al-Qaeda-in-Yemen.pdf>

104. *Is This the End of Jemaah Islamiyah? (Updated)*, Report No.96, 4 July 2024

On 30 June 2024, sixteen senior leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) gathered in Bogor and issued a statement dissolving the organisation. Some 130 JI members from across Indonesia were in the audience. The leaders affirmed their commitment to the Indonesian republic, their intention to abide by Indonesian law and their decision to ensure that the curriculum and teaching materials in JI-affiliated boarding schools (pesantren) were in line with orthodox Islam. This quick IPAC analysis within days of the declaration analysed possible motivations and suggested that the decision to disband was genuine and the result of long deliberation.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-96-Is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah-updated.pdf>

105. *Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections*, Report No.97, 8 August 2024

The report, the third in a series on the 2025 parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), looks at increasing violence as two large parties and many small ones compete to win seats in the Bangsamoro parliament and secure the all-important position of Chief Minister. The main contest will be the MILF's United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) and an alliance of traditional clan leaders known as the Bangsamoro Grand Coalition (BGC). The report examines the electoral strength of the parties that have registered to take part, the alliances being formed, the internal rifts, and the ethnic and regional issues involved. It also examines the political interests of key actors in Manila and how these could affect the outcome. The main recommendation is that President Marcos and his advisers should stay neutral, as some in the president's inner circle are suggesting that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) needs another three years in power – one more election cycle -- to consolidate the peace.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-97-Philippines-Avoiding-a-Zero-Sum-Game-in-the-2025-BARMM-Elections-pdt.pdf>

106. *Potential Fraud and Violence in Papua's Approaching Elections*, Report No.98, 15 November 2024

Indonesia's easternmost region was carved up into six provinces in 2022, and four of them will be choosing local executives for the first time in November 2024. Local elections in Papua always face difficulties with logistics, corruption, lack of witnesses, ethnic rivalries, and in some cases, disruption by insurgents. Contrary to popular belief, however, the biggest problem in these elections is not going to come from the insurgents or the military but rather from individuals trying to rig the vote to get more spoils for themselves and their backers, including from Jakarta. The report focuses on races for governor in Papua, Central Papua and Highland Papua provinces.

<https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/2024-11-14Final-FrmtPotential-Fraud-and-Violence-in-Papuas-Approaching-Elections-eng.pdf>

107. *Planned Repatriation of Indonesian Nationals from Syria, [restricted circulation]*, Report No.99, 20 November 2024. Restricted at the request of families of those to be repatriated until their relatives are safely home.

108. *Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending “Noken”*, Report No.100, 28 January 2025. The November 2024 regional executive elections in Papua, Highland Papua, and Central Papua were marred by violence and allegations of fraud, with the *noken* system of proxy voting at the heart of the controversy. The report rejects the Indonesian government’s conclusion that the problem can be solved by ending direct elections and suggests instead that more resources be poured into cleaning up voter rolls, allocating more resources for voter education and poll monitoring, ensuring better election supervision and punishing fraud.
<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report-100-Indonesia-Election-Credibility-in-Papua-Requires-Ending-Noken>
109. *Philippines: The Impact of Sulu’s Exclusion from BARMM*, Report No. 101, 17 February 2025
Sulu’s exclusion from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) via a Supreme Court ruling serves the interests of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the short term and no one in the long term. The decision reinforces the power of traditional clans and marginalises the ethnic Tausug component of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an outcome that could have serious security consequences.
<https://understandingconflict.org/en/publications/IPAC-report-101-Philippines-The-Impact-of-Sulus-Exclusion-from-BARMM>
110. *The Danger of Middle-Aged Recidivists*, Report No.102, 20 February 2025
The recidivism of three extremists in their fifties suggests that the risk of a resurgence of violent extremism in Indonesia will depend less on what happens in Syria or Afghanistan, though both bear close watching, but rather how well government authorities can manage the multi-generational homegrown groups that have never wavered in their desire for an Islamic state, to be achieved, if necessary, by force.

INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist, and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website is www.understandingconflict.org.
